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Pietro Nenni at 80

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Pietro Nenni at Eighty

Pietro Nenni, Vice-Chairman of the Socialist International, former leader of the Italian Socialist Party and former Foreign Minister of Italy, celebrated his eightieth birthday on February 9. There were numerous special celebrations in Rome, including a ceremony at which Pietro Nenni was presented with the second Silver Plate of Honour of the Socialist International by Chairman Bruno Pittermann. SOCIALIST AFFAIRS pays its own tribute below to a great socialist.

The biography of Pietro Nenni reads like a personalised history of the European socialist movement in the 20th century. All the crises, setbacks, problems and contradictions which the working-class movement has suffered are mirrored in his personal experience. But so too are the victories and achievements. Happily it can be justly said that both in the case of Nenni and of the socialist movement the latter outweigh the former.

Nenni was born in 1891. The fact of his having grown up an orphan is perhaps one of the keys to his later belief in the efficacy of personal action and determination. Certainly he decided at an early age both to act and to be determined. From the beginning, Nenni was a revolutionary activist. In 1911 he was imprisoned for leading strikes against the Italo-Turkish war in Libya, and when war broke out in Europe in 1914 Pietro Nenni joined with the celebrated Italian anarchist Malatesta in leading the famous 'red week'. This movement started in Ancona and spread all over Italy, although as a revolutionary action it was doomed to failure.

The end of the war heralded the upsurge of fascist violence in Italy. At this moment, in 1921, Nenni joined the Socialist Party of Italian Workers. The party was at that time under the control of the 'maximalists'. Inspired by the example of the Bolshevik revolution in Russia, this school of thought argued that it was useless to come to terms with the bourgeois parties for the sake of small reforms when it was evident that the ruling order must inevitably give way to the working class. Pietro Nenni campaigned vigorously against the maximalists and against any accommodation with the Comintern. Eventually the pure communists broke away and established a separate party.

These were difficult days for all shades of the Italian socialist movement. The fascists came to power in 1922. Two years later the socialist leader Giacomo Matteotti was murdered. Nenni by now had become editor of the party newspaper Avanti! in Milan. He served one prison sentence for publishing an anti-fascist pamphlet, and then in 1924 he joined Carlo Rosselli in editing Il Quarto Stato, a...
The paper of the Italian Social Democratic Party recently published a tribute to Pietro Nenni from which the following is an extract:

Pietro Nenni has for sixty years shared the hopes, the myths, the illusions and also the deep human urgings of the people for progress, and he has been identified in large measure with the history of the people and with the history of socialism and the working-class movement.

Nenni's last period of active political life—his second term in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs—was one of the most brilliant in Italian foreign policy. He was perceptive enough to see that the crucial development was the rapprochement between America and Russia, but that Italian policy had to be concerned above all with the problem of the political unification of Western Europe—the problem of the re-establishment of intermediary forces which would be genuinely independent because their security was guaranteed. Many of the most fruitful initiatives in our foreign policy today have their origin in this period.

At that time the foreign policy outlined by Nenni was perhaps undermined by the internal weakness of the Italian political situation. Nenni did not give up, however, and his initiatives had a quality of idealism which placed them far above petty opportunist manoeuvres and forced the political section of the country, if not the country as a whole (which had other distractions), to feel some sense of its duties, its aims and its responsibilities. It was perhaps a contributory factor that his very involvement in his new tasks led him to be unaware immediately of the lacerations that were tearing his party asunder.

Aldo Garosci

magazine critical of the old deterministic, maximalist outlook which in their frustration and depression Nenni's generation of militants regarded as responsible for the inability of the forces of democracy to deal with fascism.

But by 1926 it was already clear that the Italian socialists could not withstand the onslaught of fascism. Nenni and many other democratic leaders were forced into exile. For Nenni the years that followed were a period of unremitting struggle against the evil which had driven him from Italy. He was aware sooner than many people of the international character of fascism and of the need for the working-class movement to mount an effective international counter-challenge.

This awareness was certainly one of the reasons why Nenni became a strong believer in the strategy of close cooperation with the communists which was known as the 'popular front'.

There were many setbacks. The history of the thirties is essentially one of defeat and retreat for the socialist movement. There were some noble episodes, nevertheless. One such was the attempt to preserve the Spanish Republic against fascist insurrection. Nenni fought in this campaign as a member of the legendary Garibaldi Brigade, and also as a representative of the Labour and Socialist
International.

But the defeat of the Republican cause in Spain, followed by the Munich surrender, brought Europe to one of the darkest moments in its history.

At this crucial juncture Nenni and his supporters continued to work for the unity of popular forces. But then the Hitler-Stalin Pact struck this strategy a blow which was almost mortal. Nenni denounced the policy of the Soviet Government, but because he had been one of the keenest advocates of unity of action with the communists he was forced to resign as Secretary of the Italian Socialist Party in exile.

However, in 1941, when Russia entered the war against the Nazis, Nenni and Saragat (who had both found themselves in the minority) were able to re-launch a new alliance with the communists, which continued throughout the war and after. Nenni's personal experience in those years (his daughter died in a concentration camp and he himself spent a long period in prison) confirmed him in his conviction that the unity of working-class forces was all-important.

When democratic government re­vived in Italy after the liberation in 1945, Nenni played a vital role in the successful campaign for a republican constitution, using his slogan 'the constitution or chaos'. As the leader of the Socialist Party he held several high ministerial posts in the period 1945-7.

The orientation of the Socialist Party continued to be a leftwards one, even after the onset of the cold war in 1947 and the exclusion of the communists from government. The result was a split in the party which has lasted until the present time. It is doubtless too early for a final assessment of this period, but it is perhaps fair to say that the split did not make Nenni's task any easier. In any event, the lion of Italian socialism and his party found themselves excluded both from the revived Socialist International and from the national political life of Italy.

Through the 50s a slow evolution took place within the PSI. Above all the brutal suppression of the Hungarian Uprising in 1956 deeply affected the outlook of Italian socialists, revealing as it did the bankruptcy and danger of communism. Nenni placed himself at the head of this metamorphosis, and in 1963 led the PSI into the Centre-Left experiment. Although by no means an unqualified success, Italy is still ruled by a government of this character. The Centre-Left concept has undergone a good many ordeals in the last nine years, not the least of which was the splitting of the Socialist Party only a couple of years after the mending of the 1947 schism. The fact that the Centre-Left has survived all such crises has been due in no small measure to the efforts of Pietro Nenni.

Notwithstanding the contradictions which the story of his life reveals, Pietro Nenni is a man of integrity, a tremendously gifted leader of the masses of the kind that is fast disappearing from the modern political scene. Throughout his life he rode on the crest of the wave of history. And now at the age of 80 he is still prepared to carry on the old fight. As he himself told a special meeting of the PSI Executive to mark his birthday: 'I shall always be committed to continuing the struggle for peace and justice—in other words for socialism.'

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EASTERN EUROPE

Revolt of the Workers in Poland

ADAM CIOŁKOSZ

Adam Ciołkosz gives a detailed and well-informed account of the dramatic events which took place in Poland recently. He believes that the country-wide disturbances which led to the fall of Gomulka marked the emergence of the Polish working class 'as an independent social and political factor conscious of its own power.'

To summarise the present situation in Poland after the events of December 1970, one has to establish its three basic premises. Firstly, the era of Władysław Gomułka, the First Secretary of the Polish United Workers' Party (PZPR), came definitively to an end, while no other communist leader succeeded in replacing him firmly and indisputably. Secondly, the working class of Poland emerged as an independent social and political factor, conscious of its power. Thirdly, the economic situation remains desperate, thus creating constant revolutionising stress on the workers. Thus one has to assume that the workers' revolution on the Baltic shore, while marking a distinct caesura in Poland's post-war history, is only the opening of a series of dramatic events. The decisions adopted by the plenary meetings of the Central Committee on 20 December 1970 and 7 February 1971 settled very little, if anything. Poland remains on the edge of a volcano.

In events like those in Poznan of June 1956 or in Gdansk of December 1970 there is always a spark which falls upon inflammable material accumulated during long years and lights the fire. In 1970 events developed much more quickly than in 1955-6. The ground had been prepared by shortages of food which had plagued the workers' families since the autumn. There were shortages of meat, particularly pork, and shortages of coffee, these two items representing the indispensable ingredients of the working man's diet. The dockers of Gdansk, like dockers anywhere in the world, must have their meat. Their wives were in despair, which deepened as Christmas approached. Christmas Eve dinner is traditional in every Polish home, even if the inmates happen to be non-believers. It is their annual family reunion. It is looked forward to as the happiest day of the year.

It was destined not to be like that this time. On Saturday 12 December 1970 the cat was let out of the bag. Stanisław Kociołek, First Secretary of the party's provincial committee in Gdansk and a member of the Politbureau, a rather young man (37), then generally regarded as a possible

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successor to Gomulka, addressed an evening meeting of 3,000 workers in the Gdansk shipyard. He answered their complaints in a rather strange way—by telling them what the near future had in store for them. Whether by imprudence or impudence he revealed the secret of the decision adopted by the Council of Ministers in Warsaw that very same morning. The workers protested and requested that neither the Government’s decision be withdrawn or their wages be increased. Kociolek replied that neither was possible. The meeting ended in pandemonium, and the workers arriving at the Gdansk shipyard on the night shift went on strike. The dockers of Gdansk joined them.

The next morning the press announced the decisions taken by the Council of Ministers the previous day. First were listed the reductions, and only secondly the increases, in retail prices. But everybody looked at the increases first and found to his or her horror that beer had gone up by 19.1%, lard by 11.1%, and meat products by 18%. That was only the beginning of a list of increases consisting altogether of 46 items. In an attempt to balance the increases there were reductions on 40 items, mostly non-essentials. The only one to be taken seriously was that of matches, by 20.7%.

With a breathtaking jugglery of figures, the daily Trybuna Ludu attempted to convince the general public that during the next year, i.e. 1971, the difference in the cost of living should disappear, as a result, to quote, of the foreseen changes in the structure of purchase of food and industrial products. Therefore the effects on family budgets should be ‘relatively insignificant.’ The real incomes of working families in the lowest bracket would ‘temporarily’ be decreased by 2%. Obviously these over-wise people assumed that during the next year shopping habits would shift from coffee to paints and varnish, and from pork to fibre curtains. Naturally there was no ground for such an assumption. The feeling with which the news was accepted was the more bitter because the new scheme of material incentives in industry involved a freeze of workers’ wages for a year to come and made a reduction of earnings unavoidable. No wonder that the shipyard workers and dockers of Gdansk lost their composure.

The workers of Gdansk were—doubtless by chance—the first to receive the news of price increases. Thus they were the first to down tools and also the first to demonstrate in the streets of their city. Without going into details, we can make here the plain and simple assertion: this was a workers’ revolution characterized by four features. Firstly, the ORMO (the Voluntary Reserve of Citizens’ Militia—conceived and designed by the Communist Party to be a cohort of spies and traitors to the workers’ cause) refused to play the role assigned to it by the ‘people’s power’ and joined their colleagues en masse. Secondly, the workers refused to be mere shooting targets: if and when attacked they defended themselves and hit back. Thirdly, the hatred and contempt of the workers were directed first of all against the party apparatus and the Citizens’ Militia, i.e. police. Fourthly, a machinery of contact and solidarity developed spontaneously between the workers of various industrial centres.

**Spontaneous Organisation**

The last aspect is most revealing—and most important. There is a new working class in Poland, over 9 million strong, the majority of which have grown up in total ignorance of the pre-war workers’ movement. They have never belonged to any real and free trade union (the present-day trade unions being merely a ‘transmission belt’ of the party), and have never had any chance to voice freely their grievances and claims. Now, under the impact of both increases in prices and reductions in their earnings, they acted. And in action they created an adequate machinery: strike committees. They found their spokesmen and their liaison messengers. Instinctively and subconsciously, they copied the machinery which their forerunners had invented and improved step by step several decades ago. And as in former times, the spirit of solidarity found its expression most quickly and most easily among colleagues of the same trade or craft: dockers backed dockers, shipyard workers backed shipyard workers, and so on.

Perhaps the calendar of events may serve as an illustration. On Tuesday 15 December there were casualties in Gdansk, killed and wounded by the army and militia. The next day the shipyard workers and dockers of Gdynia struck in sympathy. On Thursday 17 December there were victims in Gdynia—hundreds of victims. On the same day shipyard workers and dockers in Szczecin struck in sympathy. I cite these three ports because in these three localities the clashes were the most violent and the most bloody. But I could also quote many other industrial centres, all over Poland, where the workers struck. This includes the capital. A mass demonstration of the workers of Warsaw was planned for Monday 21 December. Anonymous leaflets for that purpose circulated throughout the city and they would undoubtedly have produced a result.

To prevent a mass demonstration and a ‘day of wrath’ in the capital, the Politbureau decided to embark on an unusual step. A plenary meeting of the Central Committee was convened to take place on Sunday 20 December, only a few days after the previous such meeting—a step unprecedented in any country under communist rule. In fact, the plenary session took place, deposed Gomulka and his followers, and appointed Gierek as the new First Secretary. Gierek announced the news himself on Warsaw TV on the Sunday night. He also promised improvements in the material position of families in the lowest income brackets. The impression was that the party and the Government had surrendered, and that there was no point in demonstrating in Warsaw. The movement subsided.

The new regime has made a clean sweep of the Gomulka old guard. This was done in two stages: at successive plenary meetings of the Central Committee on 20 December 1970 and 7 February 1971. Of twelve members of the Politbureau six were dismissed, including Gomulka himself, whose rights as a member of the Central Committee have been suspended as a penalty for his ‘serious mistakes’. Of the nine members of the Secretariat they dismissed four, including Gomulka himself. An element of tragi-comedy may be traced in the fate of Stanislaw Kociolek, the man who started the whole chain reaction. He had been the young favourite of Gomulka. Early in his career he had been made first a substitute member, then a full member of the Politbureau. Surprisingly on 20 December 1970 he was promoted to become simultaneously a member of the Secretariat. But on 7 February 1971 he was obliged to resign from the Central Committee altogether. Together with Kliszko (ideology) and Jaszczuk (economics)
he was made the scapegoat for the crisis in the party and the upheaval on the Baltic coast. Neither was the Government and the Council of State spared. Josef Czarnikowicz, the 'iron' Prime Minister who on 17 December made a horrible and disgusting speech on radio and TV, was given a fictitious promotion to the totally uninfluential post of Chairman of the State Council. To make room for Czarnikowicz, Marshall Marian Spychalski, a creature of Gomulka's, was summarily dismissed and pensioned. A new Prime Minister was appointed in the person of Piotr Jaroszewicz, who as Vice-Prime Minister during last 13 years has been responsible for the conduct of all economic affairs, including the new system of material incentives in industry and the recent increases in retail prices.

What about Moczar? His position has greatly improved, since he was promoted to full membership of the Politbureau and given, within the Secretariat, responsibility for the armed forces and security, thus becoming the second most important man in the new set-up. The new Politbureau is composed of ten full and four substitute members. The new Secretariat has eight members. The support for Gierek and Moczar is about equally divided, with a few sitting on the fence.

An uneasy compromise has therefore been achieved, with two ideas in mind. Firstly, Gomulka and his friends, like Kliszko, Spychalski and Loga-Sowinski, must be completely eliminated because they were responsible for the collapse of party morale and the onset of panic. Secondly, the 'leading role', i.e. the dictatorship, of the party must be preserved. The compromise may work for a while, and the new balance of forces within the Politbureau and the Secretariat is likely to stick to the formula 'we hang together or we will be hanged together'. But in the longer run it is bound to embark on continuous intrigues and factional feuds.

The crisis would be the more permanent, though latent, since there is in the new leadership nobody of stature and respectability — certainly neither the abominable arrivist Moczar nor the simpleton apparatchik Gierek. The latter, after all, spent his younger days in the communist movements of France and Belgium, and only settled down in Poland in 1948. He therefore knows rather little about the Polish workers' movement, its past and its traditions.

For the time being, the agitated working masses might be pacified with a few personal changes and Gierek's promises of a new style of party activity, including closer contact with the workers. The same kind of promises were made by Gomulka after his comeback in 1956. No wonder they arouse little enthusiasm and much scepticism—the pattern is known too well. But neither are the masses in despair. First, they expected very little from the new party bosses and therefore will not be as disillusioned as they were after the revolt of 1956. Second, the experience of the Polish workers' movement teaches that sacrifices are never made in vain. After all, the revolt of 1956 at least resulted in the party's complete abandonment of the forcible collectivisation of agriculture, even if all the other achievements of the 'Polish October' have been systematically eroded and annulled.

Victory for the Workers

What have the workers achieved for themselves? The new Government, headed by Prime Minister Jaroszewicz and backed by Gierek, had not dared to cancel the December increases at once. It only promised not to increase them further during the next two years. Nevertheless, it had offered the workers some recompense in the form of higher allowances for families with the lowest incomes and a higher basic minimum wage. Furthermore, it was resolved to review and readjust both the state budget estimates and the state economic plan for the year 1971. Later it was also resolved to abandon the new scheme of material incentives in industry which had originally provoked the furious indignation of the workers in the Gdansk shipyard.

Finally, after 10,000 textile workers of Lodz had kept up five days of sit-down strikes in seven mills, Prime Minister Jaroszewicz announced on 15 February in a TV broadcast that on 1 March the increases in food prices would be repealed and cut back to the level in force before 13 December. It was great news, a decisive victory for all the workers of Poland.

There is no reason to be grateful to Gierek, and very little to be said in his praise. A man of a limited political capability and stature, he is a devoted and stubborn communist, and not likely to have a liberalising influence. His team, too, is composed of mediocrities—which does not augur well for the desperate plight of Poland's economy.

Important Change

Yet it would be wrong to overlook an extremely important change which occurred in Poland during the second half of December 1970. The 'workers' government' became afraid of the workers, and the workers suddenly became conscious of their strength. This is an experience they are not likely to forget or squander. True, there is no possibility of establishing a free workers' organisation, either openly or secretly. But it is now a proven fact that the workers' sixth sense, that of solidarity, works effectively even in conditions of totalitarian oppression and one-party dictatorship.

It is correct to say, as Gierek did in the February plenary meeting of the PZPR Central Committee, that the explosion on the Baltic shore was not of a counter-revolutionary character and therefore not directed against socialism. But it is also most certainly true that the recent revolt of Polish workers represented a protest against one-party rule and totalitarian methods. It sounded like: 'Socialism—yes, dictatorship—no' — a fundamental contradiction of everything Leninist communism stands for.

When in September 1947 the Polish Workers' Party under Gomulka crushed the strike of 40,000 textile workers in Lodz (Poland's 'Manchester'), it was fondly imagined that an end had been put to strikes in Poland once and for all. Time and again events have given this the lie. And the fact that in December 1970 both in Gdansk and in Szczecin the workers were quick to burn down the Communist Party's headquarters speaks for itself. The circumstances may compel the workers of Poland to tread cautiously and warily, with outbursts of fury in the intervals, but never will they deviate from their twofold aim and creed which they have proclaimed and paid for with their blood, both in Poznan in 1956 and on the Baltic shore in 1970. They want, quite simply, 'Bread and Freedom'. They are conscious that neither of the two will do in isolation from the other. Hence the latent but permanent enmity dividing the Polish workers from the Polish Communist Party, Gomulka or no Gomulka, Gierek or no Gierek.
Danish Socialists Facing an Election

K. B. ANDERSEN

A general election will probably be held in Denmark later this year. The Danish Social Democratic Party has been in opposition since January 1968. In this article the Party Secretary describes the prevailing political situation in Denmark and discusses his party's prospects of returning to power.

The time for a parliamentary election in Denmark is fast approaching. Perhaps the election will already have been declared when this is being read. It is more likely, however, that the election will take place in the autumn.

The last election took place in January 1968. According to the constitution the governmental span is four years, but the Government can at any time appeal to the country. There were thus parliamentary elections in 1964, in 1966 and again in 1968. It is fairly certain that the Government will not wait until January, which is not a suitable time for an election campaign. There is, therefore, a chance of an autumn election, or even a quickly declared election in the spring.

The election in 1968 led to a quite new political situation in Denmark, insofar as the Social Democratic Party, which had been in government uninterruptedly since 1953, had to give way to a non-socialist coalition government consisting of the Radical-Liberal Party, the Liberal Party and the Conservative Party. The new feature in this situation was not only that the Social Democratic Party had to hand over government but also that a completely new combination in Danish politics was thereby created, in that the Radicals 'changed sides'. Apart from participating in a coalition government for a short time directly after the 2nd World War, the Radical Party has never been in power together with the non-socialist parties. On the contrary, the party was for long periods through the thirties and again from 1957 to 1964, in a government coalition with the Social Democratic Party.

The Social Democratic Party has itself never had a majority, but has always had to rule as a minority government or in coalition governments. In the election of 1966 the Social Democratic Party and the Socialist People's Party—a party that was originally formed by a group which broke away from the Communist Party—together gained a majority. The Social Democratic Party formed a minority government and, supported by the Socialist People's Party, was able to carry through its socialist programme, something which had not previously been possible in co-operation with other parties. This led to a greater polarisation than had normally been known in Danish political life, in that the Radicals moved nearer to the Liberals and the Conservatives. In December 1967 the Socialist People's Party was split by the left wing of the party voting with the non-socialist parties and the Social Democratic minority Government was thereby brought down.

The present Government, which has by Danish standards a considerable majority behind it (namely 98 out of a total of 179 seats), set itself as its most important task to 'straighten out the country's economy'. The following was specified: to lower bank rate (the highest in Europe) and the deficit on the payments, and to check rising prices and taxation increases. In all these respects, however, the Government has failed to achieve its objective. The bank rate is higher than it has ever been during this century and the highest in Europe; the deficit on the balance of payments has doubled and is now—counted as a percentage of the gross national product—the largest in Europe; rising prices have continued and taxation has doubled in three years.

Where foreign policy is concerned there has not been any major divergence between the Government and the Social Democratic Party, either regarding NATO policy or regarding negotiations for entry into the European Economic Community. It is agreed that it must be a condition of Danish membership that Great Britain becomes a member of EEC, and that Nordic economic co-operation can be maintained.

Will the approaching election bring about a change of government? It is impossible to say, but there are indications that this may be so. Both Gallup and Oberva, the two institutes which undertake regular surveys of public opinion by somewhat differing methods, show the Government parties as having declined compared to the election in 1968. In the last Gallup Poll, the Government parties' share of the votes had fallen from 54 per cent in the 1968 election to 47 per cent, while the Social Democratic Party in all the opinion polls since the 1968 election has been placed considerably higher than the result which was gained at that time. At the moment the Social Democratic Party lies round about 40 per cent as compared with 34 in 1968. The question is—how many votes will the parties to the left of the Social Democrats get? In the last Gallup poll they had 10-10 per cent. Finally, a new and uncertain card has popped up in the voting game in the shape of a Christian People's Party, which has been formed chiefly by dissatisfied non-socialist electors. The election may result in the new party holding the balance.

In this situation it is interesting to note that the Liberal Party and the Conservative Party still talk as if a continuation of the government coalition with the Radicals is the only possibility after the election, while the Social Democratic Party's Chairman, former Prime Minister Jens Otto Krag, states that his party wants to maintain an independent position in the possibly very difficult government negotiations which may arise. Moreover, the present Prime Minister, the Radical Hilmar Baunsgaard, talks more openly than his coalition partners about possibilities of forming a government after the election.

The Social Democratic Party, which in the spring of 1970 had the best municipal election in the history of the party, awaits the election optimistically; but is at the same time quite aware that there is a hard election.
campaign ahead. The Liberal Party and the Conservative Party will not willingly surrender the power of government, despite having been unable in the last three years to solve or even improve the country's economic predicament. The Social Democratic Party is prepared to take on the responsibility of government again; but when the election results are known, it will weigh up very carefully how a new government can best be formed so as to provide it with reasonable working conditions.

SOCIALISTS AND EUROPEAN SECURITY

Progress on Berlin is the Key

GEORGE THOMSON

Britain's Shadow Defence Minister sets out the attitude of the British Labour Party to the proposal for a conference on European security. He feels that a major breakthrough or a major setback in East-West relations could be imminent, and specifies the Berlin issue as the crucial litmus test.*

The British Labour Party regards the key to world peace as still lying in the heart of Europe. There are, of course, important north-south problems. There are also urgent international dangers in the Middle East. Nevertheless, the danger of international conflict from either north-south problems or Middle East tensions is the danger of conflict by accident. The heart of the balance of power on which the peace of the world depends today is still in Europe and is the balance between the Atlantic Alliance on the one side and the Warsaw Pact Alliance on the other. It is against that background that we in the British Labour Party approach these problems.

My view is that we are probably at the beginning of a very critical period in the relationship between Eastern and Western Europe. In one way I believe that we could be on the verge of a major breakthrough in East-West relations. On the other hand, if the breakthrough is not achieved, then I think we must face the fact that we will probably find ourselves conscious of a very sharp setback. The prospects of a European Security Conference have been considerably increased over the last few months. By this I mean the prospects of a European security conference which has been properly prepared, which has the right sort of attendance and which has an agenda that will enable it to do serious business. This kind of European security conference, which is, I believe, now a possibility, is of course a long way from the original proposal of the Soviet Bloc, which was much more a propaganda manoeuvre than a proposal for making a real and constructive contribution to European détente.

Why has this change come about? Why are there these possibilities either of breakthrough or of setback? The major new event in the European field has been the Ostpolitik pursued by the German Chancellor, Willy Brandt, and by the Government led by the German Social Democratic Party. We in Britain have watched with both anxiety and admiration the progress that Willy Brandt has made in his negotiations with the Soviet Union, with Poland and indeed with other Eastern European countries. He has signed treaties with the Soviet Union and Poland, subject to ratification, and this has of course transformed the possibilities in East-West relations in Europe.

This is because the heart of the European problem remains the German problem. No one needs to be reminded of the very deep suspicion which has existed through the whole post-war period in Poland and the Soviet Union of German motives and German policies. Often these suspicions have been deliberately fanned and exaggerated by the communists for political purposes. Nevertheless it remains a fact that underneat the political provocation there was a very real hard core of fear and suspicion. It is the eroding of that fear and suspicion which is the remarkable achievement of Willy Brandt and of the present Federal German Government.

We must be conscious also, as socialists, not only of the constructive nature of the work that Brandt and his Government have undertaken in the field of East-West relations, but also of the great political risk that he has taken in so doing. He is, after all, the leader of a coalition government with an extremely narrow majority.

Because of this background, it is important to record that Willy Brandt now needs and deserves some positive sign of response from the Soviet Union and from the Eastern Bloc. It is in this sense that I believe that on the one hand there is the possibility of a major breakthrough. Yet on the other hand, if the breakthrough does not come, the very fact that Brandt has gone as far as he has and that hopes have been raised in the way that they have, could lead to quite a significant and sad setback. Certainly my own impression of the German political scene is that Willy Brandt is under very substantial pressure at the moment in his own country.

The position that Willy Brandt has taken, which the British Labour Party has very strongly supported, is that we have now come to a stage where progress in relation to the problem of Berlin is a reasonable and necessary pre-requisite to making progress in the direction of a European security conference. Perhaps I could explain why we attach such vital importance to progress on Berlin at the present time. First of all, it is important in human terms that the people of Berlin should have much freer movement and that there should be altogether much easier access. All the parties of the International should be conscious of the general duty that the socialist movement has to preserve human liberty inside Berlin. Secondly, I believe it is perfectly proper to say that if the Soviet Union is really acting in good faith in demanding a European security conference leading to progress and détente, then Berlin is a reasonable test of that good faith.

Finally, from the point of view of Britain and the other West Berlin powers (to say nothing of the point of view of the Soviet Union), if there is to be progress towards East-West détente it is very important indeed that the four-power responsibilities in relation to Berlin are reasserted and safeguarded. In the first place, it is important to Britain, as a Western

*This article, exclusive to SOCIALIST AFFAIRS, is based on an address which George Thomson gave to the January 19 meeting of the Bureau of the Socialist International in London.
power guaranteeing liberty in Berlin, that the progress of the Ostpolitik is not of such a nature that Britain, France and the United States end up with continued responsibilities in West Berlin but with their rights to fulfill these responsibilities undermined by whatever agreement might be reached. Equally, there is a good deal of evidence that the Soviet Union is not anxious for its share of the Four Power responsibility for Berlin to be undermined in favour of East Germany.

I would now like to consider the question of a European security conference itself—what it ought to seek to achieve and what would be the problems facing it. First of all, I would emphasize the very noticeable improvement which has taken place in regard to the communist conditions for a European security conference. Eighteen months ago it was by no means clear that the communists would not once again seek to use a European security conference to try to drive a wedge between the European allies within NATO and the United States and Canada. Now it has been, I believe, established beyond doubt that Canada and the United States would be members of such a conference without question from the beginning.

Secondly, there was a very great reluctance on the part of the Eastern Bloc even to consider the question of mutual force reductions being a part of the agenda of a European security conference. Although the communist position is not as clear on this as it is on the membership of the conference, I think there are some signs of movement on the Eastern side.

And finally, there has been the idea of the conference leading to the establishment of some kind of permanent machinery. To begin with, this idea was greeted with great scepticism by the communist side. Once again there have been signs of movement here.

As the British Labour Party sees it, the purposes of a European security conference would be three-fold. First of all, talking the easiest aspect, which the communists side has always emphasized, it would no doubt be useful to discuss at a general European conference the means of improving the momentum of exchanges in the technical, social and economic fields. These go on at the moment; they can always benefit from an extra impetus. But this part of the conference would be largely declaratory. Real progress in East-West exchanges in the technical and social fields is bound to be achieved on a bi-lateral basis rather than multi-laterally. Indeed, if one tried to set up multi-lateral machinery for this purpose I think you would retard the pace of progress rather than speed it up.

Secondly, there is the question of the conference leading to some continuing machinery. This is something in which we in the British Labour Party have been very interested for a considerable time. Indeed, it was Michael Stewart, as our Foreign Secretary, who can claim to have taken a leading part in trying to promote this idea within the Atlantic Alliance. What we envisage is the emergence of permanent East-West machinery on the political plane that would match the European Economic Commission (which is an East-West forum in Geneva) on the economic plane. We would not think of this as any dramatic breakthrough. Nevertheless, the establishment of continuing machinery would make a constructive contribution, and would help to enable those countries in Eastern Europe who have a different emphasis on various problems from that of the Soviet Union to be given the maximum opportunity to develop that difference of emphasis and to enable Europe generally to talk about its problems with a greater sense of continuity.

Finally, there is the main question of promoting security; that is, the problem of producing some kind of reduction of armaments inside Europe. The NATO countries have been putting forward proposals for balanced force reductions for a considerable time now, with until very recently a totally negative response from the communist side. We ought not to conceal the very substantial difficulties involved in making a reality of mutual force reductions. The Warsaw Pact countries have an overwhelming preponderance of conventional forces as against those deployed by the NATO countries. And therefore the key formula in terms of mutual force reductions which we must always keep in mind is the concept of what I would call equality of security. By this I mean that it is not enough to take arithmetically the same number of forces from each side. You have to take forces from each side in a way which at any stage in the process leaves security in as good a state as it was before the process began. And this may very well mean an asymmetrical reduction in forces—a different volume of force reduction on the Warsaw Pact side as compared with reductions on the NATO side. Simply to put it that way underlines the very considerable difficulties involved in making progress.

The final question is whether, in fact, the Soviet Union and its allies are now really serious in wanting to make progress or whether they still simply see a European security conference as a method of making people forget as quickly as possible the 1968 events in Czechoslovakia and of helping to legitimate the status quo in Europe. I believe myself that there are cautious grounds for believing that the Soviet Bloc may mean some kind of business in this field. First of all, the Soviet Union itself obviously has an interest in arrangements on its Western flank that safeguard whatever might develop on its Eastern flank, where it has the longest and most disputed frontier in the world with China.

Secondly, I would guess from what contacts I have these days with the communist side that probably there is an increasing awareness of the political risks that Brandt has taken in Germany and of the risk that the Ostpolitik might go under if it is not given some concessions which demonstrate its success to public opinion inside Germany. Thirdly, there are the differences within the Eastern Bloc to which I have referred. These probably encourage progress rather than discourage it. Finally, there is the fact that the Soviet Union is engaged in the SALT talks with the United States. Although these talks have now gone on for some time without visible progress, what is significant is that they have continued despite a number of events in various parts of the world which might easily have led either side in the talks to have broken them off. There have been crises between the Soviet Union and the US over the Middle East; the SALT talks have gone on. There has been the fact that the Soviet Union appeared to behave provocatively near the shores of Cuba; the SALT talks have gone on. One can draw from this the conclusion that both sides in the SALT talks are talking seriously. This fact has large implications both for the future of Western Europe and for the prospects of a European security conference.
SOCIALISM IN ASIA

Indonesian Socialism After Sukarno

MARY SARAN

The former Secretary of the International Council of Social Democratic Women puts the present pre-election situation in historical perspective and describes the attempts of the country’s socialist movement to re-emerge as a real force after years of suppression.

Last year I spent four weeks in Indonesia. It was my first visit. Eight years before, when I took part in a socialist conference, the Indonesian Socialist Party (PSI) had been prohibited by Sukarno since 1960. Many party officials were in jail, including the Chairman, Sutan Sjahrir. The latter had twice been prime minister after the 2nd World War and was the Indonesian representative who successfully pleaded for Indonesia’s independence before the UN. He was also co-founder of the Asian Socialist Conference. Sjahrir, probably the most outstanding socialist leader in Asia, died in Switzerland in 1966 aged 56. Desperately ill, and no longer a rival to be feared, he had at last been freed by Sukarno. But he had lived to see a dawn. The dawn in question was the end of the Sukarno regime.

All those I talked to in Indonesia, and today even most communists, accept as a fact that the end came as the result of an abortive communist action in which Sukarno was deeply involved. The action was known as the ‘Movement of 30th September’ because its main planned event occurred in the night of 30 September-1 October 1965.

That night saw the assassination of six generals (the seventh and most important on the list, Nasution, escaped). Ironically the name of the action in initials read GESTAPU. What happened was not a coup in the usual sense of the word, because the action was not directed against Sukarno. The President was a close ally of the Communist Party (KPI), whom he needed to achieve its final aim, namely, the establishment of a communist state as part of the Peking-Djakarta Axis. The purpose was, rather, to purge the General Staff by liquidating those generals with whom the KPI had eventually to reckon as determined and influential opponents—especially in the case of Sukarno’s death, which then seemed not very far off.

In the event, Sukarno was unable to extricate himself from the communist debacle, despite desperate attempts to discredit his allies after their action had failed (in Peking he was promptly denounced as a traitor). Isolated from the world, Sukarno died in 1970 in the villa where he had spent the last years of his life as a prisoner.

My main interest in Indonesia, however, was to gain a better understanding of the position of the socialists. I knew that all the political parties allowed under Sukarno, except the KPI, were again able to function, but that the PSI had not been rehabilitated. This seemed rather absurd, because the socialists had supported the new regime from the start. They had realised that only the army could halt the apparently irresistible advance of communism in the state. They had again become very active, especially among the youth and the students; and having been freed from the nightmare of communist terror were, like wide sections of the people throughout the country, ready to give the new rulers credit.

Before considering why the PSI was nevertheless not legalised, however, I shall briefly describe its historical role, since too little is known about this, even among socialists.

Before Independence. The socialists were among the leaders of the national independence movement. They fought against the Dutch colonial regime, but also organised resistance against Japanese occupation. A conflict arose between Sjahrir and Sukarno, leader of the Nationalist Party (PNI), over relations with the Japanese occupation regime. Sjahrir rejected collaboration and remained in prison. Sukarno on the other hand accepted a prominent post in the administration.

After the Allied victory. After the withdrawal of the Japanese, a united front of practically all parties was formed against the return of the former colonial power and in support of the national revolution, for which broadly socialist aims were proclaimed. Sjahrir was at the head of the Republic, set up in 1945. The national united front, so energetically promoted by the KPI, was broken up by that party in 1948 when it tried to seize power in the Madiun Revolt. This was a stab in the back of the Republic, which at that time was still fighting Dutch troops. On that occasion, as after the abortive action in 1965, the KPI and its apologists tried to present the revolt as a mere response to provocations.

Cooperation between socialists and communists then ceased. The PSI, into which many communists had infiltrated, was split. The programme of the reconstructed PSI stressed that democracy and socialism were indivisible and took a clear stand against both the old and the new (Soviet) imperialism.

1948-1957. This was a period of democratic parliamentarism, with rapidly changing coalition governments. Indonesia’s one and only general election to date was held in 1955. The results were most disappointing for the socialists. Instead of the 20 per cent they and others had expected, they polled only 2 per cent of the vote and won five seats. This certainly did not fairly reflect their influence and the respect in which they were held. It reflected, rather, an organisational inability to turn these assets into votes. Four main parties were the victors: the PNI, Masjumi (a progressive Muslim party, with a religious-socialist bent), Nahdatul Ulama (NU, orthodox Muslim) and the PKI (in opposition).

Defeat did not drive away the membership of the PSI. By October 1956 membership had risen to 100,000; a year later to 200,000. Socialist influence in the trade unions was generally considered constructive and was by no means negligible quantitatively. But the PSI was still a cadre party, pre-occupied with clarifying ideas and training activists—though the idea was that this would provide the basis for a solid mass party able to resist communist infiltration. Practically the consequence was, as Saul Rose commented in Socialism in...
Southern Asia (Oxford University Press, 1959), that while the PSI was successfully engaged in fundamental re-thinking ('agonising re-appraisal' Rose calls it) other parties gathered in the members — and indeed the votes!

Presidential Regime (1957–65). Sukarno abolished democratic institutions or froze them. Instead he introduced 'guided democracy', supposed to be an ancient traditional system of the Indonesian village community, in which no votes are taken but a consensus is sought. Sukarno applied his own interpretation by first of all assigning almost unlimited powers to the president, and by proclaiming three parties — PNI, NU and KPI—the only representative forces and this in permanence. Thus for the first time the communists entered the Government. They knew how to utilise this chance. Against their centralised organisation and the activism of their members, the other two partners were unable to compete. Moreover, the KPI increasingly had the ear of the President on all important issues. All possible opposition was eliminated by the oppression of the large Masjumi and the small PSI, and by the imprisonment of their leaders.

Suharto's Regime. In March 1966 Sukarno finally handed over power to General Suharto when he saw that the game was definitely lost. The KPI and its mass organisations were prohibited. In 1968 Suharto was confirmed as President by the old Provisional Assembly, half of whose members were still those appointed by Sukarno. He promised to hold elections in 1971. The PSI and the Masjumi remained prohibited.

Thus we are back at the starting point. Why is Sukarno's ban on these two parties still maintained? Despite all my efforts to find an answer to this question, I could discover no plausible reasons. The motives of the Suharto Government are not always clear — this I had to accept. Every-

2 It seems that not all the members of PNI and NU were satisfied with their fate in the triumvirate of 'representative' parties. Eye witnesses told me that some members of these parties took part in the murderous vendetta against the KPI which followed upon the GESTAPU affair. No doubt, in many places personal accounts were settled spontaneously in these assassinations. Furthermore, some wanted to purge themselves from their former association with the Communists by being to the fore in these killings.

where I was told that the Government really had nothing against the PSI but did not wish to revive the Masjumi, and could not see a way of allowing one but not the other, since both were in the same category. This is not very convincing.

In fact, I gave up trying to solve this riddle. Suffice it to say that the Government has shown sympathy towards individual socialists, a number of whom today occupy important posts at all levels, for example in the foreign service (the ambassador to the USA is a socialist), in the ministries, in the administration, even in the highest consultative council which advises the President. In spite of some misgivings, there were strong reasons in favour of acceptance of these posts.

The Indonesian socialists could not let the opportunity of co-operating in the establishment of freer and more just conditions simply pass by. In several places I had long discussions with socialist groups. We met undisturbed in private houses, sometimes with more than fifty people present. Mostly the question of greatest interest was whether there was for socialists an alternative to supporting the present military government. The only realistic answer was 'No'.

Another factor must be mentioned here which can become important for Indonesian socialists. The four socialist organisations which were originally linked with the PSI—those of the women, youth, students and peasants — were formally still in existence under Sukarno though deprived of the possibility of action. They have now been admitted to the 'Functional Secretariat'. This Secretariat was instituted by the Suharto Government and will make it possible for non-party political organisations to be represented in the coming elections. The four above-mentioned socialist groups have now formed a joint body—the 'Democratic Movement for Development'. I took part in a founding meeting of a local branch of this body in Surabaya. The meeting was well prepared and everything went off well. I was told in Jakarta that such joint bodies were being set up in many parts of the country, in fact in far greater numbers than had been expected.

Elections have been fixed for July 1971, simultaneously for the national, provincial and district parliaments. Nine parties will put up candidates, as well as the Functional Secretariat. An election law has been promulgated with the aim of preventing any KPI elements from making a come-back through the election campaign. Members of the former KPI and its auxiliary mass organisations have no right to vote or to be elected; the same applies to all who were involved in the GESTAPU action.

It is likely that the elections will have a result favourable to the Government, not least because it will nominate 100 members (out of 460) of the National Assembly. Apart from this, it may have a considerable influence over the candidates of the Functional Secretariat. The political parties, moreover, are weak and divided. Thus a question arises why elections are to take place so soon, when the Government does not dare to proceed according to democratic rules. The answer seems to be that the Government is urgently concerned to create for itself a legal basis of a somewhat democratic kind, but without risking its position. Hence the elections in the form I have outlined.

If one examines calmly the background and record of the Government to date, one must reject the accusations of some Left circles in Europe and the USA who speak of a neo-fascist or even fascist regime. The trade unions, to mention briefly another aspect of the situation, are now able to breathe more freely again. In some of the trade union organisations attempts are being made to shake off the dependence on political parties which split the movement for far too long in the past and estranged it from its real tasks. As conditions become more stable, so one must hope, the trade unions will one day be able to digest the former communists who are at present — and millions are involved — allowed to join any union.

In spite of their heavy losses the communists have quickly regrouped themselves and undoubtedly operate illegally. They still have followers in the country and mighty friends abroad (leading officials who are mainly in Peking). Whether the communists will have the chance for a 'third Madiun' depends on many factors, both within and outside Indonesia. Political, economic and social stabilisation and improvement in all spheres — of course these have an intrinsic value in any case—are the most important tasks. The Indonesian socialists consider it their duty to make their contribution to this task in as far as it lies within their power.
Commentary

South African Arms

TOM MCNALLY* writes: Nothing is more depressing about British Conservative foreign policy than its almost open contempt for the Commonwealth. It is depressing because it means that the Conservative Party is still characterised by a chronic inability to come to terms with the modern world.

In recent years it has become clear that the twin challenges of the next two decades will be race and poverty. The tensions caused by the differences in wealth between the white, developed, industrial nations and the coloured, under-developed, primary-producing nations will be among the greatest dangers to world peace. Nowhere is this danger more obvious than in southern Africa, where the white elite clings to power and privilege at the expense of its black fellow citizens.

The Commonwealth offers a unique opportunity for British statesmen with vision and ability to play a decisive role in bridging this gulf between the rich white and poor black nations. If the Soviet Union can destroy such an organisation simply by pandering to the British Prime Minister's paranoia and stationing two frigates off Singapore, it will be one of the cheapest victories since Joshua brought down the walls of Jericho. Yet by contemplating the sale of arms to South Africa the present British Government will almost certainly destroy the Commonwealth and at the same time expose large sections of Africa to Communist subversion — a greater threat to British interests than any number of Soviet ships in the Indian Ocean.

Even if we put aside the moral factors concerning the nature of the apartheid regime in South Africa, let us examine the following facts.

1. If Mr. Heath has based his decision on obligations under the Simonstown Agreement, why did the South African Government not challenge the Labour Government's legal definition between 1964 and 1970? The legal obligation ended in 1963. That was the clear advice given to the last Labour Government and not once did the South African Government challenge the legality of that decision or the right of the Labour Government to refuse arms. Even the present Government's own Law Officers claim no further obligation than to supply a handful of Wasp Helicopters.

2. If Mr. Heath believes (and he has said on a number of occasions that this is so) that to refuse to sell arms will damage our trading position, has he fully considered the fact that last year Britain exported more goods to black Africa than to South Africa (actual figures in the first 6 months: £187.3 million to Black Africa and £161 million to South Africa)?

3. If he sees the major danger being in terms of Russian control of the Cape Route (and he has said this on occasions), he should consider the following facts:

(a) neither NATO nor the USA have accepted the validity of his arguments;
(b) of nearly 35,000 merchant ships which rounded the Cape between June 1967 and December 1969, only 3,000 were British (in fact only 5% of dry cargo shipped in and out of Britain goes round the Cape); (c) if oil supplies are his fear, then he is at odds with the oil companies, who fear no such interference (all military advice pointing to the fact that if the Russians seriously wanted to intercept British shipping they would do so further north near the Gulf or the approaches to the English Channel rather than try and mount such an operation thousands of miles from base where interception would be at its most difficult); (d) finally, there is the political argument: does Mr. Heath really think that British interests will be furthered by undermining the United Nations and making Britain the clearly ally of white supremacy in Southern Africa?

As we have seen in Uganda and elsewhere — the emerging nations of the Commonwealth have regimes vulnerable to take-over. If those regimes which have advocated moderation in southern Africa are publicly snubbed then the way is open for subversion. The Chinese and the Soviet Union must be unable to believe their luck that a British Government seems so determined to alienate black Africa. These Governments already feel threatened by the military and economic subversion practised by South Africa. For Britain to go ahead with arms will have repercussions as deep as the Aswan Dam decision had on the Middle East. Every justification which Mr. Heath has put up — economic, political, military — has been knocked down by experts and he now searches for justification by trying to re-interpret the small print of a fifteen-year-old treaty.

The magnitude of the decision now being contemplated must not be underestimated. In 1967 Lester Pearson, then Prime Minister of Canada, warned that the Commonwealth could not compromise with racialism in southern Africa. He said: 'As a multi-racial association, its very existence is at stake in this question: nothing less than that. This is contrary not only to democratic principles and basic human rights, but it violates the multi-racial character of our Commonwealth and could destroy our association.' This warning is equally valid today. If Mr. Heath does destroy the Commonwealth he will not only be doing grievous damage to British interests, he will be robbing Britain of the opportunity of playing a major role in finding peaceful solutions to problems which constitute major threats to world peace.

Dominican Terror

PIERRE SCHORI* writes: 'It is necessary for the United States to resort to all kinds of repressive methods in order to subdue us. This we note with pride, because it means that we are strong and that the revolutionary climate is so strong in our country that there is no other way to stop us.'

This declaration was made by José Francisco Peña Gomez—General Secretary of the Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD)—at a press conference in Stockholm on January 26. Peña Gomez was heading a delegation of six representatives of his party. They were invited to Sweden by the Social Demo-

* Pierre Schori is International Secretary of the Swedish Social Democratic Labour Party.
The PRD, which is led by former President Juan Bosch (who was deposed from the presidency in 1965 following an invasion by American marines), is the only political organisation in Latin America which gets material aid from the Swedish party’s international solidarity fund. So far, $25,000 have been given, to be used for, among other things, seminars, trade union organisation and political training.

'The United States', continued Peña Gomez, 'is directing the whole state apparatus, the army, the police and above all the economy of the Dominican Republic. We also know that several ministries are completely directed by the United States. The American Embassy in Santa Domingo is gigantic, one of the five biggest in the world if you count the personnel. We also know that the American organisation USAID pays CIA people who operate at all levels in the whole of the state apparatus. We know this from the statements made by the former Deputy Director of USAID in the Dominican Republic who, disgusted by the organisation’s intervention in our domestic affairs, resigned his post in protest.'

The PRD General Secretary went on: 'The Government of the United States and its puppet in the Dominican Republic, the Balaguer regime, know our strength and therefore resort to physical liquidation. As late as last week, ten members of our Party were murdered. President Balaguer himself talked about "uncontrollable forces" as being responsible for the assassinations. To this we say two things. First, these uncontrollable forces have an embassy in our country. Second, how can the Balaguer regime claim to be democratic when it cannot even guarantee the life and security of its citizens?'

'The regime, which won the elections last year, represents the extreme right and continues in practice the policy of the previous dictator Trujillo', said Peña Gomez. 'Our party could not participate in the elections of last year, because there is room neither for representative democracy, nor for a genuine opposition party within parliamentarism in the Dominican Republic.

'There is too much repression, fraud and violence, as there was during the election campaign. We also know that the United States will not allow clean elections. 500 people have been murdered since Balaguer took power in 1966. Today my country is occupied territory. The military is encamped in the suburbs of Santa Domingo, where the PRD has its stronghold. Night and day the streets are patrolled by armoured cars and heavily armed police. At the same time, the regime creates shadow organisations parallel to our popular organisations. This is particularly the case in the trade union field, where the PRD majority is over 70%. We also know from the former Deputy Director of USAID that the United States Labour Attaché pays and directs the functionaries of the shadow trade unions. Our movement is probably the biggest revolutionary mass movement in Latin America and we control all the popular organisations in the country', concluded Peña Gomez.

The primary aim of the PRD visit to Europe was to alert public opinion about the deteriorating situation in the Dominican Republic. Not even in Puerto Rico, half an hour by air from Santa Domingo, does news about the wave of terrorism against the democratic opposition in that country come out. Peña Gomez appealed to all democratic European organisations to protest against the repression and direct telegrams of solidarity to the PRD.

In Sweden the delegation had meetings with Olof Palme and Party Secretary Sten Anderson. Both expressed their grave concern over the situation and expressed the Swedish Social Democratic Party’s solidarity with PRD in its struggle to stop the terrorism.

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Allende’s Progress

Carlos Parra* writes: The news that Chile’s long-oppressed minority Indians have been taking over land in some parts of the country should not lead anyone to jump to the easy conclusion that President Salvador Allende’s programme of socialist transformation has got out of hand.

Land seizure by the Indian peasants has indeed become increasingly widespread in the southern part of the country since the triumph of the Popular Unity front in last year’s election. But it should be remembered, in the first place, that in former times these Indians were themselves possessed of the very same land. In the second place, it was precisely this kind of upsurge of consciousness on the part of the deprived urban and peasant masses which the Popular Unity strategy was aiming to achieve.

It is clear that President Allende’s Government has the situation well in hand. The Agriculture Minister, Jacques Chonchol, was dispatched to the centre of the land-seizing movement at Temuco. There he has been mediating personally, hearing complaints and petitions and explaining that the Government is speedily preparing a comprehensive agrarian reform bill to meet the needs of Chile’s depressed three million peasants. ‘I welcome the agitation which we face today, as long as it is compatible with our resources,’ announced the Minister.

The Government’s agrarian reform proposals include the setting up of a National Peasant Council to ‘politicize’ the peasants locally and to shape agricultural policy nationally. Only a quarter of Chile’s cultivable land is being farmed at present. The job of the new Council will be to bring more land into productive use, as well as to advise on the expropriation of large estates and their sub-division into smaller units. Long-term proposals include investment in education to raise the level of the Indians’ skill and the creation of collective farms. It is also intended that the smaller farms should find it easier to obtain credit facilities.

The new Government has also been giving considerable attention to honouring its election pledges on Chilean industry. A major promise made by the Popular Unity was fulfilled at the end of December when in front of the Moneda presidential palace Salvador Allende signed a bill to go before Congress which nationalises all mineral deposits in Chile (with the exception of sand and gravel). The measure is aimed principally at bringing Chile’s great national resource—copper—under the control of the nation. As President Allende told the assembled crowd on that occasion, between 1930 and 1969 the large copper-mining companies had sucked
resources out of the country to the value of $3,700 million. The total loss in resources over the same period approached $10,000 million. The nationalisation bill was passed immediately by Congress.

Maintaining the Government's impetus into the new year, President Allende announced his plans for nationalising Chile's 24 private banks. This fulfils another of his election pledges, although the opposition to these proposals coming from the Christian Democrats (on whom the Popular Unity depends for a majority in the Chilean Congress) suggests that they may have a much more difficult passage than the copper nationalisation bill.

In the field of foreign policy the Allende Government has not been less active. After restoring diplomatic relations with Cuba nine days after taking office, the new regime went on to announce recognition of Communist China. The Formosan ambassador left Santiago on the same day. Chile has, moreover, opened trade relations with North Korea and 'consular' relations with East Germany.

All these moves are being watched with close attention by the Left throughout Latin America. Already the trail blazed by the Popular Unity in Chile is being followed by the forces of the Left in Argentina and Uruguay, in both of which countries political alignments have been created based on the Chilean model. It is in this sense that the outcome of the Chilean experiment is of vital importance. And as the Congress of the Socialist Party—Allende's own party—met in La Serena (a northern city) last month, the delegates had reason for satisfaction at what had already been achieved and for optimism at what was yet to come.

OBITUARY

Nath Pai

ZVI HAMOR* writes: The passing of Nath Pai deprives India of one of its most brilliant parliamentarians and the international socialist movement of a most loyal comrade.

Some twenty years ago, when much of Asia and Africa was still under colonial rule or recently emerged from it, there were several young Asians and Africans studying in Britain who were destined to play major roles in the leadership of the newly established states or in the struggle for independence. One of these was Nath Pai.

At the London School of Economics, from which he graduated with distinction, Nath Pai gathered around him students of the 'third world' who began to challenge the supremacy of Europe in socialist thinking. He was the driving force in a campaign which resulted in an Asian being elected the first non-European President of the LSE Students' Union. He was a founder member of the Indian Socialist Group in London and of the British Overseas Socialist Fellowship, of which he later became Chairman. And he was active in the Bureau of the International Union of Socialist Youth, becoming the first Asian to be elected President of that movement.

On his return to India, Nath Pai resumed activity in the Praja Socialist Party (of which he had remained a member during his stay abroad), and was soon elected to the Lok Sabha as one of the youngest members of parliament.

Among the small but talented group of PSP MPs, Nath Pai took his place with ease. His ability, devotion and contact with the grass roots of the labour movement, combined with his powers of analysis and rhetoric, fashioned him into one of India's leading parliamentary figures. Had he chosen to leave his colleagues he could easily have become a member of the government.

At the present time, when the coming elections in India may present the Praja Socialist Party with the opportunity to participate in government, the absence of Nath Pai will be sorely felt. More than this, he will be missed in the ranks of the party and the trade union movement, in which he played a leading role. The loss will also be felt in the world brotherhood of democratic socialists which is the Socialist International.

Nath Pai will long be remembered among those of us who are honoured to have been counted among his friends.

*Zvi Harmor (Israel Labour Party) is Vice-Chairman of the Asia-Pacific Socialist Bureau of the Socialist International.

LETTER

Wedgwood Benn
Assuming Too Much

Sir, An article entitled 'In praise of workers' control' written by Anthony Wedgwood Benn, who was technological overlord in the Labour Government and who is a self-styled left-winger, should make interesting and worthwhile reading. The one printed in your January issue did not. Mesthinks that he doth assume too much.

Mr. Benn assumes that '300 years free of violent revolution' is a guarantee that nothing has changed. He is wrong. There is a new society in Britain (not necessarily worse) and new social patterns. Once the strike was the ultimate weapon of the worker in his fight for justice against the exploiting employer. Who can make this claim today without his tongue tucked well into his cheek?

Mr. Benn assumes that the voters control something (it is not quite clear exactly what) in Britain. But not even a Labour Government nationalised the land, which is the basic of all public resources. It is true, in a limited sense, that MPs are now hired and fired by the voters, but the voter does not hire and fire the civil servants and that is the parallel with management. It is Parliament that decides on policy (as submitted by a majority controlled government), but it is the civil service which 'runs the business'.

Another illusion is the example of workers' control in the mass media. It would seem that there is too much of it at the present. Each reporter and commentator is free to reach a public of millions with his own ideas on matters of great importance, even when such ideas are based on prejudice or ignorance, or even deliberate mischief.

One would have hoped for something better from Mr. Benn. His article may have sufficed if the idea of workers' control was something he had just invented. But we know that experiments have been going on in this field in several countries for many years, and it should have been possible for him to attempt an analysis of what has been done together with some more concrete proposals which could apply to the British situation.

London
DAVID YORK

SOCIALIST AFFAIRS
The Time is Right for a Dialogue

GIUSEPPE TAMBUURANO

The writer, who is a Central Committee member of the Italian Socialist Party (PSI), argues that both the communist and the social democratic models have been proved deficient. He believes that the time has come to try to heal the old split in the working class movement on the basis of genuine socialism.*

The problem of relations between socialists and communists has to be considered from two distinct points of view: firstly, that concerned with relations between socialist governments and communist states (for example, Brandt's Ostpolitik or Eastern Policy); and secondly, that concerned with relations between socialist and communist parties within a particular country.

Relations between governments are essentially influenced by national interests and the aims of foreign policy (although an ideological element may intrude where diplomatic relations are intended to lead to a certain political understanding between the parties in question). Relations between political parties are also influenced by political and governmental factors; but in general these relations respond to factors of an ideological kind. Whether we like it or not, socialists and communists have the same origins. They claim to spring from the same class and their general declared aims are similar. It is accordingly inevitable that their relations will be marked by very special significance.

I shall only touch here upon the question of inter-party relationships and ignore altogether the question of inter-governmental relationships.

By and large socialists have refused, and still refuse, to collaborate with communist parties because of the very nature of these parties, which is both authoritarian and totalitarian. This is not the absolute rule: from the Popular Front in France to the socialist-communist alliance in Finland there have been from time to time varying degrees of co-operation and collaboration. In Italy for more than five years Socialists and Communists worked together and were very near to forming a single party; but then they went separate ways and engaged in bitter struggle against each other. After the 2nd World War, both in France and in Italy, communists and socialists collaborated in government. But this proved to be only a brief experiment, which was followed by a fierce political struggle in France whilst in Italy the socialist party split in two, with the Social Democratic Party adopting an anti-communist line and the Socialist Party adopting a pro-communist line.

Things have Changed

Many things have changed today. In France the Socialists are examining the prospects of an alliance with the Communist Party. In Italy the parties claiming to represent socialism became one single party in the act of unification of October 1966, only to split asunder again in July 1969, with the Social Democratic Party re-adapting its anti-communist line and with certain sections of the PSI (Italian Socialist Party) considering a dialogue with the Communists. In Finland the Social Democratic Party collaborates in government with the Communists. And the Swedish socialists are not averse to parliamentary support from the Communists.

It is true that we cannot compare Finland with France, or Sweden with Italy. In Finland, and especially in Sweden, the Communists represent a minority faction of the working class and the electorate, whereas in Italy and still more in France the Socialists are the ones who represent a minority of the working class and the electorate. But it is also true that in France a dialogue is developing between the opposition parties. In Italy, although certain tendencies within the PSI point in favour of a dialogue, the Communists are content to stay in opposition and the Socialists in government. In Finland, and perhaps in Sweden too, some agreement is being worked out at government level. In point of fact, there is a clear change of attitude on the part of socialists towards communists, both as regards Brandt's Ostpolitik and, more significantly, the relations between parties in the same country. Needless to say, our worries are far from being at an end concerning the fate of democracy in the event of a communist seizure of power; but this prospect seems to us to be continually diminishing.

At the present time the fundamental question is to know whether it is possible to speak of a new working relationship with the communists with the aim of bringing about in some measure an organic political unity.

The differences which led to the split between socialists and communists round about 1920 were concerned with the relationship between the struggle for socialism and democratic liberty and with the attitude to be adopted towards the Soviet Union. Communist experience has clearly demonstrated the limitations of communist theory, for the dictatorship of the proletariat has shown itself in practice to be, not the dictatorship of the 'overwhelming majority' but the dictatorship of the party apparatus and even of one man among a restricted group of party leaders. The USSR for its part has failed in its role as a model for socialism and as the 'advance guard in the international struggle of oppressed peoples'.

As against all this, the international lessening of tension and the evolution of the foreign policy of the USSR have begun to bring about an increasing measure of understanding between the Western powers and the communists, so making it possible to put an end to the uncompromising anti-communist line of the social democratic parties. Last but not least, social democratic experience has demonstrated on its side the limitations of theories relating to 'bourgeois' democracy as a vehicle for socialism. We can therefore say that the atmosphere is conducive to dialogue, and it is moreover a matter for reflection on

*This article is based on a paper prepared for the Socialist International Seminar held in Vienna last December.

FEBRUARY 1971

Due to industrial action by British postal workers, the January SOCIALIST AFFAIRS could not be posted. It is therefore being despatched jointly with this issue.
all sides that, if a start is to be made on a revision of theory, the point of departure will be the failure of the respective models for socialism and the new data emerging regarding the reality of modern capitalism.*

Just as it would be difficult for western communists to propose the pure and simple introduction of the Soviet model, so too would socialists be hard put to maintain that the reforms effected in England and in the Scandinavian countries have introduced socialism or set these countries on the road to socialism. So both communists and socialists who still believe in the general principles of socialism and in the original values that they once held in common cannot be expected to find many of the ideas which were the cause of the historic split are today void of content, and that likewise many of their analyses regarding capitalism, the state, the working class, imperialism, are sadly out of date.

**Overtaken by Time**
It is clear that no firm alliance can be built in an ideological and strategic void and it is equally certain that the differences between socialists and communists, even when merely sustained by the force of inertia emanating from accepted ideas, remain substantial. But it is also important to emphasize that the historic and ideological reasons behind the split have largely been overtaken by time. As a result, socialists bent on examining the forms of struggle for socialism in modern industrial society and communists seeking a road different from the Soviet road may now come together and engage in discussion. This assumes that both sides recognize that social democratic and Soviet experiences are not valid as models in the struggle for socialism. If it is now certain that there are many socialists who are ready to admit this, the question arises whether the same is true for the communists.

Let us cast our minds back to the Prague drama, where an entire Communist Party, after an agonising revision, sought to establish another model of socialism; and let us think back to the revision, less agonising but no less profound, undertaken by the Italian Communist Party. Let us think too of the crisis in the ranks of other and less important communist parties in the western hemisphere. And finally let us think of the myth of the USSR triumphantly at the head of the oppressed peoples. These facts show that there are many communists who are trying to provide a socialist answer to the problems of our time without searching for it in the texts of Marxism-Leninism or in Soviet experience. We can therefore assert that the dialogue between communists and socialists is no longer closed but is in process of opening up. I would go so far as to say that there is now the objective possibility of attempting to start a dialogue with the communists so as to find common ground in the struggle for socialism.

The conditions for this dialogue are clear. On the socialist side, it must be admitted that the theory of western social democrats regarding the structural transformation of capitalist society is not valid. On the communist side, the admission must likewise be made that the society created in the countries of the East has nothing to do with socialism and that relations with the USSR respond merely to the rules of international diplomacy and not to those governing socialist internationalism.

A pre-condition to any dialogue is unconditional loyalty to the principles of democracy. On the basis of the common acceptance of the principles of democracy and with the aim of rendering these formal principles effective, we can begin a dialogue about modern capitalism, our concept of the working class and of alliances with other classes, the functions of the state, the internationalisation of capital, and neo-colonialism in all its aspects; and also about the long-term concrete aims of the socialist movement.

It has been said of the Italian Communist Party (PCI) that it is the most ‘Western’ of the communist parties. What is the meaning of this statement? The PCI has gone further than any other communist party in its revision of Marxism-Leninism and in its independence from Russia. It has accepted the rules of democracy as far as admitting that a majority can change into a minority; that is to say, it has conceded the possibility of the party having to give up power as a result of free elections. It condemned the 1968 military intervention of the armies of the Warsaw Pact in Czechoslovakia. It upholds its right to independent judgement in respect of Russia. All this is quite true; but we should not be satisfied with too superficial an examination. The party’s conversion seems limited and even, one could say, suspect; for it should not be forgotten that the rules governing inner party life are based on centralism, so much so that the extreme left minority group, centred around Il Manifesto, was expelled from the party.

**Exploding Contradictions**
The day that the PCI accepts democracy within its own fold will be the time when this revision of Marxism-Leninism will appear more credible and more trustworthy. For the time being, all that can be said is that a lot more discussion goes on in the party than in the past. But it is also true that up till now the party leadership has been successful in preventing the formation of organised groups with differing tendencies. These tendencies, nevertheless, exist within the party and will, in my opinion, finally see the light of day.

The relations of the Italian Communist Party with the communist states of the Soviet bloc are governed by the principle of ‘unity in diversity’. Such a principle belongs rather to idealist philosophy than to the area of real politics and smacks of political conjuring. In reality this principle simply obscures the difficulty the party has in managing its own internal democracy, even more necessary for its freedom of political manoeuvre in the Italian and European sphere, with the link that binds it to the Soviet Union, the country for so long exalted by the party and its militant supporters. Here is a contradiction that can only end in an explosion.

At the present time the Italian Communist Party is less concerned with ideological problems than with the possibilities of sharing, in one way or another, in the power of government. The crisis in the Centre-Left on the one hand, and the strengthening of the trade unions and leftist currents in the country on the other, make it possible that ministerial reshufflings will somehow find a place for the Communists.

For the time being, however, it is difficult to forecast whether under
prevailing conditions the ideological revision and the debate between groups of differing tendencies will seize up or will acquire new energy. One thing is certain though, and this is that a political opening for the Communists is not likely in the immediate future, but can no longer be ruled out altogether. A policy based on courageous initiatives on the part of the Socialists could stimulate this debate and this ideological revision, so as to explode the contradictions in the communist line and in this way create the conditions necessary for a dialogue on the problems of the struggle for socialism in Western capitalist society.

Analysing the Communist Reply
To the SPD

RICHARD LOEWENTHAL

The German Social Democratic Party (SPD) is currently in process of reappraising and reaffirming its attitude towards communism. A leading role in this ideological exercise has been taken by Professor Loewenthal. In this article he discusses some of the communist reactions to the SPD's restatement of its position.

Over two months ago I wrote an article [see SL, December 1970] which was intended as the draft of a declaration of principles on the relationship between democratic socialism and communism. Since then this draft has been completed and approved by a commission appointed by the Party Executive. Then in Munich the Party Council accepted the draft in principle, with some additional alterations, and referred it, together with the remaining proposals for amendments, to all SPD branches for discussion. In the ensuing public debate, the people concerned—the Communists of the SED [the East German Socialist Unity Party] and the DKP [the West German Communist Party]—joined in.

On the whole the discussion of the basic problems has been partially, if understandably, overshadowed by the practical decision that the Party Council took at the same time, which was against social democrats joining forces with the communists. But the refusal of the SPD to sanction co-operation with Communists on the innumerable committees, conferences and meetings which the latter are constantly calling to further the aims of the 'united front' is based on a sound knowledge of the character, aims and methods of the Communist Party. Anyone who has not acquired this knowledge through bitter experience can attempt to make good the loss in the course of a discussion of principles.

Major Opposition
The German Social Democratic Party has to face, as the leading party in the Federal Government, a difficult and bitter struggle against a massive right-wing opposition, including the obviously anti-democratic forces of right-wing extremism. Every new election and every new press campaign confirms the view that combating this is the SPD's fundamental task. But this does not mean that we should renounce our basic differences with the Communists (any more than they do with us), or that we should rely on the 'alliance' offered by the Communists in the struggle against the forces of conservatism. We are conducting our campaign on the basis of democracy, and this is something the Communists do not recognise—even if they do like to disguise themselves as democrats from time to time.

If 'anti-communism' means the negative process of rejecting communist ideas instead of making it our foremost concern to carry out our own positive aims, then we are certainly not 'anti-communist' in that sense. But preserving the fundamental division between social democrats and communists remains a necessary task of democratic socialism, and it has become more and more important of late—in particular because the Federal Government is trying to improve international relations with the communist governments of the East.

Nothing could illustrate the need for this division better than the objection raised by Neues Deutschland [the East German communist paper] in its controversial article of November 8 that our intention was to pretend that the power of capitalism in the Federal Republic was democratic freedom. The Federal Republic is a free and democratic state, even though it is by no means perfect—a condition that we intend to improve. In this free democracy there is capitalism, which does have power, but not complete control. Capitalism is only one force among many other effective social forces, and the success of democratic socialism shows the limits of capitalism's power. Therefore our democratic state is not 'a capitalist state' in the sense that the monolithic state of the SED is 'a bureaucratic state', because the latter really does have no organised social forces of opposition.

It is very instructive that Neues Deutschland attributes to me the definition of socialism in the classic sense as being only the control of economic sources of power by society with the aid of the state'. The insertion of the word 'only'—I did not use it—is amusing! In accordance with good Stalinist tradition, ND believes that control of society with the aid of the state is something less than state ownership. For social democrats, however, socialism means—as it did for Marx, who talked about the socialisation of the means of production, and for the Yugoslav Communists—that social control is the main thing, while the form of ownership is a matter of expediency. Experience has shown, moreover, that effective control by a society over the sources of its wealth...
is only possible in a democracy, because only in a democracy can society—in other words the people—have any real control over the state. Not formal nationalisation but real democracy—this is essential for effective social control as far as social democrats are concerned; and it is necessary for socialist development 'in the classical sense.'

Ownership Not a Difference
One of the basic promises of the original draft is that the form of ownership is a matter of expediency, and that however important ownership might be, it does not constitute a decisive difference between social democrats and communists. For this reason, an over-simplified phrase in the original draft was misleading, namely 'In order to make its programme a reality, German social democracy has no need to have recourse to expropriation measures.' At the Munich Party Council it was pointed out that this sentence (which was particularly nicely received by Die Welt) was a simplification that went beyond the bounds of the SPD's Godesberg Programme, which said: 'Private property will be protected and maintained as long as it does not hinder the construction of a just social order.' Since it was not intended to lay down a new property dogma nor to alter the content of the party manifesto, this problematical sentence in the draft was replaced by the appropriate sentence from the Godesberg Manifesto by general consent.

The communists, on the other hand, have a dogmatic belief in completely revolutionising all forms of property by nationalisation and compulsory collectivisation. This for them justifies the use of measures which to us are a barrier to the real progress of socialism, which can only be achieved on a democratic basis. In other words, they believe in the establishment of a totalitarian party dictatorship. ND is particularly sensitive to our suggesting that their goal can only be achieved 'according to Leninist doctrine, by a series of civil wars and wars of liberation'.

But to deny this before readers trained in Leninist doctrines must be very awkward. Do we really have to remind them that this was one of the theses in the resolution of the 1960 World Conference of Communist Parties—in which all the communist parties with the exception of the Yugoslav, took part, including the Chinese and their adherents—and that it is contained in Khruschev's official report on this conference? It is true that according to Soviet opinion—which differs from the Chinese—civil wars are not necessary in every country, because under favourable conditions the communist party can be established as the sole governing body, as it was in the Soviet-occupied zone of Germany or by the Prague coup d'état of 1948. But to dispute that this absolute power is essential to the achievement of their aims, as expressed by all communists before and since—this is not genuine 'revisionism'. It is pure deception.

Neues Deutschland is even more annoyed over my reference to the fact that entire classes hostile to the communists have been forcibly liquidated in country after country—which it once again misquotes as though I had attributed this to Leninist doctrine as well. It cuts out the words 'according to the practice of both Stalin and Mao Tse-tung' which in my text precede this reference. Perhaps ND will not dispute the fact that the property-owning and capitalist classes were annihilated in the course of the October Revolution. But has it really not heard of the 'liquidation of the Kulaks as a class' which was Stalin's justification for the mass deportation of 5 million peasant families to achieve the compulsory collectivisation of agriculture between 1929 and 1932?

This mass deportation laid the foundations of the labour camps and condemned Soviet agriculture to 25 years of stagnation. But Stalin, in his 'Short Lesson' on the history of the Soviet Communist Party, glorifies it as 'a second revolution, as important as the October Revolution, but this time from above'. Do they not know that this interpretation of the revolutionary necessity of compulsory collectivisation was never criticised, even during the Khruschev 'de-Stalinisation' period, let alone revoked? And do they not know Mao Tse-tung's doctrine of the necessity of permanent revolution in order to destroy continually the capitalist class structures which apparently continue to re-form?

We remember these things—and also the terror of the Stalinist mass liquidation of old party cadres between 1936-1938, which the Soviet Communists themselves have criticised. We remember, not because we enjoy reveling in the horrors of the past, but because the communist parties have not recognised to this day that atrocities like this are the necessary result of a one-party system which justifies its claim to absolute power by the doctrine that all opponents of its policy are the mortal enemies of social progress and as such deserving only of annihilation. Anyone who is welcomed by the communists as a 'partner in a united front' on the basis of agreement on current problems will find that as soon as there are differences he will be denounced as a 'traitor' and an 'agent of the class enemy'; and if the communists are in power, he will be treated accordingly. Party political alliances and compromises made with different parties in order to co-operate on common problems—this is normal in a democracy. But it is only possible among democrats who share a mutual respect for the right of others to have their opinion represented, even when the opinions are very different indeed.

Communism Not Immutable
We emphasised in the SPD's document that even communism is not immutable. We referred to the efforts of the Yugoslav, Czechoslovak and Italian Communists to reform their movement, but also to the tenacity with which the established one-party regime defends its monopoly of power when such attempts are made to democratise it. This is the part of our position which has been most grossly distorted by Neues Deutschland, interestingly enough. It quotes the SPD's profession of constitutional democracy as a political credo and goes on to say that, according to us, this would flourish best in 'countries with a system of private property', or else in an economy where the means of production were predominantly private-owned. According to ND, this was what we wanted to introduce into socialist countries with the help of the communist reformists.

Certainly it did say in my draft (and the passage is unaltered in the approved party version) that free democracy—like modern industry—was 'first established . . . in those countries boasting a system of private property', and 'then underwent further development in the context of a mixed economy, with preponderantly private property linked with state planning and a state policy of growth and stability—the reigning pattern in advanced Western democracies.' But
in my draft I expressly added that 'the attempt by the Czechoslovak reformist communists to democratise their state on the basis of the system of state property prevailing there was, in terms of internal politics, by no means devoid of prospects of success before it was throttled to death by outside military intervention. So experience has shown that private property does not necessarily lead to fascism, nor state property necessarily to Stalinism.' This part of my draft has been left unchanged.

German Social Democrats are far from regarding liberal democracy as being necessarily linked with private ownership or from recommending the communist reformers to restore private ownership. I have shown that the question of democracy does not depend on systems of ownership, and that democracy, not ownership, is the decisive question for social democrats. And I added, in the passage discussing the prospects of the communist reformers, that to argue that such reforms would endanger the real social achievements of the regime is simply an attempt by the people who hold a monopoly of power to defend their interests. In fact, the reverse is true. Only when communist states decide in favour of democratisation will they be sure of maintaining the partial social progress that they have made. Neues Deutschland has made just such an attempt to defend the status quo, but this still does not make the allegation true.

The methods of quotation employed by ND are only possible with readers who cannot check the original text for themselves. This is an example of the methods of a one-party system, which neither can nor will meet ideological opponents on their own ground. This practice is neither new nor surprising, and it does not affect our conviction that we have to co-exist with the communist countries for the sake of peace, even if they do use these methods. But it does confirm us in our determination not to ignore the fundamental differences and not to accept the communists as 'allies' in domestic politics. I conclude with a quotation from Herbert Wehner, which was recorded in the resolution of the Munich Party Council: 'We have to live in a world which we share with the communists. Because we have to live with them, we must be careful that we do not get swallowed up by them.'

**BUREAU MEETING**

**Solidarity With Polish Workers**

A detailed discussion of the disturbances in Poland last December was one of the main features in the proceedings of the Bureau of the Socialist International, which met in London on January 19. A number of points of view were advanced by Bureau members. It was agreed that the events in Poland were a further example of bureaucratic communist suppression and further evidence of the failure of the communist system. The Bureau expressed its solidarity with the Polish workers who had demonstrated their legitimate grievances, and noted the admission by the new First Secretary of the Polish Communist Party that past policies had failed.

Before beginning its formal business, the Bureau stood in tribute to the memory of the late Nath Pah, of the Indian Socialist Party (see p. 38). It then formally accepted a proposal from Tom McNally (Britain) that the Socialist International should organise a series of expert conferences to study important aspects of party work such as organisation, finance, membership and publicity. It was envisaged that such groups could also study important internal policy questions, such as workers' control and the role of the multi-national company.

European issues were prominent on the 'political' agenda of the Bureau meeting. In addition to the debate on Poland already mentioned, the Bureau had discussion on the split in the Luxembourg Socialist Labour Party and the question of European security. As regards the recent scission in the Luxembourg Socialist Labour Party (LSAP), the General Secretary reported that the new LSAP Chairman (Antoine Wehenkel), General Secretary (Raymond Vouel) and Second Secretary (Roger Linster) had visited the London Secretariat of the International in the previous week, and informed him of the current situation (see January issue for details). The Bureau expressed its regret that the split had taken place, and instructed the Chairman and General Secretary to meet representatives of both sides and report back to the next Bureau meeting.

On the matter of European security, British and Finnish representatives gave verbal reports on bilateral contacts between the two parties the week before, in which the question of European security had figured prominently. The Bureau made further decisions regarding the working of the International's study group on European security, whose report will be presented to the Council Conference in Helsinki. After the luncheon interval the Bureau was addressed by a special guest — George Thomson, British Labour Shadow Defence Minister — on the subject of European security and defence. (An article based on his remarks appears on pp. 32-33.) Bruno Pittermann summed up the discussion which followed by restating the International's support for the holding of a European security conference.

The Bureau's consideration of non-European matters covered the Middle East, Latin America, Pakistan, North Vietnam and Iran.

After looking at the present situation in the Middle East, the Bureau decided that this subject would be included in the business of the May Council of the Socialist International. It was also agreed that the International should set up a study group on the Middle East, to examine the present situation from a socialist standpoint, as well as the problems that would follow any peace settlement.

The second proposal came from Luciano De Pascalis of the Italian Socialist Party, who had recently led a delegation of his party to the United Arab Republic (see SH, November
1970. The thinking of the Bureau on this matter was summed up by Gwyn Morgan (Britain). Recalling an earlier decision that the International should seek contacts with Arab socialists and countries, he said that because of the changing situation in the Middle East an 'on-going study' was needed on which the appropriate bodies of the International could base their decisions.

As regards Latin America the General Secretary reported on his visit to Chile to attend the inauguration of President Allende. He also informed the Bureau that the Radical Party of Chile had decided to apply for full membership of the Socialist International.

Turning to Asian matters the Bureau heard a report from K. B. Andersen (Denmark) on a recent Scandinavian socialist mission to North Vietnam. The delegation, comprising representatives of the Danish, Norwegian, Finnish and Swedish member parties of the International, visited Hanoi and met several political leaders. They had formed the opinion, said Andersen, that the Communists of North Vietnam had no wish to copy the Russian or Chinese models. They also believed that the North Vietnamese were capable of fighting a much longer term war if necessary. The Danish representative added that the Nordic socialist democratic parties had invited the North Vietnamese to send a delegation to Scandinavia.

The Bureau then heard a report from Hans-Eberhard Dingels (Germany) on a recent visit of a delegation of the German Social Democratic Party to Iran. Finally, the Bureau welcomed the Secretariat's initiative in establishing contacts with the All-Pakistan Awami League led by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman.

The next Bureau meeting of the International will be held in Zurich in March, on the invitation of the Swiss Social Democratic Party.

**REPORTS**

**BELGIUM**

Belgian Socialists Preserve Identity as the Country's Only National Party

The Belgian Socialist Party (PSB) has preserved its identity as the only one of the country's three major parties that can claim to be genuinely national. The PSB Congress held in Brussels on January 23-24 saw the election of a dual leadership comprising Edmond Leburton and Josse van Eynde by an overwhelming majority of 827 votes to 196 (with 71 abstentions). The two new Chairmen succeed Léo Collard, who had led the party since 1959.

Edmond Leburton, Belgium's Minister of Economic Affairs, is a Walloon (French-speaking), and Josse van Eynde, until now Deputy Chairman of the party, is Flemish-speaking. The dual chairmanship will continue for two years, after which the leadership will revert to a single chairman, to alternate between the two communities every four years. In a television interview Josse van Eynde said that he had agreed to serve as Chairman to act as a 'buffer' between the socialist federations of the two communities and to prevent Léo Collard's retirement leading to a split.

The PSB has been the junior partner in Belgium's present Social Christian/Socialist government coalition since 1968. In this time strenuous efforts have been made, notably by Socialist Communal Relations Minister Freddy Terwagne, to find a solution to the country's intractable Flemish-Walloon confrontation. After several setbacks, a constitutional revision was finally passed by the Chamber last December which provided for a large measure of autonomy for the three regions—Flemish-speaking, French-speaking and bi-lingual Brussels. These divisions explain why two of the traditional Belgian parties—the Social Christians and the Liberals—can no longer be regarded as single parties; they are also a measure of the PSB's achievement in preserving its national unity.

The first day of the Congress was largely taken up by election of the new Chairmen and tributes from the delegates to Léo Collard. During the second day the new Party Bureau was elected as follows:

EDOUARD CLOSE, ERNEST GLINNE, G. COPPEE, FREDDY TERWAEGNE, R. LAMERS, LOUIS NAMECHE, ABEL DU BOIS, FERNAND DELMOTTE, A. SWEERT, G. CUDELL, E. MACHTENS, LOUIS MAJOR, ALPHONSE VRANCHIX, WILLY CLAES, B. VAN HOORICK, EDOUARD ANSEELE, ACHILLE VAN ACKER, W. GELDOLF, J. RAMAEKERS, GUSTAVE BREYNE, VAN HEEYLANDT, HENRI FAYAT, F. GELDERS. The PSB's two National Secretaries, JAN LUYTEN and GUY MATROT, are also members of the Bureau.

(*These members are excluded by PSB statutes from participation in the Bureau because they are ministers in the Belgian Government, and substitutes were elected. By virtue of becoming Party Chairman, Edmond Leburton was obliged to resign as Economic Affairs Minister.)*

The Congress adopted a number of resolutions, notably one congratulating the Government, and particularly the socialist ministers in it, on the recent announcement of a compromise solution to the country's communal dispute. The Congress denounced 'dictatorial and authoritarian regimes' and demanded that the Belgian Government should oppose any participation by Spain in the European Community. The PSB also pledged itself to work for East-West détente and international disarmament.

**NETHERLANDS**

Important Political Results Of Dutch Labour Party Congress

Rarely has a congress of the Dutch Labour Party (PvdA) been anticipated by so many with such a lot of different feelings. But for everybody one thing was sure: the Dutch Labour Party had arrived at crucial point in its 25 years of existence.

Within the party we have seen in recent years a process which has led to an almost complete renewal of leadership. The known people have been replaced by younger men and the established ideas renewed by younger generations. This internal turmoil was not only a function of the party itself. It was part of the total crisis which many people felt was afflicting the Dutch party system.

Many people inside and outside the...
PvdA were convinced that something must change either in the party system or in the election system. New parties such as Democrats 66 (D'66) are in favour of changes in the election system. The general thinking of the Labour Party has been that the problem should be approached in another way. The party believes that the essentially a-political religious parties are the reason why the Netherlands do not have a sound political system. In particular, the Catholic Party has been in government since the 2nd World War, either with the socialists or with the conservatives. Never has its line been clear. This has been made possible by the fact that Catholic workers have tended to support the Catholic Party even in situations where it pursues a conservative policy, as is now the case. The socialists say that it has to be made clear to these people that their political choice should be made on a political basis, not on an a-political religious basis, which essentially has nothing to do with their social position.

It must be admitted that the effort to get the workers in religious circles into the socialist party has been made before. The fact that the PvdA failed meant that several times the party had to share power with the Catholics. The last such government was brought down in 1966, when on a crucial point of policy the Catholics again chose to the religious workers that their political choice should be made on a political basis, not on an a-political religious basis, which essentially has nothing to do with their social position.

The direct result was that at its Congress held in Amsterdam on February 4-6. Many people inside and outside the PvdA had announced in the Swedish Parliament on January 20 by Foreign Minister Torsten Nilsson. The application of the existing international laws of war to the Indo-China conflict was, said Torsten Nilsson, difficult because 'there is in this theatre a new form of war'. He went on: 'In South-East Asia a people's war is being fought in which one side consists to a large extent of a poor peasant population. These people have difficulty in satisfying the conditions which traditional international laws... places on the combatants.' For example, the NLF included large
numbers of peasant guerillas who did not fulfill the condition of having 'a fixed distinctive sign recognisable at a distance'.

Other unparalleled features of the Indo-China war, said Nilsson, were the absence of a battle-field in the normal sense and the fact that 'the most powerful nation in the world, from another continent and another civilisation, possessing a technologically superior military machine' was confronting 'a poor peasant population possessing relatively simple weapons.' The 'complete monopoly of air supremacy' possessed by the USA was also an unprecedented situation, added the Foreign Minister. American bombs possessed by the USA was also an unprecedented situation, added the Foreign Minister. American bombs in Indo-China 'have obliterated innumerable villages, and napalm and splinter bombs have killed and maimed several tens of thousands of people. The compatibility of this type of warfare with international law can certainly be questioned,' said Nilsson. Different values prevented common education activities with other parties.

VIENNA

Socialist International Seminar On Political Education And Participation

One of the main features of the international socialist seminar held in Vienna in December and attended by research experts from ten member parties of the Socialist International was a discussion and exchange of experience on the subject of political education and participation.

Siegbert Heid presented a detailed survey of political education within the German Social Democratic Party, with emphasis on the role of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation. The goal in Germany was to give people a basis for independent thinking. But there could be no objective education, he said. Different values prevented common education activities with other parties.

Political education in the SPD, went on Heid, concentrated to some extent on solving special problems. It was known, for example, that young people only getting a lower education tended to have a marked lack of political interest the first 3-4 years after school leaving. A special programme was, therefore, directed towards this group. The educational programme of the SPD was based both on particular themes and on environmental factors, said Heid. An example of the latter was to link up courses in a specific region to concentrate on a special issue.

In choosing these themes, the need to support government policies was borne in mind. In 1971, for example, the themes selected included the Ostpolitik, economic policy, reform of democracy, social policy and educational policy. This selection had been influenced by the need to spread information and create discussion about the policies of the Federal Government and the party.

Outlining the work of the Swedish Social Democratic Labour Party, Bo Elmgren said that in 1969-70 about 600,000 people had participated in study groups arranged by the Swedish Workers Educational Association and affiliated organisations. Of these, over 100,000 participated in study groups arranged within the Swedish party itself.

At an earlier period, said Elmgren, study groups and courses had concentrated almost entirely on a number of 'eternal' subjects. But since the mid-fifties the activity of these groups had been increasingly concentrated on current issues within the labour movement. During the later part of the 1960s, study activity had also become a channel for influencing policy formulation, through the so-called 'consultation groups'. They dealt with important political questions which the party had to decide upon. For example, the Government's 'equality programme' had recently been discussed by 30,000 people and the new taxation reform by 40,000.

Lately this activity had run into a difficult phase, went on Elmgren. Expectations had been created as regards future reforms which did not fit with economic realities. This showed the need for additional discussion on the economic possibilities of reforms. It was also important, said the Swedish delegate, that people did not get the impression that they were being played with—being used for propaganda instead of considered as partners in a decision-making process.

Franz Rosenberger then gave a thorough account of political education within the Austrian Socialist Party. This was a formal part of the party's activities at all levels, he said. Of the 700,000 party members, some 130,000 were in current contact with some sort of educational activity.

There were, he said, three main categories of educational activities in the Austrian party: ideology and political principles, organisational questions, and economic and other current policies. A number of different methods were used. In 1969 there were, for example, 351 district party courses usually lasting two days each, while most courses run by the party nationally lasted a week. The Vienna party operated a full-scale party school which provided courses lasting three terms. The SPOe's educational activities were carefully planned, said Rosenberger, usually on the basis of six-month periods. In 1971, for the first time, the party had arranged a ten-month long correspondence course.

After Norwegian and Danish representatives had stated that their parties also used the system of 'consultation groups', Terry Pitt (British Labour...
Party) reported that a system of participation groups was being used in Britain. The next main theme would be that of equality. First, however, every party member would be given the chance to contribute to deciding the party research programme for the next four years. A list of sixteen major political problems will be circulated, said Pitt, so that party members could choose among them, ranking the themes according to importance. Terry Pitt said that the party rank and file should be given every possibility of pushing the leadership. In international contacts he believed that socialist parties ought to exchange documents on basic principles and theory.

It was generally agreed by the participants at the Vienna seminar that an exchange of views and material on the aims and methods of political education as practised by member parties would be most useful. It was envisaged that the Socialist International would be the appropriate channel for this exchange.

(News from the parties)

THE GHOST of the defunct Federation of the Democratic and Socialist Left was invested with new substance at the beginning of February when the French Socialist Party and the Convention of Republican Institutions (CIR), together with some smaller groups, agreed on a programme of unification, to culminate in a grand unity congress in June. The plan was drawn up by a 'national delegation for the union of socialists', and owes its inspiration largely to the CIR leader François Mitterrand, first and only President of the old Federation and the man who, backed by the whole range of the French Left, ran de Gaulle pretty close in the 1965 presidential elections. The other main component of the Federation, the Radical Party (now led by Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber), has held aloof from these new moves towards unity, which will be put to the test in the approaching municipal elections. In many towns the Socialists have also made electoral arrangements with the French Communists.

ENLARGEMENT of the EEC and direct elections to the European Parliament were among the points supported in a resolution adopted by a national conference on European problems held by the Italian Socialist Unity Party (PSU) in Florence on January 5-6. Attended by over 100 delegates and chaired by Antonio Cariglia MP, the conference was called to re-affirm the PSU's European outlook and to lay down its priorities for the construction of a united Europe. Among the speakers was EEC Commission member Altiero Spinelli. The resolution adopted also called for wider powers for the European Parliament, an initiative from member states towards political union and the encouragement of the people's participation in European construction 'in the framework of the democratic traditions of the member countries of the Community.'

EMILienne Moreau, heroine of two world wars and decorated for bravery by both England and France, died in Lens on January 5. Mme. Moreau, who was 72, was for many years until 1963 a member of the Executive of the old French Socialist Party (SFIO). THREE CHINESE diplomats visited the London headquarters of the British Labour Party in Transport House last month. They were Chang Tsien-hua, Commercial Counsellor at the Peking Legation in London, Lieu Keng-yuan (1st Secretary) and Liu Ching-hua (2nd Secretary). They had talks with party officials on Labour policy and organisation, and were given a reception attended by a number of party leaders, including Denis Healey, Labour's foreign affairs spokesman. The visit to Transport House follows the attendance of a Communist Chinese delegation at last year's Blackpool Conference — the first time this has happened.

FEBRUARY 1971

FORMER PRINTER'S COMPOSITOR Franz Jonas has been elected by the Executive of the Austrian Socialist Party to stand again for the presidency of the Republic in the elections due on April 25. 71-year-old Jonas, a former Mayor of 'Red Vienna, has been President since 1965.

The Federal Executive of the Austrian Socialist Party has authorised Party Chairman Bruno Kreisky to make proposals for the establishment of a 'Karl Renner Institute', the role of which would be to further political education in the aims of democratic socialism.

Latin America

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Broad Organisation of Austrian Socialists

This short survey of the Austrian Socialist Party shows how the impressive range of subsidiary organisations which the party operates is the secret of its strength.

The 1970 new year message of the Austrian Socialist Party (SPOe) contained the following passages: 'At the end of the year 1888 the unification congress of the Austrian Social Democratic Party took place in Hainfeld. Today, therefore, Austrian Social Democrats can look back on 80 years of existence. In these 80 years the socialist movement has been the motor of progress and humanism. ... It was the Austrian Social Democrats who, after a bitter struggle, realised the achievement of democracy in Austria.'

And the 1970 May Day message of the party said: 'On March 1 the confidence of the Austrian people has made the Socialist Party the strongest party in parliament for the first time since 1945. As a consequence this May Day is characterised by a Federal Government made up by the Socialist Party alone. Thus we are celebrating May 1—for the first time since 1945—under a Socialist Federal Chancellor ... In this way have the hopes of 2½ million of men and women voters come true. ...'

What is the secret of the strength of the SPOe? The Party Report for 1970 says: 'Behind the political successes of the last two years (victory in the general elections and in most provincial and local elections) there stand the great achievements of all sections of our party. ... Political success stems from the performance of the 69,000 party workers (Vertrauenspersonen) and of the various socialist organisations and groups, on the basis of new ideas and enthusiasm. ...'

The seven policy statements which formed the election platform, and which had been elaborated in innumerable meetings and discussions, became best-sellers. The SPOe economic programme achieved a circulation of 48,000 copies. The school programme ran to 60,000 examples, with every teacher in Austria receiving a copy. The university teachers also received the programme for universities. All judges, state prosecutors and lawyers (both state and private) were sent the SPOe law programme, while about 21,000 doctors, social workers and civil servants got the party's social programme. And the housing programme had a circulation of roughly 6,000 copies. The 1970 Report remarked of this performance that never before in Austria had publications of this sort, with their high demand on the understanding of the reader, met with such success.

The SPOe's current total of nearly 70,000 party workers are active for the party in some way on average about twice a week. The results of this voluntary work have been tremendous. 83,000 new members have been recruited in the past year alone. Membership fees are collected with a 95% success (8.2 million membership stamps were sold in 1969). This is due to the party workers of the 113 local organisations, who do their job sometimes under the most difficult conditions (in the Austrian mountains, for example) in their spare time and without pay. The Austrian Socialist Party is one of the few member parties of the Socialist International which still has its own daily paper. Moreover, it can still sell 270,000 badges (in a population of 7 million) for May 1st.

At the same time the SPOe runs comprehensive educational programmes of a cultural and political nature, and encourages an active life in its organisations, of which the following are the most important: the Austrian Friends of Children, the Socialist Youth, the Federation of Socialist Schoolchildren, the Federation of Socialist Graduates, the Study Group for Christianity and Socialism, the Workers' Federation for Sport and Gymnastics, the Friends of Nature, the Federation of Workers' Angling Associations, the Workers' Samaritan Society, the Workers' Abstinence Society, the Society for the History of the Workers' Movement, the Workers' Choral Association, the Federation of Workers' Music Associations, the First Austrian Workers' Stamp Collectors Association, the Consumers' Federation, the Free Trade Association, the Austrian Working Peasants Association, the Federation of Austrian Pensioners (with about 300,000 members), the Socialists Freedom Fighters, the Socialist Teachers Association of Austria, the Socialist Association for Social Housing, the Central Union of Smallholders and Animal Breeders, etc.

Special mention can be made of the Friends of Children (Kinderfreunde), which had 317,842 members in 1969, out of whom 6,510 were active workers, reflecting the traditional alliance of socialism and humanism which dates from the 1st Austrian Republic. There are also 12,000 Socialist Graduates, 110,000 Friends of Nature (who send expeditions each year to places like the Himalayas or the Andes) and 510,000 cooperative households. In all this is revealed a little bit of the secret of the SPOe.

As regards membership figures, the Austrian Socialist Party stands relatively high in the ranks of the parties of the Socialist International. This has been achieved with only individual membership and no affiliated block membership such as the British Labour Party or the Scandinavian social democratic parties have. The SPOe has 720,000 members at present, every tenth inhabitant, every seventh voter, and every third person who votes for the party being a member. Within the SPOe the strong Vienna branch, rich in tradition and with nearly 300,000 members, maintains its predominance. Every fifth inhabitant, every fourth voter and every second SPOe voter is a member of the Austrian Socialist Party in Vienna.

Edgar Schranz