REFORMING THE UNITED NATIONS
FOR A NEW GLOBAL AGENDA

NOTE

This Position Paper was prepared by the Socialist International High-level Group on United Nations Reform created by the SI Congress of São Paulo in 2003. Its first draft (2005.01.24) was launched in a consultation process leading to this second version for formal discussion and adoption by Socialist International bodies, to take place in May 2005.

This Position Paper builds on the broader debate concerning United Nations reform which is underway, based on a vast and rich literature, as well as the recent reports of the UN Secretary-General, *In Larger Freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all*, UN, 2005, and of the High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, *A more secure world: Our shared responsibility*, UN, 2004, to be discussed by the Leaders’ Summit in September 2005, in New York. That is why we have made the choice of quoting directly these main documents in order to make more explicit the additions and amendments proposed by the Socialist International.
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Introductory Remark

The Congress of the Socialist International in Sao Paulo adopted the document "Governance in a Global Society" as the basis for its work on global policy issues. The SI agreed, as proposed by its President, to specify and update its proposals on the issues of the reform of the United Nations, the reform of the International Financial Institutions and trade and social rights. High Level Working Groups and experts from SI member parties prepared these proposals. The SI is presenting them to the global public as its contributions to the debate taking place in the year 2005, especially in view of the United Nations Leaders Summit in September and the General Assembly. The SI will consider and evaluate the results of these events and further develop its positions and proposals for the global agenda.

1. A NEW SENSE OF URGENCY TO REFORM THE UN AND THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC RESPONSIBILITY

The reform of the United Nations system is regaining a strong sense of urgency. The recent report of the UN High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change (UN-HLPTCC), as well as many other contributions have provided the basis for the Secretary-General's Report in May 2005 which will be discussed by the world leaders in a special summit to take place in New York in September 2005. As stated in this position paper, the Socialist International supports the main recommendations of this Report but, recognising its limits, intends to go beyond it by defining some other objectives and main actions.

Recent security and environmental issues are putting a new spotlight on UN reform, but they should not overshadow the other relevant issues of sustainable development, social justice and democracy. By the same token, the debate on this reform should not be confined to the reform of the Security Council. What is at stake is to launch a reform process of the general UN system with a view to fostering a new global agenda and building a new world order based on multilateralism, the rule of law, peace and more social justice.

This reform process of the UN system should tackle both problems of effectiveness and of legitimacy, transparency and accountability in the various policy areas. It is also important to distinguish between pragmatic reform steps, which can be taken in the short term if there is political will and a broader need to redesign the UN system architecture – which might require some amendments to the UN Charter. We should be ambitious on both fronts in order to create a strong and lasting political momentum.

Bearing in mind these two objectives of the UN reform process, the way forward is to develop new political instruments to mobilise more actors at international, regional, national and local levels in order to change the power relationships and forge real and meaningful reforms. New global alliances are needed to strike a new Global Deal and to set a new global agenda underway. This new Global Deal should involve both developed and developing countries in order to fight poverty and disease, to spread sustainable development and to make globalisation work for all.

Social democrats, being active in all these bodies and levels worldwide, are in a unique position to play a leading role in building these new global alliances. In order to cope with this responsibility and renewing with their already long traditions of initiatives in this field, the Socialist International has prepared this Position Paper, following a consultation of our partners all over the world.
After an introduction presenting the general approach, this Position Paper deals with:

- The means to improve the effectiveness of UN bodies (Chapter 2);
- The way to strengthen the legitimacy and to rebalance the architecture of the UN system (Chapter 3);
- The means to develop democratic global governance (Chapter 4);
- And the ways to develop a reform process (Chapter 5).

1.1. The present challenges and the objectives of the UN system

1.1.1. Security and development and a broader approach to security issues

The Socialist International agrees that the new threats against security should be recognised, clearly identified and addressed with the appropriate means. Nevertheless it is also important to acknowledge that these security threats, which should be condemned in themselves, are intertwined with other problems concerning development, democracy and good governance. This calls both for a more comprehensive approach on security issues and for a broader agenda on global issues.

1.1.2. The objectives of the UN system

The reforms need to establish international institutions based on a system of values and provided with the necessary mechanisms to implement new policies in view of the following main objectives:

- global democracy with respect for and promotion of an ethical framework based on human rights;
- peace and security based on justice and freedom;
- sustainable human development that takes diversity into account;
- global justice to ensure that these objectives are achieved throughout the world.

1.2. In search of a new model of global governance

1.2.1. The gaps of this model of global governance

The original role of the UN should be strengthened in agenda setting, as well as norms definition regarding social and economic development, peacebuilding, security, justice and the promotion of human rights, addressing a wide range of chronic emergent problems. The failure of global governance institutions to avert the Iraqi crisis provides further proof of this critical need. Reform proposals seek to ensure that the legitimacy of the United Nations is recognised with respect to the coordination of global policies and the enforcement of collective decisions.

The search for a different model of global governance is of critical importance, because the current model lacks effectiveness, legitimacy, transparency and accountability.
1.2.2. A new model of global governance

The recent Reports of the HLPTCC and of the UN Secretary General provide a relevant list of reform proposals to be considered. Still, a more fundamental approach is needed about the very architecture of the governance model.

Key documents recently adopted by the Socialist International and the PES bodies are already identifying some main features of a new model of global governance. Governance which will meet the challenges of globalisation must be good, that is, effective, democratic and subject to the rule of law, at the state level as well as on the global, regional, sub-regional and local level. A new global order is at stake. A neo-conservative agenda has been deployed to make it a unilateral and unipolar order. The Socialist International needs to build global alliances to make it a multilateral, multipolar and multilevel order capable of improving relations of partnership among the various stakeholders. It calls for multilateral institutions to be strengthened and to increase international cooperation.

1.2.3. Redesigning the architecture of the UN system

The architecture of the UN system should also be redesigned in line with this new model of global governance. A renewed United Nations ought to be based on two global governance councils at the top of the UN system, each attempting to reflect both the requirements of legitimacy and effectiveness:

- On the one hand, there would be the renewed UN Security Council (UNSC), responsible for political and security affairs, and
- On the other, an Economic, Social and Environmental Security Council (UNESEC), or a UN Council for Sustainable Development, would provide global governance for economic and social affairs, including trade and the environment.

The Councils could periodically meet together, create joint sub-committees and working groups on matters concerning both security and economic issues. Having two councils rather than one has some definite advantages. Firstly, the UNESEC could be created free of some of the existing constraints that make it so difficult to reform the Security Council. Secondly, it could be based on qualified majority voting. Thirdly, Europe could, from the start, agree to have a joint seat. Fourthly, military capability, which is an unavoidable weighting factor for countries in the Security Council, does not need to be a factor for UNESEC, opening the door for stronger representation and voting power of large developing countries in the economic and social domain (See Dervis, 2005, Chapter 3, for a more detailed presentation).

Furthermore, we also support a redefined structure establishing a UN Human Rights Council, as proposed by the recent UN Secretary-General’s report, In Larger Freedom.
2. IMPROVING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE UN BODIES

There is much scope to improve the effectiveness of global governance if we take into account the broader range of global challenges and threats, as well as the broader range of international institutions.

2.1. Security Council

It is also useful to recall a comprehensive approach on security:

“The concept of global security must be broadened from the traditional focus on the security of states to include the security of people and the security of the planet. The following six concepts should be embedded in international agreements and used as norms for security policies in the new era:

- All people, no less than all states, have a right to a secure existence, and all states have an obligation to protect those rights.
- The primary goals of global security policy should be to prevent conflict and war and to maintain the integrity of the environment and life-support systems of the planet by eliminating the economic, social, environmental, political and military conditions that generate threats to the security of people and the planet, and by anticipating and managing crises before they escalate into armed conflicts.
- Military force is not a legitimate political instrument, except in self-defence or under UN auspices.
- The development of military capabilities beyond that required for national defence and support of UN action is a potential threat to the security of people.
- Weapons of mass destruction are not legitimate instruments of national defence.
- The production and trade in arms should be controlled by the international community.”


2.1.1. Common definition of threats

A common definition of threats should be agreed upon:

“78. The threats to peace and security in the twenty-first century include not just international war and conflict but civil violence, organised crime, terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. They also include poverty, deadly infectious disease and environmental degradation since these can have equally catastrophic consequences. All of these threats can cause death or lessen life chances on a large scale. All of them can undermine States as the basic unit of the international system.

79. Depending on wealth, geography and power, we perceive different threats as the most pressing. But the truth is we cannot afford to choose. Collective security today depends on accepting that the threats which each region of the world perceives as most urgent are in fact equally so for all.

80. In our globalised world, the threats we face are interconnected. The rich are vulnerable to the threats that attack the poor and the strong are vulnerable to the weak, as well as vice versa. A nuclear terrorist attack on the United States or Europe would have devastating effects on the whole world. But so would the appearance of a new virulent pandemic disease in a poor country with no effective health-care system.

81. On this interconnectedness of threats we must found a new security consensus, the first article of which must be that all are entitled to freedom from fear, and that whatever threatens one threatens all. Once we understand this, we have no choice but to tackle the whole range of threats. We must respond to HIV/AIDS as robustly as we do to terrorism and to poverty as effectively as we do to proliferation. We must strive just as hard to eliminate the threat of small arms and light weapons as we do to eliminate the threat of weapons of mass destruction.
Moreover, we must address all these threats preventively, acting at a sufficiently early stage with the full range of available instruments.

In: In larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all, Report of the Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, United Nations, 2005, pp.24-26

For the Socialist International, a common definition of threats should also include:

- natural disasters requiring stronger international coordination for prevention and reaction;
- threats to space security from the development of space-based weapons and weaponisation of space, in violation of the wording and spirit of the Outer Space Treaty which proposes the exploration and use of Outer Space for peaceful purposes only.

2.1.2. Nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological weapons

The means to control the proliferation of nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological weapons should be strongly enhanced and enforced:

“97. Multilateral efforts to bridle the dangers of nuclear technology while harnessing its promise are nearly as old as the United Nations itself. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 35 years old this month, has proved indispensable: it has not only diminished nuclear peril but has also demonstrated the value of multilateral agreements in safeguarding international peace and security. But today, the Treaty has suffered the first withdrawal of a party to the Treaty and faces a crisis of confidence and compliance born of a growing strain on verification and enforcement. The Conference on Disarmament, for its part, faces a crisis of relevance resulting in part from dysfunctional decision-making procedures and the paralysis that accompanies them.

98. Progress in both disarmament and non-proliferation is essential and neither should be held hostage to the other. Recent moves towards disarmament by the nuclear weapon States should be recognised. Bilateral agreements, including the 2002 Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty signed by the United States and the Russian Federation, have led to the dismantlement of thousands of nuclear weapons, accompanied by commitments to further sharp reductions in stockpiles. However, the unique status of nuclear-weapon States also entails a unique responsibility, and they must do more, including but not limited to further reductions in their arsenals of non-strategic nuclear weapons and pursuing arms control agreements that entail not just dismantlement but irreversibility. They should also reaffirm their commitment to negative security assurances. Swift negotiation of a fissile material cut-off treaty is essential. The moratorium on nuclear test explosions must also be upheld until we can achieve the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty. I strongly encourage States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to endorse these measures at the 2005 Review Conference.

99. The spread of nuclear technology has exacerbated a long-standing tension within the nuclear regime, arising from the simple fact that the technology required for civilian nuclear fuel can also be used to develop nuclear weapons. Measures to mitigate this tension must confront the dangers of nuclear proliferation but must also take into account the important environmental, energy, economic and research applications of nuclear technology. First, the verification authority of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) must be strengthened through universal adoption of the Model Additional Protocol. Second, while the access of non-nuclear weapon States to the benefits of nuclear technology should not be curtailed, we should focus on creating incentives for States to voluntarily forego the development of domestic uranium enrichment and plutonium separation capacities, while guaranteeing their supply of the fuel necessary to develop peaceful
uses. One option is an arrangement in which IAEA would act as a guarantor for the supply of fissile material to civilian nuclear users at market rates.”

“102. Where progress has been made, it should be consolidated. The 1997 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction13 calls for the complete elimination and destruction of chemical weapons by all States parties, thus offering a historic opportunity to complete a task begun more than a century ago. States parties to the Convention on Chemical Weapons should recommit themselves to achieving the scheduled destruction of declared chemical weapons stockpiles. I call upon all States to accede immediately to the Convention.

103. The 1975 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction14 has enjoyed a remarkable degree of support and adherence, and has been strengthened further through recent annual meetings. States parties should consolidate the results of these meetings at the 2006 Review Conference and commit themselves to further measures to strengthen the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. I also call upon all States to accede immediately to the Convention and to increase the transparency of bio-defence programmes.”


2.1.3. Defining Terrorism

The issue of terrorism should be envisaged according to the following principles, building on the recent experiences and debates:

“88. Our strategy against terrorism must be comprehensive and should be based on five pillars: it must aim at dissuading people from resorting to terrorism or supporting it; it must deny terrorists access to funds and materials; it must deter States from sponsoring terrorism; it must develop State capacity to defeat terrorism; and it must defend human rights. I urge Member States and civil society organisations everywhere to join in that strategy.

89. Several steps are urgently required, as described below.

90. We must convince all those who may be tempted to support terrorism that it is neither an acceptable nor an effective way to advance their cause. But the moral authority of the United Nations and its strength in condemning terrorism have been hampered by the inability of Member States to agree on a comprehensive convention that includes a definition. We must set aside debates on so-called “State terrorism”. The use of force by States is already thoroughly regulated under international law. And the right to resist occupation must be understood in its true meaning. It cannot include the right to deliberately kill or maim civilians. I endorse fully the High-level Panel’s call for a definition of terrorism, which would make it clear that, in addition to actions already proscribed by existing conventions, any action constitutes terrorism if it is intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or non-combatants with the purpose of intimidating a population or compelling a Government or an international organization to do or abstain from doing any act. I believe this proposal has clear moral force, and I strongly urge world leaders to unite behind it and to conclude a comprehensive convention on terrorism before the end of the sixtieth session of the General Assembly.

92. It is vital that we deny terrorists access to nuclear materials. This means consolidating, securing and, when possible, eliminating hazardous materials and implementing effective export controls. While the Group of Eight Major Industrialised Countries (G8) and the Security Council have taken important steps to do this, we need to make sure that these measures are fully enforced and that they reinforce each other. I urge Member States to complete, without delay, an international convention for the suppression of acts of nuclear terrorism.

94. Terrorists are accountable to no one. We, on the other hand, must never lose sight of our accountability to citizens all around the world. In our struggle against terrorism, we must never
compromise human rights. When we do so we facilitate achievement of one of the terrorist’s objectives. By ceding the moral high ground we provoke tension, hatred and mistrust of Governments among precisely those parts of the population where terrorists find recruits. I urge Member States to create a special rapporteur who would report to the Commission on Human Rights on the compatibility of counter-terrorism measures with international human rights laws.”


2.1.4. Criteria for the use of military force

The following recommendations should be considered for a clear definition of the criteria to use military force:

“122. Finally, an essential part of the consensus we seek must be agreement on when and how force can be used to defend international peace and security. In recent years, this issue has deeply divided Member States. They have disagreed about whether States have the right to use military force pre-emptively, to defend themselves against imminent threats; whether they have the right to use it preventively to defend themselves against latent or non-imminent threats; and whether they have the right - or perhaps the obligation - to use it protectively to rescue the citizens of other States from genocide or comparable crimes.

123. Agreement must be reached on these questions if the United Nations is to be - as it was intended to be - a forum for resolving differences rather than a mere stage for acting them out. And yet I believe the Charter of our Organisation, as it stands, offers a good basis for the understanding that we need.

124. Imminent threats are fully covered by Article 51, which safeguards the inherent right of sovereign States to defend themselves against armed attack. Lawyers have long recognised that this covers an imminent attack as well as one that has already happened.

125. Where threats are not imminent but latent, the Charter gives full authority to the Security Council to use military force, including preventively, to preserve international peace and security. As to genocide, ethnic cleansing and other such crimes against humanity, are they not also threats to international peace and security, against which humanity should be able to look to the Security Council for protection?

126. The task is not to find alternatives to the Security Council as a source of authority but to make it work better. When considering whether to authorise or endorse the use of military force, the Council should come to a common view on how to weigh the seriousness of the threat; the proper purpose of the proposed military action; whether means short of the use of force might plausibly succeed in stopping the threat; whether the military option is proportional to the threat at hand; and whether there is a reasonable chance of success. By undertaking to make the case for military action in this way, the Council would add transparency to its deliberations and make its decisions more likely to be respected by both Governments and world public opinion. I therefore recommend that the Security Council adopt a resolution setting out these principles and expressing its intention to be guided by them when deciding whether to authorise or mandate the use of force.”

In: In larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all, Report of the Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, United Nations, 2005, p.33

2.1.5. Peacekeeping and peace enforcement

“111. Over the decades, the United Nations has done a great deal to stabilise zones of conflict, and in the last 15 years or so also to help countries emerge from conflict, by deploying peacekeeping forces. Since the issuance of the report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, which led to important reforms in the management of our peacekeeping operations, the renewed confidence of Member States in United Nations peacekeeping has led to a surge in demand, with the result that the United Nations now has more missions on the ground than ever before. The majority of these are in Africa, where - I regret to say -
developed countries are increasingly reluctant to contribute troops. As a result, our capacity is severely stretched.

I appeal to Member States to do more to ensure that the United Nations has effective capacities for peacekeeping, commensurate with the demands that they place upon it. In particular, I urge them to improve our deployment options by creating strategic reserves that can be deployed rapidly, within the framework of United Nations arrangements. United Nations capacity should not be developed in competition with the admirable efforts now being made by many regional organisations but in cooperation with them. Decisions by the European Union to create standby battle groups, for instance, and by the African Union to create African reserve capacities, are a very valuable complement to our own efforts. Indeed, I believe the time is now ripe for a decisive move forward: the establishment of an interlocking system of peacekeeping capacities that will enable the United Nations to work with relevant regional organisations in predictable and reliable partnerships.”

In: In larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all, Report of the Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, United Nations, 2005, pp. 30-31

New measures to improve peacekeeping should contain clear and enforceable provisions on jurisdiction over peacekeeping forces. Furthermore, recent allegations of abuses by UN peacekeepers have shown a clear lack of such provisions and thus compromised peacekeeping missions. The UN should therefore be given adequate powers to ensure prosecution of offenders either by special institutions or by clear commitments by countries providing peacekeepers to prosecute back home.

2.1.6. The responsibility to protect

The responsibility to protect is an emerging norm which requires further elaboration.

“135. The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty and more recently the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, with its 16 members from all around the world, endorsed what they described as an “emerging norm that there is a collective responsibility to protect” (see A/59/565, para. 203). While I am well aware of the sensitivities involved in this issue, I strongly agree with this approach. I believe that we must embrace the responsibility to protect, and, when necessary, we must act on it. This responsibility lies, first and foremost, with each individual State, whose primary raison d’être and duty is to protect its population. But if national authorities are unable or unwilling to protect their citizens, then the responsibility shifts to the international community to use diplomatic, humanitarian and other methods to help protect the human rights and well-being of civilian populations. When such methods appear insufficient, the Security Council may out of necessity decide to take action under the Charter of the United Nations, including enforcement action, if so required. In this case, as in others, it should follow the principles set out in section III above. 136. Support for the rule of law must be strengthened by universal participation in multilateral conventions. At present, many States remain outside the multilateral conventional framework, in some cases preventing important conventions from entering into force. Five years ago, I provided special facilities for States to sign or ratify treaties of which I am the Depositary. This proved a major success and treaty events have been held annually ever since. This year’s event will focus on 31 multilateral treaties to help us respond to global challenges, with emphasis on human rights, refugees, terrorism, organised crime and the law of the sea. I urge leaders especially to ratify and implement all treaties relating to the protection of civilians.”

In: In larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all, Report of the Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, United Nations, 2005, pp. 35-36

The responsibility to protect should be envisaged as a broad concept which should involve prevention of the conflicts in the first place. Even concerning reaction, different political and economic means should be considered before military action. Nevertheless, in case of unavoidable military action, several criteria should be pre-defined.
If we want to elaborate on the criteria restricting the use of force for humanitarian purposes, the six criteria given by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) are the following (as stated in a speech by Gareth Evans):

“These six criteria – a threshold test of seriousness, four prudential criteria and a legal test - were essentially those agreed by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty published its report ‘The Responsibility to Protect’, setting out these principles, in December 2001.

(1) Just Cause: is the harm being experienced or threatened sufficiently clear and serious to justify going to war? For external threats to others, as with self defence, everything depends on the quality of the evidence. Actual behaviour is one thing, merely threatened behaviour is something else: to establish a threat, plausible evidence of both capability and intent to cause harm is required.

For internal threats, the threshold criteria to justify coercive intervention need to be tough. Unless the bar is set very high and tight, excluding less than catastrophic forms of human rights abuse, prima facie cases for the use of military force could be made across half the world: the only rule book would be the whim of the potential enforcer, and any prospect of mobilising consensus for international action in the cases most deserving it – e.g. another Rwanda – would fly out the window.

The ‘just cause’ for intervention in these internal cases should be narrowly confined to two kinds of situation: large scale loss of life, actual or apprehended, with genocidal intent or not, which is the product either of deliberate state action, or state neglect or inability to act, or a failed state situation; or large scale ‘ethnic cleansing’, actual or apprehended, whether carried out by killing, forced expulsion, acts of terror or rape.

(2) Right Intention: is the primary purpose of the proposed military action to halt or avert the external or internal threat in question, even if there are some other motives in play as well?

(3) Last Resort: has every non-military option for the prevention or peaceful resolution of the crisis been explored, with reasonable grounds for believing lesser measures will not succeed?

(4) Proportional Means: is the scale, duration and intensity of the planned military action the minimum necessary to secure the defined human protection objective? In the case of Iraq, the question has to be asked whether some 5,000 civilian deaths and 10,000 military deaths – assuming that those guesstimates are at least roughly accurate – were an appropriate trade, from an Iraqi perspective, for the end of Saddam Hussein’s capacity to persecute his people

(5) Reasonable Prospects: is there a reasonable chance of the military action being successful in meeting the external or internal threat in question, with the consequences of action not likely to be worse than the consequences of inaction? Military action can only be justified if it stands a reasonable chance of success, and will not risk triggering a greater conflagration or a greater peril.

(6) Right Authority: is the military action lawful? As international law now stands, if the Security Council says no that means no. But should the absence of Security Council endorsement be the end of the intervention story? Is legality the whole story or, as many have argued, are there not wider questions of legitimacy as well? What if the Security Council fails to approve military action in another Rwanda-type, utterly conscience-shocking situation that just about everyone else thinks cries out for action? A real question arises as to which of two evils is the worse: the damage to international order if the Security Council is bypassed, or in the damage to that order if human beings are slaughtered while the Security Council stands by.” This is an issue which underlines that the Security Council should not be blocked as easily as in the past.
2.1.7. Peacebuilding

A much stronger institutional framework should support the peacebuilding initiatives.

"114. Our record of success in mediating and implementing peace agreements is sadly blemished by some devastating failures. Indeed, several of the most violent and tragic episodes of the 1990s occurred after the negotiation of peace agreements - for instance in Angola in 1993 and in Rwanda in 1994. Roughly half of all countries that emerge from war lapse back into violence within five years. These two points drive home the message: if we are going to prevent conflict we must ensure that peace agreements are implemented in a sustained and sustainable manner. Yet at this very point there is a gaping hole in the United Nations institutional machinery: no part of the United Nations system effectively addresses the challenge of helping countries with the transition from war to lasting peace. I therefore propose to Member States that they create an intergovernmental Peacebuilding Commission, as well as a Peacebuilding Support Office within the United Nations Secretariat, to achieve this end.

115. A Peacebuilding Commission could perform the following functions: in the immediate aftermath of war, improve United Nations planning for sustained recovery, focusing on early efforts to establish the necessary institutions; help to ensure predictable financing for early recovery activities, in part by providing an overview of assessed, voluntary and standing funding mechanisms; improve the coordination of the many post-conflict activities of the United Nations funds, programmes and agencies; provide a forum in which the United Nations, major bilateral donors, troop contributors, relevant regional actors and organisations, the international financial institutions and the national or transitional Government of the country concerned can share information about their respective post-conflict recovery strategies, in the interests of greater coherence; periodically review progress towards medium-term recovery goals; and extend the period of political attention to post-conflict recovery.

116. I believe that such a body would best combine efficiency with legitimacy if it were to report to the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council in sequence, depending on the phase of the conflict. Simultaneous reporting lines should be avoided because they will create duplication and confusion.

117. The Peacebuilding Commission would be most effective if its core membership comprised a sub-set of Security Council members, a similar number of Economic and Social Council members, leading troop contributors and the major donors to a standing fund for peacebuilding. In its country-specific operations, the Peacebuilding Commission should involve the national or transitional authorities, relevant regional actors and organisations, troop contributors, where applicable, and the major donors to the specific country.

118. The participation of international financial institutions is vital. I have started discussions with them to determine how best they can be involved, with due respect for their mandates and governing arrangements."


The Socialist International strongly supports the creation of this Peacebuilding Commission and underlines that its role can be more effective if it is supported by a UN Economic, Social and Environmental Security Council.

2.1.8 A Human Rights Council

"181. The Commission on Human Rights has given the international community a universal human rights framework, comprising the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, the two International Covenants and other core human rights treaties. During its annual session, the Commission draws public attention to human rights issues and debates, provides a forum for the development of United Nations human rights policy and establishes a unique system of independent and expert special procedures to observe and analyse human rights compliance by theme and by country. The Commission’s close engagement with hundreds of civil society
organisations provides an opportunity for working with civil society that does not exist elsewhere.

182. Yet the Commission’s capacity to perform its tasks has been increasingly undermined by its declining credibility and professionalism. In particular, States have sought membership of the Commission not to strengthen human rights but to protect themselves against criticism or to criticise others. As a result, a credibility deficit has developed, which casts a shadow on the reputation of the United Nations system as a whole.

183. If the United Nations is to meet the expectations of men and women everywhere - and indeed, if the Organisation is to take the cause of human rights as seriously as those of security and development - then Member States should agree to replace the Commission on Human Rights with a smaller standing Human Rights Council. Member States would need to decide if they want the Human Rights Council to be a principal organ of the United Nations or a subsidiary body of the General Assembly, but in either case its members would be elected directly by the General Assembly by a two-thirds majority of members present and voting. The creation of the Council would accord human rights a more authoritative position, corresponding to the primacy of human rights in the Charter of the United Nations. Member States should determine the composition of the Council and the term of office of its members. Those elected to the Council should undertake to abide by the highest human rights standards.”

In: In larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all, Report of the Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, United Nations, 2005, pp.44-45

2.2. ECOSOC

The Socialist International considers that the creation of a Council for Economic, Social and Environmental Security with the same political standing of the Security Council is required to provide a credible answer to the present development challenges. Nevertheless, in the meantime, some improvements can be introduced by reforming the existing ECOSOC:

“171. The Charter of the United Nations gives the Economic and Social Council a range of important functions that involve coordination, policy review and policy dialogue. Most of these seem more critical than ever in this age of globalisation, in which a comprehensive United Nations development agenda has emerged from the summits and conferences of the 1990s. More than ever, the United Nations needs to be able to develop and implement policies in this area in a coherent manner. The functions of the Council are generally thought to be uniquely relevant to these challenges, but it has not as yet done justice to them.

172. In 1945, the framers of the Charter did not give the Economic and Social Council enforcement powers. Having agreed at Bretton Woods in the previous year to create powerful international financial institutions and expecting that these would be complemented by a world trade organisation in addition to the various specialised agencies, they clearly intended that international economic decision making would be decentralised. But this only makes the Council’s potential role as coordinator, convener, forum for policy dialogue and forger of consensus the more important. It is the only organ of the United Nations explicitly mandated by the Charter to coordinate the activities of the specialised agencies and to consult with non-governmental organisations. And it has a network of functional and regional commissions operating under its aegis which are increasingly focused on the implementation of development goals.

173. The Economic and Social Council has put these assets to good use in the recent years, building bridges through an annual special high-level meeting with the trade and financial institutions, for instance, and establishing a unique Information and Communications Technology Task Force. It has also contributed to linking the issues of security and development by establishing country-specific groups.

174. These initiatives have helped to promote greater coherence and coordination among various actors, but there are still visible gaps to be addressed.

175. First, there is an increasing need to integrate, coordinate and review the implementation of the United Nations development agenda that has emerged from the world conferences and
summits. **To this end, the Economic and Social Council should hold annual ministerial-level assessments of progress towards agreed development goals, particularly the Millennium Development Goals.** These assessments could be based on peer reviews of progress reports prepared by member States, with support from United Nations agencies and the regional commissions.

176. Second, there is a need to review trends in international development cooperation, promote greater coherence among the development activities of different actors and strengthen the links between the normative and operational work of the United Nations system. **To address this gap, the Economic and Social Council should serve as a high-level development cooperation forum. Such a forum could be held biennially by transforming the high-level segment of the Council.**

177. Third, there is a need to address economic and social challenges, threats and crises as and when they occur. **To this end, the Council should convene timely meetings, as required, to assess threats to development, such as famines, epidemics and major natural disasters, and to promote coordinated responses to them.**

179. Finally, while the normative and strategy-setting role of the Economic and Social Council is clearly different from the managerial and policy-making role played by the governing bodies of the various international institutions, I would hope that, as the Council starts to assert leadership in driving a global development agenda it will be able to provide direction for the efforts of the various intergovernmental bodies in this area throughout the United Nations system.

180. Implementing all these recommendations would require the Economic and Social Council to function with a new and more flexible structure, not necessarily restricted by the current annual calendar of “segments” and “substantive session”. In addition, the Council needs an effective, efficient and representative intergovernmental mechanism for engaging its counterparts in the institutions dealing with finance and trade. This could either be achieved by expanding its Bureau or by establishing an Executive Committee with a regionally balanced composition.”

In: *In larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all*, Report of the Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, United Nations, 2005, pp.43-45

2.3. Improving the mechanisms of coordination

The Socialist International also supports the recommendations made by the UN High Level Panel and by the UN Secretary-General concerning the need for a stronger Secretariat.

2.3.1. The Secretariat

“184. A capable and effective Secretariat is indispensable to the work of the United Nations. As the needs of the Organisation have changed, so too must the Secretariat. That is why in 1997 I launched a package of structural reforms for the Secretariat and followed up with a further set of managerial and technical improvements in 2002, aimed at giving the Organisation a more focused work programme and a simpler system of planning and budgeting and enabling the Secretariat to provide better service.”

“187. Member States also have a central role to play in ensuring that the Organisation’s mandates stay current. **I therefore ask the General Assembly to review all mandates older than five years to see whether the activities concerned are still genuinely needed or whether the resources assigned to them can be reallocated in response to new and emerging challenges.**

188. Today’s United Nations staff must be: (a) aligned with the new substantive challenges of the twenty-first century; (b) empowered to manage complex global operations; and (c) held accountable. 189. First, I am taking steps to realign the Secretariat’s structure to match the priorities outlined in the present report. This will entail creating a peacebuilding support office and strengthening support both for mediation (my “good offices” function) and for democracy
and the rule of law. In addition, I intend to appoint a Scientific Adviser to the Secretary-General, who will provide strategic forward looking scientific advice on policy matters, mobilising scientific and technological expertise within the United Nations system and from the broader scientific and academic community.”

“190. Achieving real progress in new areas requires staff with the skills and experience to address new challenges. It also requires a renewed effort to secure “the highest standards of efficiency, competence and integrity”, as required by Article 101.3 of the Charter of the United Nations, while “recruiting the staff on as wide a geographical basis as possible” and, we must add today, ensuring a just balance between men and women. While existing staff must have reasonable opportunities to develop within the Organisation we cannot continue to rely on the same pool of people to address all our new needs. I therefore request the General Assembly to provide me with the authority and resources to pursue a one-time staff buyout so as to refresh and realign the staff to meet current needs.”

The Socialist International supports these new means to strengthen the role of the Secretariat and the Secretary-General. **UN officials should be selected according to their experience of solving very concrete security and development problems on the ground.** A debate is also needed on more openness and transparency in the criteria and procedures to appoint the Secretary-General.

**2.3.2. The Chief Executives Board of Coordination**

The United Nations System Chief Executives Board of Coordination (CEB) in which the Secretary-General and the executive heads of all specialised UN agencies, funds and programmes and of the World Trade Organisation are represented, can be seen as a natural mechanism for the coordination of policies to implement the Johannesburg Declaration on Sustainable Development, the Global Agenda for Employment and the Millennium Goals. However, in the light of its unsatisfactory functioning thus far the working methods of the CEB should be revised and strengthened in order to change it from a discussion forum into an active and authoritative coordinating body. This requires the willingness of the executive heads to participate fully in the CEB’s handling of global common goods and their acceptance of the role of the CEB as arbitror in case of conflicts of competences.

**2.3.3. The Funds and Programmes**

The UN Funds and Programmes should be streamlined and merged in order to avoid overlappings, increasing the efficiency and enhance the role of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).

**2.4. Bretton Woods Institutions**

The Socialist International can provide a unique vehicle to build broad international support for such governance and policy reforms aiming at greater equity and democratic participation, provided that the reform proposals can be practically implemented and that socialist and progressive governments in advanced countries show the political courage to both explain and honour their internationalist commitments.

**2.4.1. Macroeconomic policies, development and debt relief**

With renewed high-level governance that is accepted globally as more legitimate, the Bretton Woods institutions (BWIs) could and should also support policies that are more effective in promoting growth with equity and help achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).
Such policies should include the recognition that the quality of fiscal policy is as important as
the aggregate magnitudes targeted, that social and redistributive policies should form an
integral part of IMF and World Bank financed reforms and that the measurement of growth
and economic welfare should take into account environmental effects and the use of finite
natural resources.

In some of the highly indebted emerging markets, there should be long term support for
policies that reduce debt burdens, including some modest concessionality built into granting
long-term lending to countries that pursue equitable and stable growth policies. A Stability
Growth facility should be provided to allow emerging economies to grow out of the debt trap.
In the least developed countries there should be strong support for debt cancellation with
recognition that total aid levels to the poorest countries must at least double if the MDGs are
to be met. Moreover, the current criticisms of the Washington consensus also emphasise the
need to avoid a too fast liberalisation of short term capital flows when the financial institutions
are not sound enough and the need to promote trade liberalisation without damaging national
capacity building.

2.4.2. Conditionality

Reforming governance must go hand in hand with reforming important parts of the strategies
and policies supported and pursued by the various institutions. A great deal of effort has
gone into improving the policy advice and the quality of the conditionality in programmes
supported by the Bretton Woods institutions but some of the most difficult issues remain
unsolved. At the root of the problem one often finds a schizophrenic attitude towards
conditionality. One cannot be against all kinds of conditionality and, in particular, argue
against specific requests relating to economic policies while, at the same time, arguing that
the international institutions should impose tough social-political conditions on the borrowing
countries. This problem is clearly linked to the problem of legitimacy. If governance was
considered and perceived as more legitimate, conditionality would become more acceptable
(See Dervis, 2005, Chapter 4). That is why the reform of policies must be linked to the reform
of governance and vice-versa. Moreover, the conditionality criteria should also take into
account the impact of macroeconomic policies on the general conditions for development,
namely in social, environmental and technological areas.

2.4.3. Poverty reduction strategy

The Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) must be reformed so that it lives up to its
promise as a country-owned, participatory document that sets a country's individual
development path. Among the reforms needed, the PRSP must enable broad, informed, and
timely participation by civil society in the design, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation
of all components of the PRSPs. Technical assistance should be provided to civil society and
governments, including parliamentarians, to enhance participation and accountability. IDA
Directors should track the extent to which civil society views have been incorporated in
PRSPs and require countries to list the civil society recommendations and reasons for not
including them.

2.4.4. New financial resources

The Zedillo report presented to the high-level development conference held in Monterrey in
2002 documented the need to double the amount of 50 billion dollars that the international
community spends on development assistance. The Socialist International fully supports this
objective and additionally encourages governments to find innovative ways to raise
resources that can be channeled to global poverty reduction. Some of these resources can
and should be deployed to cover the costs of the provision of global public goods such as
disease control and environmental protection in poor countries with very limited domestic budgetary capacities. The mobilisation of these resources may require development oriented special allocations of SDRs, some forms of international taxation such as a carbon tax or a tax on the production or sale of armaments, or a small profit tax surcharge on the income of large corporations. It may also be useful to provide early access to traditional development assistance as proposed by the British Labour Government provided this is not seen as a substitute to a long term increase in development aid.

2.5. World Trade Organisation

2.5.1. Trade liberalisation and development

The World Trade Organisation is a rules-based, multilateral trading system that provides objective procedures to deal with trading conflicts and is designed to protect its members from unilateral and unfair treatment. Since its inception, the WTO has proved effective in solving trade disputes and has undoubtedly contributed to the enormous rise in international trade. Nonetheless, while the present system may serve as a basis, it remains completely inadequate and unsatisfactory.

The benefits that flow from rising volumes of trade are distributed unevenly. Large parts of the developing world remain economically marginalised and have not been able to integrate into world markets. Finding a way to reverse this trend and to ensure that international trade contributes to the eradication of poverty remains one of the key challenges to global policymaking. The WTO has yet to produce an adequate response to this challenge. The Doha Round must be turned into a Development Round. Policies are needed that enhance the capacity of developing countries to participate on a more equitable footing in the multilateral trading system. These policies must be embedded in comprehensive and coherent country-specific poverty reduction strategies with trade issues comprising an essential element.

Negotiations and procedures at the WTO must be made more transparent and opened up further to political dialogue and participation by all the relevant actors. The working methods of the WTO, including the voting procedures, should be seriously reviewed in order to facilitate the negotiation of agreements.

The capacity of delegations from developing countries to meaningfully participate in the WTO processes must be strengthened by means of capacity-building programmes and technical cooperation. The relevant programmes agreed on in Doha should be implemented and the funding of the WTO Secretariat for such programmes increased.

At the level of member countries, the information, consultation and participation of parliaments in the ongoing negotiation process must be enhanced. In February 2003, the first meeting of parliamentarians of the WTO member states took place in Geneva. Such meetings should take place regularly and be institutionalised.

Civil society, trade unions, business and NGOs should be offered a formal consultative process ensuring that they can present their views and voice their concerns to organs of the WTO.

2.5.2. Promoting and enforcing decent work standards and environmental standards

One issue of particular importance in the context of international trade is the need to compensate weak sections of the populations in developed and developing countries alike
for losses they may suffer as a result of trade liberalisation. International trade has great potential to create greater prosperity and more rapid economic growth by allowing greater scale of production, diffusion of knowledge and higher productivity. At the same time it should be recognised that the transformations it triggers can also create groups that lose out in the process, at least in the short and medium term.

The UN Economic, Social and Environmental Security Council could play a very useful role in suggesting ways to compensate the lower income groups among potential losers and helping mobilise the required resources. Another useful role for this Council in relation to trade, would be to provide some guidance as to which issues should be handled as part of trade negotiations and which issues are best left to other settings and institutions. It is important, for example, to reach agreement on whether or not, and to what extent, environmental, labour standard and human rights issues should be discussed within the WTO framework as opposed to discussing them under other umbrellas such as, in the case of labour issues, the ILO.

“At the international level we propose that a new operational tool be systematically developed to upgrade the quality of policy coordination between international organisations on issues in which the implementation of their mandates intersects and their policies interact. This would correct the imbalance between economic and social policies, eliminate the harm inflicted by policies working at cross-purposes, and harness the synergy from complementary policies.”


The WTO cannot and should not strive to be the international organisation that settles environmental, social, labour and cultural issues. However, since trade policies directly impact on these areas, there is a need for a clear division of responsibilities between the WTO and the international organisations that have the competence to tackle these issues. Cooperation between the WTO and these institutions must be intensified and could be modelled on that between the ILO and the WTO. There is a need to establish a coherent global mechanism that will enable trade and other issues to be dealt with in a balanced manner and prevent social, environmental and cultural issues from developing into divisive and disruptive trade conflicts or creating new, unfounded barriers to access by developing countries to developed country markets.
3. STRENGTHENING THE LEGITIMACY AND REBALANCING THE ARCHITECTURE OF THE UN SYSTEM

The question of legitimacy is at the heart of the ‘international system’. Legitimacy requires a certain degree of ‘global democracy’ that would gradually increase over time. At the same time, realistic global governance cannot ignore existing power relations in both the economic and military sense. A blueprint that ignores the resources controlled by various actors and their relative weights in the world would not be feasible. The reform agenda must try to balance three divergent requirements:

- Global democracy, which in some fundamental sense must give equal weight to each human being;
- Recognition of the endurance of nation states which do have "equal" legal status as sovereigns and remain fundamental "units" of the international system; and reflection of the divergent economic and military "capabilities" of nation states. It is obvious that India, Japan, Sri Lanka and Barbados, to take four examples, while being "equal" sovereign nation states, have very different economic and defence capabilities which must be reflected in the architecture of the international system.
- It is important to stress that a United Nations adapted to the needs and realities of the 21st century should be the overall institutional setting for both the political and the economic sphere. The current arrangements need to be replaced by new ones, changing from the post-World War II representation to constituencies, weighted votes and universal participation, and adjusting the policies of those institutions in favour of the actual needs of today’s world.

3.1. Security Council

The membership and the use of the veto right should be reconsidered in order to strengthen the legitimacy of the Security Council.

“168. In the Millennium Declaration, all States resolved to intensify their efforts “to achieve a comprehensive reform of the Security Council in all its aspects” (see General Assembly resolution 55/2, para. 30). This reflected the view, long held by the majority, that a change in the Council’s composition is needed to make it more broadly representative of the international community as a whole, as well as of the geopolitical realities of today, and thereby more legitimate in the eyes of the world. Its working methods also need to be made more efficient and transparent. The Council must be not only more representative but also more able and willing to take action when action is needed. Reconciling these two imperatives is the hard test that any reform proposal must pass.

169. Two years ago, I declared that in my view no reform of the United Nations would be complete without reform of the Security Council. That is still my belief. The Security Council must be broadly representative of the realities of power in today’s world. I therefore support the position set out in the report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change concerning the reforms of the Security Council, namely:

(a) They should, in honouring Article 23 of the Charter, increase the involvement in decision-making of those who contribute most to the United Nations financially, militarily and diplomatically, specifically in terms of contributions to United Nations assessed budgets, participation in mandated peace operations, contributions to voluntary activities of the United Nations in the areas of security and development, and diplomatic activities in support of United Nations objectives and mandates. Among developed countries, achieving or making substantial progress towards the internationally agreed level of 0.7 per cent of GNP for ODA should be considered an important criterion of contribution;
(b) They should bring into the decision-making process countries more representative of the broader membership, especially of the developing world;
(c) They should not impair the effectiveness of the Security Council; (d) They should increase the democratic and accountable nature of the body.

170. I urge Member States to consider the two options, models A and B, proposed in that report (see box 5), or any other viable proposals in terms of size and balance that have emerged on the basis of either model. Member States should agree to take a decision on this important issue before the summit in September 2005. It would be very preferable for Member States to take this vital decision by consensus, but if they are unable to reach consensus this must not become an excuse for postponing action.”


3.1.1. The membership

The main objective for reforming the Security Council should be to improve its democratic and representative nature and its effectiveness by striking a new balance between developing and developed countries. Still, the UN-HLPTCC was not able to reach a final agreement concerning two alternative models.

“74. A decision on the enlargement of the Council, satisfying these criteria, is now a necessity. The presentation of two clearly defined alternatives, of the kind described below as models A and B, should help to clarify - and perhaps bring to resolution - a debate which has made little progress in the last 12 years.

75. Models A and B both involve a distribution of seats as between four major regional areas, which we identify, respectively, as “Africa”, “Asia and Pacific”, “Europe” and “Americas”. We see these descriptions as helpful in making and implementing judgements about the composition of the Security Council, but make no recommendation about changing the composition of the current regional groups for general electoral and other United Nations purposes. Some members of the Panel, in particular our Latin American colleagues, expressed a preference for basing any distribution of seats on the current regional groups.

76. Model A provides for six new permanent seats, with no veto being created, and three new two-year term non-permanent seats, divided among the major regional areas. Model B provides for no new permanent seats, but creates a new category of eight four-year renewable-term seats and one new two-year nonpermanent (and non-renewable) seat, divided among the major regional areas. (252-253)

78. There should be a review of the composition of the Security Council in 2020, including, in this context, a review of the contribution (as defined in paragraph 249 of the main report) of permanent and non-permanent members from the point of view of the Council’s effectiveness in taking collective action to prevent and remove new and old threats to international peace and security. (255)”


There is agreement in the UN-HLPTCC of not adding new permanent members with veto. Two options are on the table: Model B adds a new group of semi-permanent members; the other, Model A, has a new look at the Razali plan, which means enlarging the Council to 24 without veto for the newcomers and with a reduced veto right for P5. The five permanent members were the victors of World War II: the United States, Russia, China, the United Kingdom and France. In the short-term it would be unrealistic to imagine that these five countries would not continue to have a permanent seat in the Security Council.

For either Model A or Model B, we believe that it is in the best interests of the UN to increase the number of members from African, Latin American and Asia-Pacific countries as well as countries which contribute most to UN activities in order to achieve a better North-South balance, more compatible with today’s world. The Arab world should also have appropriate representation.
The rotation of the non-permanent members of the Security Council should be based on regional organisational structures or an institutionalised permanent regional distribution key.

There is insufficient continuity as well as insufficient regional coordination and ties in the group of rotating members to ensure that the small member nations in the UN system have long-term strategic influence.

A new Security Council structure could be based on two different principles:

First, membership of the Security Council could be regionally based to a greater extent, so that each member would represent its own region.

Representation could be based on a regional organisation, with individually appointed regional delegates in the Security Council, or it could be based on rotation between the countries in the region and ad hoc coordination.

Alternatively the rotating seats could be allocated on the basis of an institutionalised permanent regional distribution key.

EU representatives in the Security Council must work in a much more coordinated way based on mutual solidarity. The EU should speak with one voice both at open and closed Security Council meetings. The medium-term goal should be to have a permanent EU seat in the Security Council, replacing the nation states.

3.1.2. The right to veto

A realistic way of modernising the Security Council would be to establish a new category of permanent or semi permanent members without a right of veto (which could be reviewed periodically) and combine it with restricted access of the current permanent members of the Security Council to exercise their right of veto. The ultimate goal must be a veto-free culture and cooperation.

Being one of the most criticised elements of the UN decision-making structure, the right of veto in the Security Council is considered a symbol of the UN's lack of efficiency and ability to tackle some of the most important conflicts in the world.

This decision-making structure is also important as regards the legitimacy of the UN system among the world's most powerful nations. Extensive changes to the decision-making structure might have a significant impact on the support for the UN system among the most important players on the international political scene.

Nevertheless, we believe that the UN should aim at a veto-free culture in the Security Council. There is no doubt that the veto-based decision-making structure has a number of negative features. Sensitive matters often trigger repeated vetoes, which means that the Security Council is unable to act in areas that are in fact clearly within its area of competence. One example of this is the Israel-Palestine conflict, in relation to which the United States has exercised a veto on several occasions, thus blocking any real decisions by the Security Council concerning the conflict.

We therefore think that in any event a limitation or qualification of the right of veto in the Security Council would facilitate its operation and ability to make decisions, and that this would benefit democracy in the UN – provided that the current major powers actively support such limitations.
We would be able to support the following models for limitation of the veto right:

- **Qualification under the UN Charter**
  One model could be only to allow a veto if the vetoing nation provides a written, publicly accessible motivation for its veto with reference to the UN Charter. An alternative model would be to allow a veto solely with reference to Chapter VII of the UN Charter concerning threats to international security. This could possibly reduce the use of vetoes based purely on national interests.

- **With recourse to the General Assembly**
  It would also be possible that the use of vetoes would automatically lead to a subsequent debate in the UN General Assembly.

Over the years very few models to overcome the veto powers of current Permanent members of the Security Council and restore the decision-making power of the United Nations in situations of crises have been developed. In this respect attention should be given to Resolution 377(V) of the General Assembly ("Uniting for Peace") that was voted in 1950 to circumvent attempts by the then Soviet Union to block UN action against the invasion of South Korea by North Korea.

### 3.2. An Economic and Social Security Council

The Socialist International considers that, apart from the Security Council, another top-level Council should be created.

### 3.2.1 The role

"The time is now ripe - indeed overdue - to build a global forum that can provide leadership in economic, social, and environmental fields. This should be more representative than the Group of Seven or the Bretton Woods institutions, and more effective than the present UN system. We propose the establishment of an Economic Security Council (ESC) that would meet at high political level. It would have deliberative functions only; its influence will derive from the relevance and quality of its work and the significance of its membership.

The ESC's tasks would be to:
- continuously assess the overall state of the world economy and the interaction between major policy areas;
- provide a long-term strategic policy framework in order to promote stable, balanced, and sustainable development;
- secure consistency between the policy goals of the major international organisations, particularly the Bretton Woods bodies and the World Trade Organisation (WTO); and
- give political leadership and promote consensus on international economic issues.

The ESC should be established as a distinct body within the UN family, structured like the Security Council, though not with identical membership and independent of it."


"Proposal for a United Nations Council for Sustainable Development
a) Hence there is a need to establish on a global coordination level a new United Nations Security Council on Economic, Social and Environmental issues - a Council for Sustainable Development."
b) This Council should be composed and function in a manner that takes into account the difficulties facing the current UN Security Council. The eventual permanent members should be more representative of the world as a whole and of all the major economic regions, including the United States, Europe, China, Africa, Latin America, Oceania and Asia. In other words, it should reflect the world of 2005, not the world of 1945.

c) The Council for Sustainable Development should be independent of the Security Council and have the same standing with respect to international economic and social matters as the Security Council has in peace and security matters. It should be in a position to improve coordination between international economic, financial, social and environmental policies. It should be a deliberative forum aimed at contributing to world social and economic justice, stability and prosperity on the basis of the UN Charter. It should have the task of:

- continuously assessing the state of the world economy and ensuring macro-economic coordination;
- providing a long-term strategic framework for sustainable development;
- securing consistency between the policy goals and activities of the international economic, social and environmental institutions;
- producing common guidelines on the priorities of the global agenda, monitoring their follow-up and acting as a coordinating body for trade-offs between trade, employment and the environment.

Once a year the Council should meet at the level of heads of state and government together with the chief executives of all main global agencies related to sustainable development.”


In order to overcome this fundamental problem with all its repercussions, the governance of the economic sphere of the international system has to be part of the overall framework of a reformed and renewed United Nations. Without destroying some positive features of the existing system, notably the professionalism and specialised nature of some of the agencies, it is necessary to legitimise governance and provide an overall UN umbrella. This is crucial, notably, for a stronger implementation of the Millennium Development Goals as well as the commitments made in Johannesburg and Doha.

### 3.2.2. The membership

A new United Nations Economic, Social and Environmental Security Council (UNSEC) has been proposed by progressive working groups for many years. This Council would function with a system of qualified majority voting and constituencies.

With regard to the participation in a UNSEC, it is clear that participation of all states in General Assembly style meetings would be impractical. Smaller meetings as currently exercised in the UN Security Council allow discussion and creative debate. Therefore, the practice of having the most important members as permanent members and others as rotating members has advantages and could be combined with the reformed voting system.

The proposed Council would have a mixture of permanent members and non-permanent members – although no sharp distinction between them - representing multi-country constituencies (See Dervis, 2005, Chapter 4).

The UNSEC would operate at two levels. It would normally meet at the level of heads of government once a year during the annual meetings of the UN in New York in September, with the presence of the main related international agencies. In addition, every second year, at the General Assembly meeting, the world community would elect a new UNSEC for a two-year period. They would have to satisfy certain criteria in terms of experience with designing and implementing economic and social policies at the national, regional or global level. These criteria should be explicit and binding. The Council Members would normally not
only be career diplomats, but senior officials with distinguished careers in the economic and social sphere.

3.2.3. Voting procedure

A voting procedure is needed that is more flexible than the rules of the Security Council, where the vote of just one country is enough to veto action; but is more stringent than purely majority voting so that major groupings in the world cannot be outvoted when they act together. A system of double majority (of States and of votes) might be considered. Whilst it is hoped that consensus decision-making would be the norm, it is proposed that if voting is necessary, a majority of two-thirds of those States present would be required for both procedural and non-procedural issues. This means that neither developed nor developing countries can pass resolutions without at least some support from members from the other category. Besides that, the voting strength would be determined by three main criteria: a country’s share in world population, GDP and contributions to the UN global goods budget. The voting powers that result from such a scheme must have two essential characteristics: they must appear reasonable and appeal to the demand for legitimacy present in world public opinion, and they must be acceptable to the nations states that would have to agree to the reform. The present decisions on the voting procedures are part of a permanent process for a more democratic global governance.

3.2.4. The interface with the UN agencies, BWIs and WTO

The UNESEC would be the governance umbrella for all specialised economic and social agencies currently in the UN system, such as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the International Labour Organisation (ILO), the World Environment Organisation (WEO) to be created, and so on, as well as the Bretton Woods institutions and the WTO. The mission of the UNESEC would be to provide an overall framework of coherence and efficiency to international institutions and cooperation in the economic and social sphere. It would elaborate guidelines to avoid duplication, work on long-term reform and cooperation strategies, evaluate the effectiveness of all institutions and their programmes, conduct some comparative research focused on effectiveness, and be accessible to civil society networks and their criticism and proposals for change in policies and practices of the various institutions.

A newly created UNESEC would not interfere in the day-to-day workings of the existing international institutions themselves. It would, however, provide strategic guidance, promote communication and public discussion, and evaluate performance. What is proposed is a UNESEC which acts as a strategic board for the entire international system in the economic, social and environmental sphere, a UNESEC which has the very important function of appointing heads of agencies and which reviews policies independently of any one agency.

This would reflect the hopes, aspirations and concerns of human performance, promoting cooperation and evaluating effectiveness. It would do so as a whole rather than for any one particular group or set of interests. It would be a source of strengthened legitimacy for all institutions, particularly the IMF and the World Bank and thus give multilateralism the necessary global support, desperately needed in order to efficiently tackle the global challenges we face.

It is important to stress at the outset that we are not at all advocating an “absorption” of the BWIs or of the WTO into the UN administration.

If as proposed by the SI and many other progressive organisations and civil society groups a United Nations Social and Economic Security Council is created as the overall high-level
strategic governance group in the economic, social and environmental domains of the international system, it would be desirable to have the WTO also come under the overall umbrella of the UNESC. As proposed for the Bretton Woods institutions, the idea is not for the UNESC to try to manage the WTO but to provide a framework of strategic governance, to choose the Director General according to transparent criteria and to help define the mandates of the various institutions in the economic domain and also to help mobilise resources in support of development and the action of these institutions. In the context of the WTO there is great need for resources to help the poorest countries build up the institutional and physical infrastructure that would allow them to benefit much more from international trade (See Dervis, 2005, Chapter 4).

3.3. General Assembly

3.3.1. Enhancing the General Assembly

The General Assembly should be revitalised as a universal forum of the world’s states. Measures should be taken to improve its working methods, particularly in view of the steady increase of its membership to 191 presently. One avenue might be the increase of the powers of the General Committee that due to its smaller size should be more workable. The powers of the President of the General Assembly could equally be increased to streamline the workings of the Assembly. This might be helped by creating clearer criteria for the electability of Assembly Presidents, who should not only be chosen on the basis of regional rotation. Organising regular theme sessions, and an effective exercise of budgetary authority, streamlining of its agenda and procedures and opening up to the civil society should also be part of the process of revitalisation of the General Assembly.

“160. Member States agree, as they have for years, that the Assembly needs to streamline its procedures and structures so as to improve the deliberative process and make it more effective. Many modest steps have been taken. Now, new proposals to “revitalise” the Assembly have been put forward by a wide range of Member States. The General Assembly should now take bold measures to rationalise its work and speed up the deliberative process, notably by streamlining its agenda, its committee structure and its procedures for holding plenary debates and requesting reports, and by strengthening the role and authority of its President.

161. At present, the General Assembly addresses a broad agenda covering a wide range of often overlapping issues. It should give focus to its substantive agenda by concentrating on addressing the major substantive issues of the day, such as international migration and the long-debated comprehensive convention on terrorism.

162. It should also engage much more actively with civil society - reflecting the fact that, after a decade of rapidly increasing interaction, civil society is now involved in most United Nations activities. Indeed, the goals of the United Nations can only be achieved if civil society and Governments are fully engaged. The Panel of Eminent Persons on United Nations-Civil Society Relations, which I appointed in 2003, made many useful recommendations for improving our work with civil society, and I have commended its report (see A/58/817 and Corr.1) to the General Assembly together with my views. The General Assembly should act on these recommendations and establish mechanisms enabling it to engage fully and systematically with civil society.

163. The Assembly also needs to review its committee structure, the way committees function, the oversight it provides to them and their outputs. The General Assembly needs a mechanism to review the decisions of its committees so as to avoid overloading the organisation with unfunded mandates and continuing the current problem of micromanagement of the budget and the allocation of posts within the Secretariat. If the General Assembly cannot solve these problems it will not have the focus and flexibility it needs to serve its members effectively.

164. It should be clear that none of this will happen unless Member States take a serious interest in the Assembly at the highest level and insist that their representatives engage in its
debates with a view to achieving real and positive results. If they fail to do this the Assembly’s performance will continue to disappoint them and they should not be surprised.”

In: In larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all, Report of the Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, United Nations, 2005, pp.40-41

3.4. Jurisdictional competencies

3.4.1. International Court of Justice (ICJ)

Greater recourse should be enabled to the ICJ for constitutionally doubtful Security Council actions.

The Chamber Procedure of that court should be modified to enhance its appeal to states and to avoid damage to the Court’s integrity.

We do not emphasise formal enforcement measures but failing voluntary compliance, Security Council enforcement of World Court decisions and other international legal obligations should be pursued under Article 94 of the Charter.

“139. The International Court of Justice lies at the centre of the international system for adjudicating disputes among States. In recent years, the Court’s docket has grown significantly and a number of disputes have been settled, but resources remain scarce. There is a need to consider means to strengthen the work of the Court. I urge those States that have not yet done so to consider recognising the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court - generally if possible or, failing that, at least in specific situations. I also urge all parties to bear in mind, and make greater use of, the Court’s advisory powers. Measures should also be taken, with the cooperation of litigating States, to improve the Court’s working methods and reduce the length of its proceedings.”

In: In larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all, Report of the Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, United Nations, 2005, pp.36-37

3.4.2. International Criminal Court

The International Criminal Court plays a particularly important role in the persecution of people responsible for genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and crimes of aggression. It is regrettable that several of the permanent members of the Security Council, i.e. the United States, Russia and China, as well as India, Israel and the vast majority of the Arab countries are not among the parties who have ratified the statutes of the Court.

We should work toward universal ratification of the Rome Treaty.

“138. Justice is a vital component of the rule of law. Enormous progress has been made with the establishment of the International Criminal Court, the continuing work of the two ad hoc tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, and the creation of a mixed tribunal in Sierra Leone and hopefully soon in Cambodia as well. Other important initiatives include commissions of experts and inquiry, such as those set up for Darfur, Timor-Leste and Côte d’Ivoire. Yet impunity continues to overshadow advances made in international humanitarian law, with tragic consequences in the form of flagrant and widespread human rights abuses continuing to this day. To increase avenues of redress for the victims of atrocities and deter further horrors, I encourage Member States to cooperate fully with the International Criminal Court and other international or mixed war crimes tribunals, and to surrender accused persons to them upon request.”

In: In larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all, Report of the Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, United Nations, 2005, p.36
3.4.3. **Progressive Development of International Law**

A strong call should be made to strengthen and revitalise the existing body of international law by organising a series of International Conferences to complete, modernise and revitalise existing conventions, particularly in the field of human rights and fundamental freedoms. Some of these Conferences could be organised as Review Meetings of earlier ones such as the Vienna Human Rights Conference of 1993.

3.5. **Bretton Woods Institutions**

3.5.1. **The role**

Socialists and social democrats agree that with increasing globalisation and, in particular, increasing integration of financial markets, there is a need for a global regulator of these markets as well as an institution that can help countries that experience financial crisis. Markets do need regulation and supervision, and when they have become global, these functions must also be global. Moreover, the developing countries generally, and even more so, the least developed countries, should have access to concessional resources; both, because they cannot cover the costs of providing for global public goods from which everyone benefits such as environmental protection, disease control and security and, as a matter of international solidarity, there should be some redistribution of income from the most fortunate to those most in need, also across national borders. There is therefore an important role for the IMF and the World Bank, although the framework within which they operate should be reformed and many of their policies need to address social needs much more forcefully.

3.5.2. **Voting in the BWIs**

Voting power within the BWIs should be reallocated so as to ensure that the institutions represent the interests of the whole membership, and that the block of the borrowers and that of the creditor countries have an equal allocation of votes. The reallocation should ensure that the proportion of basic to total votes is elevated to the original one, and that the ratio is kept constant in new quota increases. GDP in PPP should also taken into account in this reallocation.

The constituencies represented by each ED should be reshaped to ensure a more even distribution. A ceiling of no more than ten countries per constituency should be established. Board members should express their positions with formal votes. Agendas, transcripts and minutes of World Bank and IMF Board meetings should be made publicly available to parliamentarians, civil society groups, academics, etc. except when strictly required to avoid harm that could result from such disclosure.

3.5.3. **Selection of the heads of the BWIs**

Finally, and this is crucial, all heads of institutions would be appointed with the help of transparent search procedures and criteria which would include professional track record of leadership and good management, and overall gender, race and geographical balance in the top management of international institutions. The de facto requirement that the head of a particular institution should come from a particular country would no longer apply.
3.5.4. Creating an International Financial Supervision Authority

The creation of an international Financial Supervision Authority should also be considered, based on IMF or building on the experience of the existent Financial Stability Forum. This authority is increasingly needed to regulate the financial markets, to enforce codes of conduct and to control the off-shores.

3.6. WTO

3.6.1. The problem of legitimacy

The WTO is another organisation that is formally outside the UN system and that is in need of greater international legitimacy. Passions run high in the trade debate. The Socialist International should contribute to efforts to ensure that the benefits from international trade reach the greatest number of people, and that the system built around the WTO is equitable and sensitive to the interests of working people, in developing and developed countries alike.

3.6.2. Dispute settlement procedures

The WTO should cease to be a house apart and be brought within the UN family, reporting through the ECOSOC or, preferably, through a new Economic and Social Security Council. This would also imply that at the national level, international trade and investment policy should be evaluated and reviewed within an inter-departmental or cross-governmental frame, in light of social, environmental, human and labour rights priorities, the policies of national governments and the concerns of their parliaments.

3.7. Environment: From UNEP to UNEO

Negotiation and implementation of international environmental treaties should be facilitated and regional environmental cooperation promoted. Existing international environmental treaties cover a broad range of issues relevant to environmental security, including climate change, cooperative water management, land degradation and desertification and biological diversity. But most environmental treaties contain few specific targets and timetables, and provisions for monitoring and enforcement are generally weak to nonexistent. Several important environmental treaties have not yet been ratified by enough countries to enter into legal force, including the difficulties with the 1997 Kyoto Protocol to the UN Convention on Climate Change. The UN Environment Programme (UNEP) and other UN agencies can continue to assist countries with negotiating and implementing relevant international agreements and action plans, and encourage them to move forward with ratification. The UN can also promote greater regional environmental cooperation to protect shared river-basins and other ecosystems. Working together to protect shared resources could build a spirit of cooperation rather than competition and conflict even among traditional adversaries, possibly advancing regional cooperation more generally.

A World Environmental Organisation, grouping existing programmes, would be able to muster more authority and influence than the existing programmes, such as the UNEP, can do in isolation. This new body should be created with the authority to define and enforce laws, to establish the official data on environment and to develop a worldwide monitoring system.
4. DEVELOPING A DEMOCRATIC GLOBAL GOVERNANCE

Legitimacy, transparency and accountability depend not only on a better representation of the States but also on the development of stronger democratic mechanisms at global level. Hence, new ways of enhancing democratic representation and citizenship at world level should be envisaged, as well as new ways of improving the participation of the organised civil society.

4.1. Improving Democratic Representation

4.1.1. Improving the Inter-Parliamentary Union

“The United Nations should routinely encourage national parliaments to hold debates on major matters coming up in the United Nations and to discuss those matters with the relevant ministers. Relevant documents, including those in progress achieved on the Millennium Development Goals and other globally agreed goals, should be made available to parliaments when they are transmitted to Governments. The Secretary-General should seek the cooperation of the Inter-Parliamentary Union and parliamentarian associations. Member States should regularly consult members of Parliament on United Nations matters and debrief them after major United Nations meetings.

Member States should more regularly include members of Parliament in their delegations to major United Nations meetings, while taking care to avoid compromising their independence. The Secretariat should test opportunities for members of Parliament to contribute as parliamentarians, including in debates before a General Assembly meeting on a major topic. Members of Parliament specialising in a subject could also be invited to speak in relevant committees and special sessions of the Assembly, particularly when they are reviewing progress achieved in meeting the Millennium Development Goals and other agreed global goals.

Member States should make way for an enhanced role for parliamentarians in global governance. They should instruct the Secretariat to work with national parliaments and the Inter-Parliamentary Union, as appropriate, to convene one or more experimental global public policy committees to discuss emerging priorities on the global agenda. These committees would comprise parliamentarians from the most relevant functional committee in a globally representative range of countries. In an experimental five-year period, different organisational arrangements could be tested and, through periodic review, refined over time.

The Secretary-General should form a small Elected Representatives Liaison Unit:
- To provide a dedicated information service for parliaments and associations of parliamentarians, including a dedicated web-based information service for members of parliament
- To encourage greater attention to United Nations processes in national parliaments
- To help to create more effective opportunities for members of parliament to take part in United Nations forums
- To organise global public policy committees to work closely with national parliaments, the Inter-Parliamentary Union, specialised agencies and other organisations as appropriate
- To foster debate within the United Nations system about new or improved strategies for engaging parliaments and parliamentarians”.

4.1.2. Creation of an Inter-Parliamentary Assembly

The Socialist International is committed to enhancing the Inter-Parliamentary Union, but wants to go further. Better-structured democratic control and accountability is needed if the world’s democratic deficit is to be addressed seriously. At some point, contemplation of a UN Parliamentary Assembly will be needed to complement the UN General Assembly, where the states are represented. Such a development should be supported by the gradual emergence of truly global citizenship, underpinned by rights drawn from the 1948 declaration on Human Rights and the 1966 Covenants on civil and political rights and economic and social rights.

This idea is disputed and is often brushed aside as utopian. Before rejecting it, one should at least look closely at European experience, which, admittedly on a smaller scale, shows that international democracy is feasible and politically necessary.

Such an Assembly should be more than just another UN institution. It would have to become a building block of a new, democratically legitimate, world order. Far from being utopian, recent developments and trends are opening the way towards it. The Inter-Parliamentary Union was set up more than a century ago. Now, a WTO Parliamentary Assembly is being brought to life. The UN is already organising a Parliamentary Forum in the context of major international conferences.

In order to attain the goal of a UN Parliamentary Assembly, every effort needs to be made by the large party communities, and they need to strengthen their cooperation. The principal starting point could be in the assemblies of the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU).

4.2. Developing the participation of the civil society

4.2.1. Developing the mechanisms for participation

Essential to the success of a system of democratic global governance is institutionalising the participation of organised civil society in the policy-making processes of the multilateral institutions and the UN. Consultative mechanisms for broad-based participation should be established, making use of best practices from past intergovernmental processes, such as interactive round-tables, civil society hearings and dialogues with governments, and multi-stakeholder dialogues. Of particular interest as a model are the multi-stakeholder dialogues adopted by the Johannesburg Sustainable Development Summit (September 2002), with their concept of major groups, including NGOs, trade unions, women, indigenous groups, local authorities, academia and the business sector. Moreover, global issues networks and partnerships should also be developed in order to increase the participation of civil society not only in the design of policies, but also in their implementation and monitoring.

Finally, the national delegations to UN initiatives involving members of the Government or of the Parliament should also invite representatives of the civil society.

“The United Nations should embrace an array of forums, each designed to achieve a specific outcome, with participation determined accordingly. The cycle of global debate on an issue should include:

- Interactive high-level round tables to survey the framework of issues;
- Global conferences to define norms and targets;
- Multi-stakeholder partnerships to put the new norms and targets into practice;
Multi-stakeholder hearings to monitor compliance, review experience and revise strategies.”

In: *Strengthening of the United Nations system*, Note by the Secretary-General, Fifty-eighth session, General Assembly, A/58/817, June 2004, pp.16.

### 4.2.2. The role of multi-constituency processes

“The Secretariat should foster multi-constituency processes as new conduits for discussion of United Nations priorities, redirecting resources now used for single-constituency forums covering multiple issues. The Secretariat, together with other relevant bodies of the United Nations system, should convene public hearings to review progress in meeting globally agreed commitments. Being technical and concerned with implementation rather than the formulation of new global policies, such hearings could be convened by the Secretary-General on his own authority. Proceedings should be transmitted through the Secretary-General to the relevant intergovernmental forums”.


### 4.2.3. Improving the consultative rights of civil society in the ECOSOC and the General Assembly

Full support should be given to the proposal made by the Secretary General in his Report to the General Assembly, for the setting up of study groups. These should take the form of thematic Expert Working Groups that will allow for adequate participation by a wide range of stakeholders, including governments, multilateral institutions, the UN system, civil society, the business sector, and independent academic experts. A task of the proposed Executive Committee should be to coordinate the composition of these expert groups, and develop a mechanism that will guarantee effective working arrangements between the groups and ECOSOC.

The time has come to seriously consider proposals that have been put forward with the aim of providing consultative rights for NGOs within the GA. These should be modelled on the consultative rights and arrangements existing at the level of ECOSOC through ECOSOC Resolution 1996/31. The consultative rights accorded to non-governmental organisations in ECOSOC should be thus extended to the General Assembly, allowing NGOs to play a critical role as advocates for the strengthening of the social dimensions of global governance.

### 4.2.4. Improving the consultative role in UN Agencies and BWIs

To achieve a truly consultative role for the organised civil society within the UN Agencies, the IMF, the World Bank and the WTO.

### 4.2.5. Forum of civil society

“We also propose an annual Forum of Civil Society consisting of representatives of organisations to be accredited to the General Assembly as 'Civil Society Organisations'. The forum should be convened in the General Assembly Hall sometime before the Annual Session of the Assembly. International civil society should itself be involved in determining the character and functions of the Forum.”

An assessment is needed to improve the working methods of this forum, in order to provide a more systematic discussion with the UN bodies.

4.2.6. Right of petition

“The Right of Petition proposed in the context of promoting the security of people requires the formation of a Council of Petitions—a high-level panel of five to seven persons, independent of governments, to entertain petitions. Its recommendations will go as appropriate to the Secretary-General, the Security Council, or the General Assembly, and allow for action under the Charter.”

“There should be a new ‘Right of Petition’ for non-state actors to bring situations massively endangering the security of people within states to the attention of the Security Council.”


4.2.7. Improving the global compact

“The Secretariat should strengthen its relationship with actors in the private sector by:
- Incorporating the Global Compact into the proposed Office of Constituency Engagement and Partnerships;
- Engaging with small and medium-sized businesses and their national associations and helping to build the capacity and competitiveness of microbusinesses and small enterprises;
- Strengthening the Global Compacts capacity for and contribution to enhancing corporate responsibility.”

5. THE REFORM PROCESS

Enhancing legitimacy and accountability and improving the effectiveness of the United Nations in implementing a new global agenda should become the main objectives of a large reform process.

Bearing in mind these two objectives of the UN reform process, the way forward is to develop new political instruments to mobilise more actors at international, regional, national and local levels in order to change the power relationships and force real and meaningful reforms. New global alliances are needed to strike a new Global Deal and to put a new global agenda underway.

These new alliances should mobilise a vast range of actors:

- social democratic and progressive governments and their representations in UN bodies,
- social democratic and progressive members of national parliaments and their representations in UN bodies;
- organised civil society and its participation in UN bodies;
- trade unions;
- citizens and public opinion at world level in the context of global communication flows, which are bringing about a global public sphere.

Beyond the instruments for representation and participation, which were already mentioned in the previous chapters, some new instruments should be developed in order to use the full potential of this vast range of actors. Some of these instruments are informal, such as global issues networks, policy coherence initiatives and a Globalisation Policy Forum, but their final aim should be to create the conditions for a crucial formal initiative: the organisation of a World Convention on Governance.

5.1. For a pragmatic reform process

5.1.1. Media and public opinion

“Responsible media can play a central role in facilitating a movement towards a fairer and more inclusive globalisation. Well-informed public opinion on issues raised in this Report is essential to underpin change. Policies everywhere therefore need to emphasise the importance of diversity in information and communication flows.”

In: A Fair Globalisation: Creating Opportunities for All, Report by the World Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalisation, Co-chaired by Tarja Halonen and Benjamin Mkapa, ILO, 2004 p. XIV

5.1.2. The role of global issues networks

“... there is need to consider the view that the emerging multitude of issue oriented networks, NGO’s and/or “special transnational clubs” are a sufficient response to the global governance challenge. It is quite true that many international issues and challenges have led to the formation of international networks. These networks focus on a variety of specific issues from landmines to the environment, from debt relief to the building of dams.”

5.1.3. Policy Coherence Initiatives

"608. We recommend that Policy Coherence Initiatives (PCI) be undertaken by the relevant organisations on key issues addressing the social dimension of globalisation. The objective would be to progressively develop integrated policy proposals that appropriately balance economic, social and developmental concerns on specific issues.

609. We invite all Executive Heads of the multilateral system to consider issues for Policy Coherence Initiatives with other agencies in which they consider that, by working together, they can make a contribution to a more fair and inclusive globalisation. A number of priority issues that are cross-cutting in nature could be immediately considered. These include employment creation and the reduction of poverty, gender inequality and the empowerment of women, the integration of the informal economy into the economic mainstream, the protection of core labour rights, education, health, food security and human settlements.

610. Executive Heads of the Agencies could decide to move forward with other organisations on issues they consider appropriate for Policy Coherence Initiatives and define in each case the best method of joint work. The understandings reached on balanced policies for achieving more equitable outcomes would be brought to the attention of their respective boards or governing bodies for consideration and action. The Chief Executives Board of the United Nations, headed by the Secretary-General, and the Economic and Social Council would be kept informed of the evolution of these initiatives. This approach would significantly enhance the quality of policy-making while using a methodology which is flexible and can be applied in a pragmatic manner.

611. In the first instance, we invite the Executive Heads of the relevant UN bodies, the World Bank, the IMF, the WTO and the ILO to address the question of global growth, investment and employment creation, through a Policy Coherence Initiative. Given the questions dealt with in the Report, we consider this subject to be of the highest priority. The institutions involved could make a significant contribution by addressing this major concern of government, business, workers, civil society and people everywhere. Such an initiative would respond to a major political demand in all countries, and would demonstrate the capacity of the institutions concerned to pioneer new cooperative ways to find solutions in this critical field."


The UN Secretary-General’s Report, In Larger Freedom, establishes a set of concrete proposals in this direction that deserve to be implemented.

5.1.4. A Globalisation Policy Forum

“A second idea for promoting dialogue and an eventual convergence of ideas on how to expand the social dimension of globalisation is behind the Commission's proposals for periodic dialogue and consultations in a Globalisation Policy Forum (GPF) on the social dimension of globalisation convening all important actors and institutions in the global economy. Such a forum would provide a space “to bring together the agencies of the multilateral system … with other organisations, groups and individuals who are concerned with the social dimension of globalisation. It would assess the social impact of developments and policies in the global economy on a regular basis".

The Forum, as well as providing a platform for multi-stakeholder dialogues, would also tap the knowledge, resources and perspectives of all participating organisations in monitoring trends in the social impact of globalisation and in analysing policy issues. Following on the Commission’s experience, the GPF could provide a meeting place for organisations and groups with divergent views to interact and discuss emerging social problems and alternative ways of tackling them."

“619… we recommend that a Globalisation Policy Forum be established among interested international organisations, as part of a sustained effort to make dialogue between different points of view the foundation of a fairer globalisation. It would examine the key issues relevant to the social dimension of globalisation.

620 The role of the Forum will be to mobilise the collective effort of the multilateral system to create a platform for multi-stakeholder dialogues and to build public support for proposals emerging from them. Such a Forum would be a space which could bring together the agencies of the multilateral system, and in particular the UN and its specialised agencies, with other organisations, groups and individuals who are concerned with the social dimension of globalisation. It would assess the social impact of developments and policies in the global economy on a regular basis. It would tap the knowledge, resources and perspectives of all participating organisations in monitoring trends on the social impact of globalisation and analysing key policy issues.

621 We believe that, in the light of the experience of the World Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalisation, the ILO should take the initiative to follow up this recommendation in cooperation with interested international organisations.

622 Participating institutions could also make an important contribution by preparing a regular “State of Globalisation Report” reflecting the experience and perspectives of their wide-ranging constituencies.”


The Global Progressive Forum recently created by the Socialist International and the Party of European Socialists is a pioneer initiative of this kind of forum gathering some of the key actors who are engaged with a progressive agenda.

5.2. World Convention on Governance

“In order to favour such a process, we propose that the UN General Assembly convene a World Convention on Governance. Drawing inspiration from the current European Convention format, such a convention would bring government representatives, parliamentarians and international organisations together in talks over a given period of time, including an active dialogue with civil society.

The World Convention would address the need for a longer-term reform agenda for more effective, balanced, coherent and democratic global governance and submit its conclusions and recommendations to the UN General Assembly.”

In: Europe and a New Global Order - Bridging the divide between global challenges and global governance, A Report for the Party of European Socialists, Poul Nyrup Rasmussen, pp. 100-101.
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