Oliver Tambo, President of the African National Congress of South Africa, Olof Palme, Vice-President of the Socialist International and Chairman of the Swedish Social Democratic Party.
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INTRODUCTION BY EMILIO MENENDEZ DEL VALLE

The SI mission to Southern Africa led by Olof Palme (Vice-President of the International and Chairman of the Swedish Social Democratic Party), which went through Angola, Zambia, Mozambique, Botswana and Tanzania, was motivated by what could be called the “Geneva spirit”, that is the terms of the resolution adopted by the Geneva Congress of the International in November 1976 [SOCIALIST AFFAIRS 1/1977]. On the situation in Southern Africa, that spirit included the assertion “neutrality towards the existing and coming struggles in Southern Africa is impossible. Between the exploiters and the exploited there is no middle ground...”

The following is the report of the Socialist International Mission to Southern Africa on September 2-11, 1977, as presented to the SI Bureau in Madrid on October 15-16, 1977, and adopted by that meeting.

At the last Congress of the Socialist International, in Geneva in November last year [see SOCIALIST AFFAIRS, 1/1977], the problems of Southern Africa were in the forefront of our discussions. We stated, among other things in our resolution, that “neutrality towards the existing and coming struggles in Southern Africa is impossible. Between the exploiters and the exploited there is no middle ground...”

Later on, in March 1977 in London, the SI decided at a Bureau meeting, to send a delegation to the front line states. The aim of the mission was to express the solidarity of the Socialist International with the liberation movement in Zimbabwe, Namibia, South Africa, to further the Socialist International’s contacts with the Governments and parties of the front line states and to study the reality in Southern Africa on the spot.

Events in Southern Africa have also made 1977 a year of mounting pressure against apartheid all over the world, with a focal point in the United Nations. In March this year the Security Council debated the South African question; in May the UN Conference in support of the peoples of Zimbabwe and Namibia convened in Maputo; and in August the UN World Conference for Action against Apartheid met in Lagos.

On the one hand, these efforts are reflecting a growing awareness that the world is witnessing what seems to be the final stage, the inevitable disappearance of the apartheid system. The liberation movements are gaining strength, the racist regimes are being increasingly isolated and world opinion against apartheid is getting stronger.

But on the other hand, the situation is very grave. The military and economic power, the huge armaments for external aggression and internal oppression at the disposal of the racist regimes and the extremist attitudes expressed in these countries are indications of this. We are facing the twofold risk of a racial war and an escalated conflict between the foreign interests in this area. Africa has traditionally been an area of colonialist ambitions from the West. It is now a theatre for superpower rivalries and involvement from many countries, and the Cuban presence in Angola is a further important factor.

The global consequences of the development in Southern Africa, South Africa's threats and aggressions against her neighbours, the situation in South Africa created by apartheid and the white regime's ambition to develop nuclear energy — these four elements constitute a threat to international peace and security.

This was the background to our mission in September to Angola, Zambia, Botswana, Mozambique and Tanzania.
Situation in Southern Africa

Tanzania and Zambia have by now consolidated their independence. They play an important role in world affairs as sovereign nations. But they are still striving to reach economic emancipation. Botswana has staunchly defended her independence, but has a difficult geographical location. Angola and Mozambique have recently gained their national independence, but in many respects they are in a difficult situation. They still have to defend their borders, to fight systematic aggression which takes a heavy toll in material and human terms. Their economic problems have been aggravated by the massive exodus of trained people from the former colonial power. In the north of Angola, as a result of the Shaba war, there are more than 200,000 refugees from Zaire who are in great need of assistance. Mozambique is particularly hurt by white Rhodesia's aggression. 2,800 people have been killed during the last 15 months. The border closure is estimated to cost the country $200,000,000 per year. 6,000 people lost their jobs. There are 37,000 refugees from Rhodesia.

But all five states are in the front line in the struggle against apartheid. Their courageous and costly solidarity with the liberation struggle is an example to the world.

In Rhodesia there is armed struggle. At the same time there are serious efforts through the Anglo-American initiative to find a peaceful settlement on the basis of majority rule. We prefer a negotiated settlement, and the Anglo-American proposals could to our mind serve as a basis for such negotiations. Apparently the African side has also accepted this. The white regime in Rhodesia has, however, reacted in an extremist way. It has committed repeated aggression towards the neighbouring countries and increased internal oppression. This minority regime is thereby taking on a great responsibility. The longer it postpones the inevitable change to majority rule, the harder the terms will be for the losers. One cannot expect 95 per cent of Rhodesia's population to compromise on majority rule, or to accept to retain the armed power on which minority rule is based. There may still be time for a negotiated settlement in Zimbabwe. But the prerequisite is an end to white extremism and maximalist positions on all sides. And if the war goes on, there can be no doubt of the ultimate victory of the liberation struggle.

In Namibia a possible way to a peaceful termination of South Africa's illegal occupation is at hand. This requires the full implementation of Security Council Resolution 385. Till then we must continue our support to SWAPO (the South West Africa People's Organization), refuse sham arrangements and refuse recognition of South African puppets. Namibia should have immediate independence and majority rule based on democratic principles. Free elections should be held under the supervision and control of the United Nations and should encompass the whole of Namibia as one political entity.

A peaceful settlement of the Rhodesian and Namibian problem requires the acquiescence of the Government in Pretoria. But there can be no price to be paid to South Africa in return for this. The Government of South Africa will certainly only do what is in its own interest. It will no doubt cooperate with the purpose of trying to install pliable regimes in Zimbabwe and Namibia, and it will only let go its hold over these territories when they have become too costly liabilities to retain. It is possible to talk to the Pretoria Government if at the same time sanctions and increasing pressure are applied to give weight to the words. No solution of the problems of Zimbabwe and Namibia could ever contain any guarantee for the survival of apartheid in South Africa. What is finally at stake in Rhodesia as well as in Namibia is the future also of South Africa.

It is of fundamental importance to be unequivocal, not to resort to wishful thinking on this point, especially in view of the developments in South Africa itself during the last two years. During these last two years the final failure of the system of apartheid has become evident, even if viewed from the perspective of the architects of the system. Their promise was racial co-existence, peace and stability, But
the people of Soweto and other urban townships in South Africa showed by their revolt that they regard the system as impossible to endure. They do not demand reforms. They demand total and immediate change. And the reply of the authorities has been an increase in violence. The young generation of South Africa has shown that it does not want to grow up as victim of an abnoxious system. Their motives were explained to us by Alfred Nzo, general secretary of the ANC (African National Congress) of South Africa:

"You in Europe may find it strange that the school children of Soweto revolted because they had to learn Afrikaans. But to them it was clear. They were forced to learn the language of their oppressors, not their own. They would be educated to be good slaves to the racist minority and never be allowed to enjoy the green pastures of equality. For them, this was a declaration of war. They had to revolt."

And their revolt will continue, flare up again and again as long as apartheid remains. Soweto was a signal, a watershed in the development towards the ultimate downfall of apartheid.

Last year, the first of the Black homelands, the Transkei, was given its so-called independence. Soweto was a signal, a watershed in the development towards the ultimate downfall of apartheid.

General Conclusions

The Independence of Africa. The degree of openness and friendliness with which we were met everywhere reflected a sincere and deep-rooted wish for non-alignment and diversified relations in all fields, for cultural, political and economic exchange to mutual benefit. African countries do not want to be used as pawns in a power game. We must work to prevent a modern scramble for Africa stemming from superpower rivalry and from the profit interests of multinational companies.

We must support the African people's struggle for liberation on their own terms, on African terms, because it represents the longing of the African peoples, the need and vital interests of the African nations. Liberation movements are no monolithic organizations. They represent a broad spectrum of opinion.

Armed Struggle. The African peoples prefer, as before, to achieve their liberation by peaceful means. But if they are met only by oppression and violence, they will continue to resort to armed struggle, as they once did in Algeria, in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea Bissau and as they now have been forced to do in Namibia and Zimbabwe. And history tells us that when a people has taken up arms to liberate itself, it will not give up until freedom is achieved. Under these circumstances there is no reason for people from abroad to moralize about the resort to arms, especially as so many have for so long condoned institutional violence to uphold the privileges of the minority.

The victims of apartheid have but one overriding goal: that of their own liberation, their own dignity, their own identity as peoples and nations. They will accept any assistance — in economic terms, in
arms, in equipment — from whatever source because they wish to achieve their freedom. The President Kaunda made this very clear to us:  
"In Africa we do not produce arms. We asked the West for arms. They did not give us any. Instead Vorster and Smith, like the Portuguese colonists before, received us any. Instead Vorster and Smith, like the freedom, to be free at last. President because they wish to achieve their investments in South Africa that this would  
important to note that the workers themselves thus been and is a contradiction between  
flow of capital from abroad. Her growing  
workers there. But in this case, it is im­  
thus does not mean that we are communists.  
world and lead to unemployment for the  
Africa has progressed to such a point that,  
unnecessary bloodshed and human suffering,  
the border closure.  
the liberation movement. The action of the Socialist International  
should be directed against the two pillars of apartheid mentioned above. The liberation  
from exploitation will be the work and the victory of the African peoples themselves.  
but they should feel the whole-hearted support from the world community. A  
consistent support to this African struggle for freedom and social justice should be a  
army of support for the Socialist International and its mem­  
ber parties to take actions against the second pillar of apartheid, the support from abroad.  
Programme of Action  
We can see the following areas where action could and should be taken.  
(1) We must halt all arms exports to South Africa and all military cooperation with its  
Government. The apparatus of oppression is strengthened by each new weapon de­  
delivery on licence. The military cooperation gives the country the means to start its  
own manufacturing of arms in most important areas of weapon technology, maybe also in the ultimate of weapons. We must overcome this apparatus of technology to South Africa, including nuclear. No African country or combination of African countries could be a military threat to South Africa. Yet South Africa continues to be armed from abroad. A UN decision on a mandatory arms embargo is long overdue.  
(2) We must work for a prohibition of new investments and export of capital to  
South Africa and Namibia. A ban on investment in South Africa can be really efficient only if it is part of an international action that has the support of industrialized countries with large economic interests in South African business and industry. The UN Security Coun­  
cil will resume its discussions on this question inter alia on the basis of a Swedish proposal adopted by the General Assembly last autumn. calling for action against foreign investment. A positive decision on this item would be the minimum expected from Western governments.  
Given the explosive situation in South Africa, each country, however, in addition to international measures has to consider unilateral action as e.g. has been done in Norway and Sweden.  
(3) We must work for increased support to the front line states. They show exempl­  
ary solidarity with the liberation struggle, experience great sacrifices and are objects of aggression. They all have a large number of refugees.  
More countries should follow the UN recommendation to contribute to alleviate Mozambique’s economic difficulties as a consequence of the border closure.  
(4) We should give political support to the liberation movements, humanitarian aid and material support for peaceful purposes to the ANC of South Africa, to the Patri­  
tistical Movement of Zimbabwe and SWAPO, Support would be given in many ways. All movements have many refugees to feed and clothe. These have found a refuge mainly in the front line states. Aid to them can be channelled through the host governments. SWAPO is probably facing an election campaign in a near future and is in great need of financial and technical assistance.  
(5) Governments should contribute or increase contributions to help the victims of apartheid. This includes help for legal assistance, help to widows, is not delayed — prisoners, refugee aid and scholarships. Among the channels to use are the Inter­  
national Defence and Aid Fund (IDAF),
In Lusaka, the UN Namibia Institute, which prepares administrators for a free Namibia, needs more funds. It is estimated that practically all white civil servants, who constitute two-thirds of the administration in Namibia, will leave the country after independence.

(6) We should encourage governments to contribute to efforts in southern Africa towards regional cooperation, aiming at reducing dependency on South Africa.

(7) We must stop the flow of mercenaries to the racist regimes. This implies legislation to end the recruitment, financing, training, transit and assembly of mercenaries from our own territories. Mercenaries play and can play a fatal role in the prolongation of the war in Rhodesia and Namibia.

(8) We should all intensify our solidarity work for the liberation of southern Africa. Each party should start a national solidarity campaign in order to mobilize public opinion, raise funds and counterbalance racist propaganda in our mass media.

(9) Governments should assist popular movements working in support of the liberation struggle in southern Africa. These include political parties, trade unions, churches and other socio-political groups.

Indeed, the issue in southern Africa has also become a test of the validity of our civilization, that is whether it should be judged by its own enlightened modern values or whether it should be judged by its tolerance of a vicious doctrine of race supremacy. Contempt for human dignity elevated to the status of a system is an offence to our basic ideas.

Democratic socialists take pride in their conception of the natural equality of man without which there can be no democratic system. We say that reason, social justice and solidarity, not prejudice and oppression, should be the principles guiding our societies.

There are, indeed, many deficiencies in our societies showing that we have not yet been able to live up to that principle. Nevertheless, the attitude to be taken in regard to South Africa poses a basic question of morality, of respect for the values and ideas which were created by those very countries in the West that now are seen to support the apartheid regime by their failure to join the great majority of nations in a programme to effect radical change. The peoples of Africa have very seldom encountered those high principles of our civilization just mentioned. They have met colonialism, advanced military technology and Western capitalism in its most brutal form. Our professed ideals can no longer co-exist with apartheid.

Our journey has reinforced our conviction that the Socialist International and its members parties can give an important contribution to the liberation of Africa.
SOCIAL DEMOCRACY AND EUROCOMMUNISM

Eric Heffer

The following is the third in a series of articles on the relationship between social democracy and communism. In this article, Eric Heffer, MP (a member of the National Executive Committee of the British Labour Party) deals in particular with the Labour Party's approach to Eurocommunism and to the small British Communist Party.

The lecture given by Professor Horst Ehmke at Bonn in April 1976 and recently published in SOCIALIST AFFAIRS [issue 4/1977] is of great importance. He has placed Eurocommunism in its proper perspective and was so right to point out that "the process alone represents a turning point in the history of the communist parties which is well worth our careful consideration".

In this article, I will concentrate in particular on the attitude, as I understand it, which the British Labour Party adopts towards the Eurocommunists. I will also say something about its relationship with the Communist parties of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, i.e. those parties which have political state power. The question of its relationships with communist parties does not loom large in the discussions or thinking of the British Labour Party. This is not because of lack of general interest, but is due to two very good reasons. Firstly, the British Communist Party is politically insignificant, and therefore of no electoral importance, and in many respects is being outflanked on the left by small leftist parties and groups; and secondly, Labour is often in Government, relationships with governmental Communist parties tend to be looked at with one eye on the diplomatic consequences and whether or not visits and discussions are in the interests of the Labour Government of the day. Such contacts with such Communist parties therefore are largely in connection with foreign policy interests.

I am not saying that the party's attitude is entirely determined by the interests of a Labour Government, but undoubtedly this is a factor which is seriously considered.

There is also a third reason, and that is that the British Labour Party, being a loyal member of the Socialist International, at no time wishes to act independently or against the interests of its fellow international members. That is why, although it invited the Italian, French and Spanish Communist parties — the main Eurocommunists — to send official observers to its 1977 annual conference at Brighton, it nevertheless first sounded out its socialist colleagues in the International to find out whether this would embarrass them, or their comrades in the three countries concerned.

With regard to the Communist parties in countries where they have power, formal exchange visits between cultural organisations etc. and the Labour Party have taken place. Such exchanges have often been criticised by reactionary forces in Britain, which have deliberately misrepresented their motives. These exchanges are primarily designed as cultural or goodwill visits and do not go beyond an exchange of views usually ending with joint statements stressing the cultural and other interests of both organisations and countries concerned. Such discussions are designed to assist the development of detente, whilst in no way accepting the political concepts or objectives of each organisation concerned.

With regard to the three Eurocommunist parties which were asked to attend the Labour conference, it was hoped that out of such a visit Labour could find out just how far the Eurocommunists had gone, how far their views were strategic and not tactical, and whether in the future further exchanges of views would be useful both to the Labour Party (especially now that Britain is part of the Common Market) and to the International. At Labour's conference there were no formal discussions; all were informally held between individuals.

Could it be said that the discussions were fruitful? Only time will tell, but if one is concerned with a socialist and democratic development in Europe, then the Eurocommunists cannot be ignored.

The question of vital importance is: are these Communist parties really sincere? How far have they gained independence from Moscow, and just how far have they jettisoned their earlier intellectual baggage which has made genuine co-operation between the communists and the socialists in the past almost impossible? Socialist are naturally suspicious as to whether their statements are only tactical when they look at the present campaign being waged by the French Communists against the French Socialists. This is so despite the fact that the left of the French Socialist Party is fairly close in its policies to the French Communist Party. The French campaign brings to mind the statement by Ponomarov, quoted by Professor Ehmke, when he said in July 1975 that Communists must "never forget their independent class position for a moment, and not abstain from serious, justifiable criticism of social democracy as the ideology and practice of co-operation between the classes". One is entitled to ask, therefore, how far is the French Communist Party influenced by Moscow's thinking and how far is it taking an independent line. It is possible that Marchais' influence is on the wane and that more dogmatic forces are reasserting themselves. Again, only time will tell.

However, it would be wrong to believe that the position of the Eurocommunists is
purely tactical. I accept what Santiago Carrillo (the Spanish Communist Party leader) says in his book *Eurocommunism and the State* when he wrote: "The Eurocommunist phenomenon is not a tactical manoeuvre. It is an autonomous strategic conception in the process of formation, born of the experience of those concerned and of concrete reality."

It is, as Professor Ehmke says, "of some importance in the long term that even communists now admit the inherent value of the basic rights and political freedoms of bourgeois democracy".

The acceptance of democracy, religious freedom, of the plurality of political parties, an independent trade union movement, a free press, freedom of opinion, free and democratic universal suffrage etc. is of immense importance. These are rights which had to be fought for. They were not handed purely tactical. I accept what Santiago Carrillo (the Spanish Communist Party leader) says in his book *Eurocommunism and the State* when he wrote: "The Eurocommunist phenomenon is not a tactical manoeuvre. It is an autonomous strategic conception in the process of formation, born of the experience of those concerned and of concrete reality."

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France, and their financial and political support of the Right wing forces. In the event of such a split being launched, the Left governments should have no hesitation in using force to defeat it.

This position is not one held only by the Communist Party; there are many British Socialists who equally accept such a position, especially after the war. They are historically used to seeing themselves as the followers of Communist writings and ideas of Harold Laski, who was a leading theorist of the Labour Party, and although on the left of the party was by no means a Communist fellow-traveller.

**Peaceful Road to Socialism**

It is the concept of the peaceful road to socialism which has caused a split in the British Communist Party's ranks. A "New Communist Party" has been formed, based mainly on areas in the south of England and generally cut off from Britain's big industrial centres. It would seem to me that the new party will have only a limited life. Like previous attempts before it to create new 'Marxist-Leninist' parties, it will wither and die unless it is financially kept going by the Russians, which is very doubtful as far as I can see. If the CPs accept the democratic process, if they have declared independence from the Soviet Union, even if a limited one, if they are prepared to accept pluralism, then providing they have a mass base, it is obvious that agreements should be discussed, and if necessary entered into. This was a perfectly correct tactic for the French Socialist Party to adopt, as it is for the Italian Socialist Party to enter into agreements to administer the cities and municipalities of Italy. In the process, further discussions can take place.

In fact, it may at times be necessary to combat the innate conservatism of the Eurocommunists, who under certain circumstances look more gradualist than the Fabian Society in Britain. A simple saying in Britain is that there should be "horses for courses". This, I feel, applies to the Eurocommunist parties.

Many in the British Labour Movement believe that if the British CP really accepts political democracy and the peaceful road to socialism, then the greatest contribution it can make to democracy is to dissolve itself. Its members could then apply for membership of the Labour Party on an individual basis. As long as it exists as an independent party with its own policies and programme, putting up its own candidates in opposition to the Labour Party, it will not meet with any sympathy or understanding under British circumstances. The situation in France, Italy, Spain etc. cannot be automatically translated to Britain. Here the situation is totally different. As the CP professes that it believes in the parliamentary road and as its programme is really no more revolutionary than that of the Labour Party, the situation is a far more conservative force, there is really little reason for its continuation, no matter how they argue for an independent existence.

The argument for an independent existence could be sustained when the British Communist Party was a member of the Comintern, or looked to the Cominform, but as both these bodies are dead and buried, as increasing the hegemony of the Soviet party is rejected, then the internationalism of CP members, particularly as the party has no mass base, could best be expressed as individuals within the Labour Party.

The experience in Britain of left-wing parties outside the Labour Party and independent of it is not good. The Independent Labour Party (ILP) collapsed, the CP was left behind and other small parties, some of which at one time were groups in the Labour Party, are struggling for membership. Eurocommunism in Italy, France and Spain does not seem to be as permanent as anything else: British Eurocommunism is something else. That is why the British Labour Party pays little attention to the Communists at home and not too much abroad, although membership of the EEC is slowly changing that.

**What Attitude?**

Therefore, what attitude should socialists take towards the Eurocommunist parties? Firstly, it is important that they look at the objective political situation in their own country and in Europe. If the CPs accept the democratic process, if they have declared independence from the Soviet Union, then Eurocommunism is something else. That is why the British Labour Party pays little attention to the Communists at home and not too much abroad, although membership of the EEC is slowly changing that.

The British CP has in no way renounced the concept of democratic centralism. In fact, The British Road to Socialism says about the party: "It is democratic, it is centralised, it is and always has been deeply rooted in the British working class movement, it is international in outlook and basing itself on the ideology of Marxism-Leninism, it has a viable strategy for socialist revolution as well as the capacity to give leadership in the daily struggle."

There are those like Jimmy Reid, the ex-Central Committee member and a leading industrial militant, who say that there is little democracy in the party. Reid has left the CP, but he did not feel prepared to accept the democratic process, if they have declared independence from the Soviet Union, even if a limited one, if they are prepared to accept pluralism, then providing they have a mass base, it is obvious that agreements should be discussed, and if necessary entered into. This was a perfectly correct tactic for the French Socialist Party to adopt, as it is for the Italian Socialist Party to enter into agreements to administer the cities and municipalities of Italy. In the process, further discussions can take place. In fact, it may at times be necessary to combat the innate conservatism of the Eurocommunists, who under certain circumstances look more gradualist than the Fabian Society in Britain. A simple saying in Britain is that there should be "horses for courses". This, I feel, applies to the Eurocommunist parties.

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The book by Roy Medvedev on socialist democracy is a model of socialist thought. We should tell the Soviet, East German, Polish, Czech and other CP leaders that as long as they refuse democracy, whilst we seek to live in peace with them, we cannot be expected to go beyond that. As some of the Eurocommunist leaders have said, the supposed socialism of the Communist countries has done untold harm to the cause of socialism. That has to be said, and for socialists there can be no compromise on that question, and no double standards.

Socialists must reject the bureaucratic societies of the Communist countries and equally the unbridled competitive capitalist systems of Western Europe. We must strive to plan our resources sensibly, but with democratic control and freedom. If public ownership is the answer then it must go beyond that. As some of the Eurocommunist leaders have said, the supposed socialism of the Communist countries has done untold harm to the cause of socialism. That has to be said, and for socialists there can be no compromise on that question, and no double standards.

It is to these problems that we must address ourselves. Merely to become socialist governments without seeking to fundamentally change society is essentially a betrayal of our socialist objectives.

The British Labour Party's programme carried at the 1976 Labour Party conference says: "Our programme is founded on the principles of democracy and socialism. At its heart is a basic socialist priority: to bring about a fundamental and irreversible shift in the balance of power and wealth in favour of working people and their families.

We believe that this can best be done by extending the public ownership of production, distribution and exchange under democratic control by the workers of hand and brain. If we fail to carry that sort of policy out then Eurocommunism cannot win the support of the workers away from the socialists. Eventually they will have to come to us, and together a regenerated socialist movement in Europe will arise."
In this third and final article the Director of the Stockholm International Research Institute deals with the terrible effects which would follow from nuclear war.

"8.15 am — Atomic bomb released.  
43 seconds later, a flash!  
Huge atomic cloud.  
9.00 am — Cloud in sight.  
Altitude more than 12,000 metres."

These stark words are from the flight diary of the B-29, the Enola Gay, which dropped the atomic bomb — with the innocent-sounding nickname "Little Boy" — which destroyed Hiroshima on August 6, 1945.

Much more graphic words were used by eye witness Futaba Kitayama, then a 33-year-old housewife, to describe the events which followed. She was standing 1.7 kilometres away from the spot on the ground directly below the point at which the atomic bomb exploded. In her words:

"Someone shouted, 'A parachute is coming down!' I responded by turning in the direction she pointed. I do not know how to describe that light. I wondered if a fire had been set in my eyes."

"I don't remember which came first — the flash of light or the sound of an explosion that roared down to my belly. Anyhow, the next moment I was knocked down flat on the ground. Immediately, things started falling down around my head and shoulders. I couldn't see anything; it seemed pitch-dark. I managed to crawl out of the debris."

"Soon I noticed that the air smelled terrible. Then I was shocked by the feeling that the skin of my face had come off. Then, the hands and arms, too. Starting from the elbow to the fingertips, all the skin of my right hand came off and hung down grotesquely. The skin of my left hand, all five fingers, also came off."

"What happened to the sky that had been such a clear blue one only a moment ago? It was now dark, like dusk. I ran like mad toward the bridge, jumping over the piles of debris."

"What I saw under the bridge was shocking: hundreds of people were squirming in the stream. I couldn't tell if they were men or women. They looked all alike. Their faces were swollen and grey, their hair..."
was standing up. Holding their hands high, groaning, people were rushing to the river. I felt the same urge because the pain was all over the body which had been exposed to a heat ray strong enough to burn my pants to pieces. I was about to jump into the river only to remember that I could not swim.

“I went back up to the bridge. There, schoolgirls, like sleepwalkers, were wandering about in confusion. Upon crossing it, I looked back and found that the Takeyacho-Hatchobori area had suddenly burst into flame. I had thought that the bomb hit only the area where I was.”

“When crossing the bridge, which I did not then recognize, I found all its parapets of solid ferroconcrete had gone. The bridge looked terribly unsafe. Under the bridge were floating, like dead dogs and cats, many corpses barely covered by tattered clothes. In the shallow water near the bank, a woman was lying face upward, her breasts torn away and blood spurting. A horrifying scene. How in the world could such a cruel thing happen? I wondered if the hell that my grandmother had told me so much about in my childhood had fallen upon the earth.”

“I found myself squatting on the centre of the Parade Ground. It must not have taken more than two hours to get to the Parade Ground. The darkness of the sky lessened somewhat. Still, the sun, as if covered with a heavy cloud, was dim and gloomy.”

“My burns started paining me. It was a kind of pain different from an ordinary burn which might be unbearable. Mine was a dull pain that was coming from somewhere far apart from my body. A yellow secretion oozed from my hands. I imagined that my face also must be in this dreadful shape. By my side, many junior high school students were squirming in agony.”

“They were crying, insanely, ‘Mother! Mother!’ They were so severely burned and blood-stained that one could scarcely dare to look at them. I could do nothing for them but watch them die one by one, seeking their mothers in vain.”

“As far as I could see with my declining eyesight, all was in flames.”

“Steadily, my face became stiffer. I put my hands carefully on my cheeks and felt my face. It seemed to have swollen to twice its size. Now I could see less and less. Soon I would not be able to see at all. I kept walking. I saw on the street many victims being carried away by stretcher. Carts and trucks, heavily loaded with corpses and wounded who looked like beasts, came and passed me. On both sides of the street, many people were wandering about like sleepwalkers.”

Little Boy was a large device — three metres long, 71 centimetres wide, and weighing 4 tons. Today’s nuclear warheads are much smaller. An 8-inch nuclear artillery shell, for example, has about the same yield as the first atomic bomb. And a modern warhead for an American intercontinental ballistic missile (the Minuteman III) has an explosive power nearly 20 times greater than Little Boy, but it weighs a mere 100 kilograms.

The atomic bomb, euphemistically called Fat Man, which exploded about 500 metres over Nagasaki at 11.02 am on August 9, 1945, is thought to have had a yield of about 22,000 tons of TNT. Plutonium-239 was the fissile material this time. About 1.3 kilograms were fissioned out of some 20 kilograms in the bomb. Fat Man, 3.25 metres long and 1.5 metres wide, weighed about 4.5 tons.

Since World War II the nuclear arsenals have grown beyond all reason. Today, tens of thousands of nuclear weapons exist. And, as we have seen in an earlier article [SOCIALIST AFFAIRS, 4/1977] the probability of a nuclear world war ever increases. There is, therefore, good reason to remind ourselves of the effects of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

With this in mind, the Geneva-based International Peace Bureau set up an international team of experts to study the effects of the bombings. Forty-four scientists from 14 countries (East, West and Third World) met between July 21 and August 3, 1977, to examine data made specially available to them by Japanese specialists. They visited hospitals and research institutes in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and interviewed doctors, social workers and A-bomb survivors. A compre-
The comprehensive account of the events in the A-bombed cities emerges from their reports.

The Number of People Killed

Hiroshima is built on a flat delta, with mountains to the north and west and sea to the south. The city was damaged concentrically. The damage in Nagasaki, built on mountainous terrain, varied considerably according to direction. Nevertheless, the death rate at various distances from the hypocentre (the point on the ground directly below the centre of the explosion) was about the same in both cities.

About 90 per cent of all those within a kilometre of the hypocentres when the bombs exploded died by the end of 1945. About 60 per cent of those within two kilometres died — about 75 per cent of them in the first 24 hours, and nearly 90 per cent within 10 days.

The number of people in Hiroshima at the time of the bombing is uncertain. About 40,000 troops were there, for example, but the exact number is not known. And a large number of Korean forced labourers were in the city, but again the exact number is uncertain. The best estimate is that about 350,000 people were in Hiroshima when the atomic bomb exploded.

The international experts concluded that, on the basis of the evidence available, the best estimate for the number of deaths up to the end of 1945 is about 140,000, about 20,000 of whom were military servicemen. But this is almost certainly an underestimate. Thousands of people were reported missing in the 1950 National Census. The number that survived through 1945 but died in the next few years is unknown. And so is the fate of about 37,000 people who came into Hiroshima within the first week of the bombing.

About 280,000 people are thought to have been in Nagasaki when the bomb exploded. According to the best estimate, some 74,000 died by the end of 1945. There were many Koreans in Nagasaki too. Perhaps about 10,000 of them were killed by the bomb; the exact figure is not known. There is, therefore, a large element of uncertainty in this estimate of the number killed in Nagasaki. The number of victims who died after the end of 1945 is not known. It may never be.

Allies as well as enemies were killed. Twenty-three American prisoners of war are known to have died in Hiroshima. In Nagasaki there were about 450 American, Dutch, and British prisoners but the number that died is unknown.

Little Boy and Fat Man probably killed about 300,000 people, about one-half of those exposed to the bombs.

Scorched Land

The people killed immediately by the atomic bombs were mainly either crushed or burnt to death. The combined effect of heat and blast was particularly lethal. Many of those burnt to death in collapsed buildings would have escaped with only injuries had there been no fires. But as it happened, an area of 13 square kilometres in Hiroshima and 6.7 square kilometres in Nagasaki was reduced to rubble by blast and then to ashes by fire.

About one-half of the energy generated by the atomic bombs was given off as blast, produced by the explosive expansion of the air around the point of the explosion. The front of the blast moved as a shock wave — a wall of high-pressure air,
spreading outward at a speed equal to or greater than that of sound. It travelled nearly 11 kilometres in 30 seconds.

Even then it was still able to destroy. It was followed by a hurricane-force wind. But as the shock wave spread outward, the pressure behind it fell below atmospheric pressure and eventually the air flowed in the inward direction. Thus, a supersonic shock wave was followed by an exceedingly powerful wind and then, after a deathly instant of stillness, a very strong wind blew in the opposite direction.

At Hiroshima the blast at a distance of two kilometres from the hypocentre reached a pressure of about 3 tons per square metre and a velocity of about 70 metre per second. All buildings within this distance were damaged beyond repair and casualties due to blast were severe.

About one-third of the total energy generated by the atomic bombs was given off as heat. The fire-balls produced by the atomic explosions instantly reached temperatures of several million degrees centigrade. In one second they had grown to about 5000 °C. Exposed human skin was burnt at distances of even 3.5 kilometres from the hypocentres. At these distances, fabrics and wood were charred. Many people caught in the open within about a kilometre from the hypocentres were burnt to death.

Fire-storms raged in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The one in Hiroshima was particularly severe, lasting for six hours and completely burning every combustible object within a radius of two kilometres from the hypocentre.

Moisture condensed around the ash particles rising from the intense fires, as they came into contact with cold air. Consequently, heavy rain fell on the two cities. But it was not ordinary rain. The highly radioactive and oily liquid that fell is known to this day as "black rain".

Hiroshima had about 76,000 buildings before the dropping of the bomb. About 68 per cent of them were totally destroyed by fire and blast, and 24 per cent were very seriously damaged. About 25 per cent of Nagasaki's 51,000 buildings were totally destroyed and another 11 per cent seriously damaged.

Because of the destruction of an extensive area by a single powerful blow, fire-fighting facilities were all but completely destroyed. In any case, the water supplies were totally disrupted in both cities. In the midst of so much debris, fire-fighting was impossible.

Damage like that done to Hiroshima and Nagasaki by the atomic bombs could, of course, have been produced by conventional high-explosive and incendiary bombs. For Hiroshima, this would have taken about 300 tons of high-explosive bombs and 900 tons of incendiaries. But an atomic bomb delivers its enormous destructive power in an instant. And it inevitably produces ionizing radiation and radioactivity.

The initial radiation dose 500 metres from the hypocentre in Hiroshima was between 1000 and 3000 rads. In Nagasaki the dose at this distance was probably about 8000 rads. Doses of 400 rads were probably received by exposed people within about one kilometre of the Hiroshima bomb and 1.2 kilometres of the Nagasaki bomb.

One who came within about a kilometre of the hypocentres in the first 100 hours after the explosions could have received substantial amounts of residual radiation and could have ingested or inhaled radioactive materials. Only rough estimates of the doses of residual radiation received are available. The maximum possible dose is thought to be about 150 rads for both Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

The Injured

People seriously burnt and injured suffered fever, intolerable thirst and vomiting. They usually went into a state of shock. Almost all of them died within a week. Such was the lack of doctors, nurses, medicines and even bandages that most died virtually without treatment. In fact, about all that could be done was to wash and disinfect wounds with cooking oil or seawater mixed with potassium permanganate, and to treat the most serious burns with zinc oxide and Acrinol (ethacridine) solution.

There were about 300 doctors in Hiroshima at the time the bomb was dropped. Sixty were instantly killed and another 210 injured. All 32 first-aid stations and all 18 hospitals in the city were destroyed.

Many of those exposed to large doses of radiation rapidly developed symptoms of the disease known as radiation sickness. They became incapacitated with nausea and vomiting. A few days later they typically vomited blood, developed a high fever, had severe diarrhoea and much bleeding from the bowels. Death usually followed within 10 days.

Those exposed to smaller doses of radiation suffered a wide variety of symptoms including nausea, vomiting and diarrhoea; bleeding from the bowels, gums, nose and genitals; and menstrual abnormalities. There was often a total loss of hair, and fever and a feeling of great weakness. Resistance to infection was markedly decreased. Septicaemia was a frequent cause of death.

Delayed Effects

The really unique, and perhaps the worst, consequences of the atomic bombs are the delayed effects of exposure to radiation. The survivors, their children, and their grandchildren will live in fear of them for years to come.

Most of the survivors still alive at the end of 1945 appeared to be reasonably healthy, but later a variety of illnesses — including eye diseases, blood disorders, malignant tumours and psychoneurological disturbances — began to appear.

The incidence of leukaemia and malignant tumours — thyroid, breast, lung,
salivary gland, bone, prostate, and so on — has been, and still is, significantly higher among those exposed to radiation at Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

Tragically, children born to women pregnant when the bombs exploded show an increase in some congenital malformation, particularly microcephaly (abnormally small size of the head) resulting in mental retardation. But there is a surprising absence of genetic effects in children conceived by survivors exposed to radiation.

The international experts suggested a number of explanations for this absence. Included are: the number of survivors available for investigation and the radiation dose received by them are such that too few of them show genetic effects, even though these may be present, to be statistically significant; the research methods used to search for effects are insufficiently sensitive; the mutations induced are predominantly recessive ones and so they will not show up in second, third or even later generations; many of the affected persons may have died from acute radiation or other effects; and there may have been a large number of undetected spontaneous abortions.

The absence of demonstrable genetic effects among the offspring of the survivors of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombs does not, of course, mean that there is no genetic effect of radiation.

**Social and Psychological Effects**

The social and psychological effects of the atomic bombings were extremely severe. Even so, the effort made so far to investigate them in detail has been pitiful. In some ways these effects overshadow the other effects. The physical damage done to the two cities was so great that the very communities totally disintegrated. So many firemen, doctors, nurses, policemen, teachers, and so on died or were injured that social services collapsed. Of those people that survived the initial onslaught, many went mad or committed suicide. Thousands of children became orphans. Countless old people lost younger family members on whom they had been dependent. Hiroshima and Nagasaki became ghost towns.

Even after 32 years, the effects of the bombs are still apparent. So many young people were killed that there is a disproportionate number of aged among the survivors. This imbalance is increased by the widespread use of contraceptives among survivors who fear that their children might be malformed. Acute diseases and chronic after-effects do not allow the survivors to live normally, but the extreme of the damage often prevents marriage, and unusual susceptibility to disease and fatigue often threatens employment.

The ratio of sick and injured among the survivors is almost twice the national average. The ratio of physically handicapped is over three times the average. Disease and poverty among the survivors are continuously aggravated by age and by failing health.

**Immorality and Absurdity of Nuclear Strategies**

We are still unable to grasp the totality of the atomic disasters inflicted on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The destruction produced by nuclear weapons may simply be incomprehensible. But Hiroshima and Nagasaki are not the only cases to speak of the immorality, of any policy based on the use of nuclear weapons. Take, for example, the nuclear strategies of NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO). Discussions of these have lost sight of the human suffering caused by atomic bombs as well as of the consequences of their use.

In Europe today there are about 7,000 American, perhaps 3,500 Soviet and hundreds of British and French tactical (so-called) nuclear weapons. The American weapons are widespread in Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, Greece, possibly Iceland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Turkey and the UK. These weapons are part of the American stockpile of more than 20,000 nuclear weapons. And the Soviet Union has probably manufactured a similar number of these weapons — but we do not know for certain because, unfortunately, the USSR does not publish this type of information.

Most “tactical” nuclear weapons are more powerful than the Hiroshima bomb; some are 100 times more powerful. The total explosive power of the tactical nuclear weapons stationed in Europe alone is equivalent to about 50 times that expended during the Second World War, the Korean War and the Vietnam War put together.

NATO and American views differ on when and how tactical nuclear weapons would be used in a European War. NATO’s plans for the defence of Europe, therefore, are based on an awesome bluff. NATO says that a significant attack by the WTO, even a non-nuclear one, would be countered with nuclear weapons. But this would set in motion a series of events leading to the destruction of most of Europe’s cities, and the death of most of its people.

But most European political leaders, and probably most of its military leaders, too, would not in fact be willing deliberately to initiate such a chain of events. However, the public admission of such unwillingness would, as the experts say, “undermine the credibility of the deterrent”, and thus increase the probability of an attack.

Nevertheless, there are doubts. Some political and military leaders who actually would destroy Europe in order to save it. And if such people should have their fingers on the trigger at the crucial time, they really might bring about a nuclear holocaust. In short, NATO’s bluff could be called and Europe utterly destroyed.

What will happen to Western Europe if a nuclear war takes place will be almost entirely determined by what the USSR acts with its nuclear weapons (and, of course, vice versa). The larger NATO weapons are mainly intended for use against targets in Eastern Europe.

One type of Soviet tactical nuclear weapon deployed in Europe is a medium-range ballistic missile equipped with a warhead having an explosive power equivalent to that of 1,000,000 tons of TNT. Six hundred such missiles are deployed.

We do not know just how the USSR plans to use these weapons, but it is relatively easy to say what kind of targets they would be effective against. Because of the extremely high accuracy, their peculiar range (covering all Europe, and not much more, from European USSR) and their vulnerability (they are more vulnerable than more modern types to a pre-emptive attack), they would be most effective in early strikes against governmental and political centres and major communications centres, large transportation centres like harbours and railways, manufacturing facilities, and civil and military airports. These targets are mostly in or near large cities. In fact, a list of them would be, for all practical purposes, simply a list of the great cities of Western Europe, and many smaller ones besides.

We can, therefore, be reasonably sure that the majority of these 600 Soviet missiles are at this moment targeted against the cities of Western Europe. They are likely to be launched in the initial stage of a nuclear war, perhaps immediately after the “bluff” is called.

According to Herbert York — former Director of Defence Research and Engineering in the US Defence Department — the bombardment of Western Europe by just these 600 ballistic missiles (or a sizeable fraction of them) would easily kill virtually the entire urban population by blast alone. In addition, if a large proportion of the warheads were exploded on or near the ground, then a major fraction of the rural population could also be killed by nuclear fall-out, and so could a very large number of people who live in the countryside.

But a tactical nuclear war is likely to escalate rapidly to an all-out strategic nuclear war. History shows that countries at war do not normally surrender until they have used all the weapons in their arsenals. And, incredible though it may seem, the nuclear weapons currently in the world’s arsenals have a total explosive power equivalent to that of about 700,000 Hiroshima-type atomic bombs. If all, or a significant fraction, of these weapons were used, the consequences would be unimaginable. Most of the cities in the northern hemisphere would be reduced to a flesh heap. And the bulk of their inhabitants would be killed instantly. This situation alone is more than the mind can grasp.

And then there are the after-effects of a nuclear world war. These are simply unpredictable. We do not know what global climatic changes would be induced by such a war. Nor do we know what damage would be done to the ozone layer, the stratospheric shield would help protect life on earth from ultraviolet radiation. And the long-term consequences of the genetic damage done to the human race by the radiation from the resulting world-wide radioactive fall-out are also unknown. This genetic damage could, over many generations, decimate the human race.

The difficulty of predicting, for example, the amount of radioactive fall-out from a nuclear explosion is dramatically demonstrated by an incident which occurred in 1954. On March 1 of that year, the USA exploded a thermonuclear device (an experimental ‘H-bomb’) at Bikini Atoll, a
coral reef in the Marshall Islands. The device was supposed to explode with a power of about eight million tons of TNT. But the scientists had seriously miscalculated and it actually exploded with a power of about double this value — 15 million tons of TNT.

And the amount of radioactive fall-out produced by the nuclear explosion was considerably more than the scientists had predicted. An area greater than 1,000 square kilometres was seriously contaminated with radioactivity. The US government promptly announced the expansion of the danger zone to an area of 1,000,000 square kilometres, eight times that originally designated as the danger zone.

As it happened, a Japanese fishing vessel — the 99-ton Daigokuyunmaru ('Lucky Dragon No 5') — was sailing about 170 kilometres west of Bikini Atoll and 35 kilometres outside the pre-restricted sea area. Soon after the explosion the ship was showered by a sandy ash which settled in the hair and on the skin of the 23 crewmen. Although the men had seen a flash and heard an explosion, they had no idea of the source or nature of the substance that fell from them in the sky. But the next day they all fell ill with headaches and nausea — the onset of radiation sickness. When the ship returned to harbour (on March 14) the crew, the ship itself and its catch of fish were found to be highly radioactive. The crew were hospitalised and treated for radiation sickness. One of them, Aikichi Koboyama, died on September 23.

Rongelap Atoll, 170 kilometres downwind from the nuclear explosion, was so seriously contaminated with radioactive fall-out that its inhabitants had to be evacuated. Had the islanders been at the north of the atoll, they would have received enough radiation in the two days before they were evacuated to have killed them. As it was, they still received about a quarter of the lethal dose of radiation. One consequence of this, is that 28 residents needed surgery to remove tumours from their thyroid glands. One of them is a man who was exposed to radiation from the fall-out from the nuclear test while still in his mother’s womb. And the thyroids of some of the exposed children were so permanently injured as to retard normal growth.

In November 1972, a Rongelap islander, Recosi Anjain, died of leukaemia.

Although there is a great deal we do not know about the many consequences of a nuclear war, we can say that, at the very least, civilization as we know it would be utterly destroyed. Hiroshima and Nagasaki teach us that the social and psychological effects of nuclear war, although the least predictable and the most often ignored, are likely to be the most terrible and catastrophic — of all. No one can be sure that humankind would, in the long run, survive a nuclear holocaust.

Footnotes

1 First published in a Japanese journal.

between democracy and dictatorship. All the opposition political parties, ranging from the Communist Party (Marxist) to the right wing Jan Sangh, joined together to fight for democracy rights under one banner: the Janata (People's) Party. This was the first time that the opposition parties of varying ideologies had joined together to form one party with the common aim of restoring democratic rights to Indian citizens.

The election results belied Mrs Gandhi's calculations and baffled all predictions. The Janata Party's success was so tremendous and overwhelming, particularly in the populous northern states of India (the southern states of India by and large voted for Mrs Gandhi's party) that even the most optimistic among the Janata Party leaders were surprised. This was in fact a massive vote against the misrule of Mrs Gandhi's (the Congress) Party. It brought in their wake some strains between the different constituents of the Janata Party in the game of power politics. Even so, the party won overwhelming majorities in the northern states of Uttar Pradesh, Haryana, Punjab, Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh. However, the Communist Party (Marxist), together with its left-wing allies, defeated the Janata Party in West Bengal and secured a two-thirds majority. Similarly, in the southern state of Tamil Nadu, the regional party ADMK defeated Janata and won the election by an overwhelming majority. In the north-western state of Kashmir the local party "National Conference" defeated the Janata Party and won a majority. It is rather significant that the three states in the extreme north, east and south should have rejected the Janata Party and Congress alike.

These constraints gave a legitimate and genuine excuse to the Janata Party in that they were unable to solve some of the burning problems of the country which they had promised to do at the time of the elections. There is no doubt that there are urgent problems confronting the nation which should be solved immediately. The prices of essential commodities are rising sharply; there are reports of atrocities against the weaker sections like untouchables; there have been incidents of inter-religious riotings between Hindus and Muslims. The Janata Government, although sincere in its intentions, has not been able to tackle these problems successfully so far. The party has embarked on one of the most radical policies of the time to bring about socialism and democracy to grass roots village level, but it does not have the means to translate these policies into practice. It has been proposed by J. P. Narayan that people's vigilance committees should be organised at village level, which could take part in micro-planning as well as fight the repressive action of the privileged class in the villages. The Socialist members of the Janata Party, who have given a lead in policy formulation, are best equipped to organise such vigilance committees.

There is no doubt that a tremendous responsibility has fallen on the shoulders of the new Government. The Indian people, who have suppressed their hopes and aspirations far too long, are eager to see a change for the better. People are hoping that the Janata Party would bring young and forward looking elements to the fore, to give the party a new direction and fresher outlook. There is no denying the fact that if the party wants to retain its popularity, it will have to embark on a dynamic programme of action to channelize the energies of youth for nation-building. Only by so doing can the party give substance to the image it has been trying to create as the champion of the poverty-stricken masses of rural India.
The third Bureau meeting of the Socialist International in 1977 was held in Madrid on October 15-16, 1977, at the invitation of the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE). Willy Brandt chaired the meeting, which was attended by 77 participants (see list below) and 29 guests.

The participants included five Vice-Presidents of the Socialist International: Leopold S. Senghor, President of Senegal; Bruno Kreisky, Chancellor of Austria; Olof Palme, Chairman of the Swedish Social Democratic Party; Irene Petry, Chairman of the International Council of Social Democratic Women; and Anselmo Sule, Chairman of the Radical Party of Chile.

Among the guests were Otto Kersten, General Secretary of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions; Frank Barnaby, Director of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute; a delegation of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) of Mexico led by the party's President, Carlos Sansores Perez; a group of six parliamentarians from the Brazilian Democratic Movement (MDB); Guillermo Manuel Ungo, General Secretary of the National Revolutionary Movement (MNR) of El Salvador; B. P. Koirala, leader of the Nepali Congress Party and former Prime Minister of Nepal; and representatives of the National Liberation Front (FLN) of Algeria; the Socialist Union of Popular Forces (USFP) of Morocco (the USFP delegation being led by Abderrahim Bouabid, General Secretary of the party), the Socialist Party of Uruguay, the Polisario Front and the Janata Party of India.

Felipe Gonzalez, General Secretary of the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party, made an opening statement to the meeting.

The main issue on the agenda was "Problems of Disarmament" — a particularly topical issue, in view of the current Belgrade follow-up conference to the 1975 Helsinki Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, the special session on disarmament of the United Nations General Assembly to be held in 1978 and the present situation regarding the SALT and MBFR talks. This subject was introduced by Willy Brandt and Frank Barnaby and the paper prepared by the former is published below (that of the latter being a summary of the three articles published in Socialist Affairs 4/1977, 5/1977 and this issue).

Three other major questions were also discussed. The report on the Socialist International mission to southern Africa was presented by the leader of the mission, Olof Palme (see elsewhere in this issue). A proposal regarding the discussion of the Middle East problem was presented by Bruno Kreisky and one on Western Sahara, by Felipe Gonzalez.

Among the decisions taken by the meeting were the following:
(a) That the General Secretary should prepare for the Bureau meeting to be held in Hamburg on February 9-10, 1978, proposals for a programme of action by the Socialist International with regard to disarmament.
(b) To adopt the report of the Socialist International mission to southern Africa, which visited Angola, Zambia, Botswana, Mozambique and Tanzania on September 2-11, 1977, under the leadership (in Angola, Zambia, Mozambique and Tanzania) of Olof Palme, Chairman of the Swedish Social Democratic Party, and (in Botswana) of Kjeld Olesen, Vice-Chairman of the Danish Social Democratic Party. The report contained a nine-point programme of action which can be summarised as follows:

- a halt to all arms exports to South Africa and all military cooperation with its government;
- to work for the prohibition of new investments and of the export of capital to South Africa and Namibia;
- to work for increased support to the front line states.

The Bureau asked the General Secretary to draw this nine-point programme to the attention of the member parties, and to remain in contact with parties as regards its implementation. It was also agreed to undertake joint action with the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions against apartheid.

(c) To accept a proposal by Bruno Kreisky that the Socialist International should organise a round-table conference on the Middle East with representatives of the Israeli labour movement and of the other member parties of the Socialist International.

(d) To adopt unanimously the position with regard to the situation in the Western Sahara expressed in the text published below.

(e) To adopt, as guidelines for the work of the Socialist International Committee for Solidarity with Chile, the principles and recommendations for action reflected by the consensus of the Conference on Chile held in Rotterdam on August 29-31, 1977 [see SOCIALIST AFFAIRS, 5/1977]; and to request the Committee for Solidarity with Chile to submit to the Bureau a programme of action for 1978:

(f) That, in order to focus more attention on Latin American problems, one Bureau meeting should be held in Latin America during each inter-Congress period following

Enrica Lucarelli, Aldo Ajello, Robert Pickersgill, Eiichi Nagasue, Tamio Kawakami.
the 1978 Vancouver Congress of the Socialist International.

(g) That the Socialist International mission to Latin America which was to have visited Mexico, Costa Rica, Venezuela and the Dominican Republic on October 17-27, 1977, under the leadership of Mario Soares, Prime Minister of Portugal and Vice-President of the Socialist International, should be postponed until 1978.

(h) To postpone the discussion on Argentina until the Bureau meeting in Hamburg, in order to allow for a paper to be presented by the Argentinian member party of the Socialist International, the Partido Socialista Popular.

(i) That, in connection with the Socialist International's intensified activities with regard to Latin America, Hector Oqueli (El Salvador) should be appointed to the staff of the Socialist International secretariat, to deal with Latin American affairs.

(j) To adopt a budget for the Socialist International for 1977 which is double the size of the 1976 budget.

(k) That the two principal themes of the Bureau meeting to be held in Hamburg on February 9-10, 1978, should be: "Employment policies", the discussion to be opened by Hans Apel, Federal German Finance Minister, and Willy Claes, Belgian Minister of Economics; and "Socialism and institutions in the eighties", the discussion to be opened by Pier Luigi Romita, Secretary of the Italian Social Democratic Party.

(i) The meeting also dealt with preparations for the Socialist International Party Leaders’ Conference which is to be held in Tokyo on December 17-19, 1977, at the invitation of the Japan Democratic Socialist Party and the Japan Socialist Party.
The following is the full text of a position paper on the Western Sahara question adopted by the SI Bureau meeting in Madrid.

The Bureau of the Socialist International at its meeting in Madrid has considered the subject of the Western Sahara. After interventions by the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE), the President of Senegal and some other speakers and having listened to a representative from the Polisario Front and to one from the Socialist Union of Popular Forces of Morocco, the Bureau unanimously agreed:

1. The Socialist International considers that the conflict taking place in the Western Sahara represents a serious and grave danger to peace and security in the Mediterranean, so that a peaceful solution is of great importance for the region.

2. Consequently, the Socialist International considers that it is extremely urgent to obtain a negotiated solution to the conflict.

3. Such a resolution needs to take into account the inalienable rights of peoples to self-determination, in accordance with the Charter, resolutions and recommendations of the United Nations.

4. All the parties involved must take part in the dialogue leading to the solution of the conflict (including the Polisario Front).

5. In view of the seriousness of the situation, the Bureau of the Socialist International has decided to ask the President and the General Secretary of the Socialist International to make a special effort to be kept constantly informed about the course of events.
BRANDT ON DISARMAMENT

The following are the “Remarks on Disarmament” submitted to the Bureau of the Socialist International in Madrid on October 15 and 16, 1977, by the President of the International and Chairman of the German Social Democratic Party, Willy Brandt.

(1) Democratic socialists all over the world have always considered themselves protagonists of peace. It is only in peace that social progress can be realised in freedom and personal responsibility.

Freedoms, justice and solidarity are the binding guidelines of our action not only within our nations. Democratic socialists at the same time aspire to an international peace order which complies with these basic principles.

Time presses. We live in a world that is threatened in many ways although it proved possible to make peace more secure in some parts of the world, above all here in Europe. Since the end of World War II alone there have been 150 military conflicts with many millions of dead. In Europe alone potentials of destruction are stored which — if used — could annihilate mankind even several times. Experts warn us that this case X could gain increasing probability unless political insight and action underwent radical change and the community of nations put into practice the policy of refraining from the use of force in international relations. We must not ignore these warnings.

(2) In the past years social democrats have created in Europe substantial preconditions for a peaceful settlement of conflicting interests. The Cold War was increasingly replaced by the will to co-operate in our part of the world. Dispassionate and realistic policy succeeded in the conclusion, across the political, military and ideological dividing lines existing in Europe, of a number of significant treaties and agreements which have made the renunciation of the use of force a central element in international relations in Europe. Thus, more cooperation became possible.

There is no realistic alternative to the policy of detente. The many foci of crisis in the world are no proof to the contrary, rather they are dramatic evidence of the fact that we suffer not from too much but — e.g. in the Middle East, in southern Africa, and in some other parts of the world — from too little détente.

The struggle for a reduction of tensions and the attempt to call a halt to the arms race are inseparably linked together. They are in keeping with the aspiration to security and stability as defined for instance, since a decade, by the concept of the Atlantic Alliance. Détente will only last if effective agreements are also reached in the military sphere. At the same time we can only hope to achieve an understanding also in these sensitive issues if all involved continue to work for a reduction of distrust and for the strengthening of the preparedness to co-operate.

We know that the policy of détente requires a process which needs permanent new efforts and which does not, at least not yet, develop automatically or without setbacks. For this very reason we welcome that the good sense has prevailed and that the Belgrade conference examines frankly the experiences since Helsinki, but then concentrates on the next phase: it is important which concrete projects are seized in the next years on the basis of Helsinki.

(3) The arms race creates instability and threatens peace. In an age in which every war can lead to the annihilation of humanity the endeavour for a control of armaments and for disarmament turns into a categorical imperative. Hence I emphasise the statement that we made at our recent congress in Geneva: “For the Socialist International, the ultimate objective continues to be that of general disarmament. It invites all governments to take suitable steps to endow this great humanitarian undertaking with real content.”

The arms race is a global problem with specific regional characteristics. More than 330 billion dollars have been spent on armaments all over the world in 1976 alone. The share of developing countries in this expenditure has soared.

The arms race is a gigantic waste of the anyhow scarce material and mental resources which are so urgently needed to build an international peace order. This waste aggravates the conflict between the fed and the hungry and thus is part of the great social issue of our time.

Every step, wherever taken, which is suitable to check this development without infringing upon external security must therefore find our unrestricted support. In view of the global character of these problems, I as President of the Socialist International call upon the governments of the world to participate, in addition to limited regional conferences, within the framework of the United Nations and to contribute realistic and effective initiatives, for instance in the Geneva disarmament conference of the disarmament commission and the conference on the advancement of the humanitarian international law of war, but especially in the UN special conference on disarmament next year.

(4) The world powers bear salient responsibility for the security of all of us. The bulk of the existing destructive potential is in their hands. Hence it is of preeminent importance that the United States and the Soviet Union should be the pacemakers of arms limitation and disarmament.

A few days ago, on October 3, 1977, the first SALT agreement which was signed in autumn 1972 expired without a continuation having been negotiated, though both sides have declared their readiness to respect
the regulations of the treaty for the future. The conclusion of a second agreement on the limitation of strategic arms systems, the struggle for which has been going on for a long time, is still pending. We learnt with satisfaction that during the last weeks both sides came a good deal closer to each other. I urge all emphasis those responsible to remove the still existing obstacles and to agree as soon as possible on a reasonable understanding. Failure of these efforts would be a grave setback for the effort to continue the policy of detente. I should like to remind the nuclear powers in this context that they committed themselves already in the non-proliferation treaty to conduct serious negotiations towards nuclear disarmament.

In addition I call upon the great powers to honour their pledge from the Moscow test ban agreement and to conclude soon a treaty on a ban of all tests of nuclear weapons.

(5) The Vienna talks on the mutual and balanced reduction of troops and armaments are of special importance to us in Europe. They must soon be brought to a first interim result. An agreement on SALT II would be an additional incentive, but not a necessary precondition. The representatives of East and West have moved towards each other during the last few years. At the same time, however, the talks have concentrated too much on discussing technical details. But the political goals of the limitation of armaments must not be lost out of sight. High-ranking political initiatives are therefore required so that also from Vienna the arms race can be checked and the security situation in Central Europe can be stabilised on a significantly lower level.

The political principle, agreed by treaty, of the renunciation of the use of force must also be reflected in the proportion of military forces. It must, therefore, be the objective of the negotiations to conclude an agreement which aims at real parity and is based on collectiveness. It is also important that at the same time concomitant measures should stabilise the situation and the arms race should be brought to a halt by means of both reductions and new maximum numbers. This would contribute to lowering the capability for a standing attack, extending pre-warning periods and reducing the dangers of incorrect assessments and false reactions. The confidence-building measures laid down in the final document of the Helsinki Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe should, in the interest also of all European states not involved in MBFR, be extended at the actual CSCE follow-up conference in Belgrade and should be agreed upon in binding form as a concomitant measure at MBFR.

(6) A cause of great concern is the development of arms systems which have thus far neither been included in the SALT nor MBFR negotiations. The so-called grey-zone weapons, as well as technological innovations, escape already negotiated results in other areas. Hence it is of great importance that the arms control negotiations should be extended to this field.

Continued development of atomic weapons by the nuclear powers represents a particular danger. Prior to the decision on the introduction of qualitatively new arms systems very careful consideration should be given as to the consequences this may have for the policy of detente and the arms control negotiations. This applies above all to the arms systems stationed outside the territory covered by MBFR but which affects it, especially the Soviet medium-range potential on the one hand, and the corresponding "cruise missiles" on the other. Also the so-called neutron bomb is to be classed into this context.

It is imperative to prevent technological developments in the field of nuclear arms from lowering the atomic threshold. Nuclear arms cannot yet not replace the insufficiency of conventional defence capability. The decision on their use must remain in the hands of the responsible politicians. The distinction between conventional and nuclear warfare must continue to be clearly discernible, and decisions on arms systems must always be based on the considerations of military strategy, also take account of the justified anxieties of the citizens.

To make peace secure it will moreover be decisive whether at long last the ban on chemical arms will be instituted which has been demanded so long by the Federal Republic of Germany and others. Here also, the two World Powers have failed to honour their word since 1974. Here also, time presses. For the conclusion of an effective treaty is made increasingly difficult by the invention of new products, for example binary combat materials.

(7) The armaments in East and West, growing ever faster, represent a considerable threat to peace. The search for safe jobs and the effort for modern know-how contributed to the sophisticated technological production of war material being considered a promising sector of industry.

Hence solutions must urgently be devised as to how the armaments industries can gradually be converted to civil production without the loss of jobs. All states should take care lest the production of military goods should become a decisive component of their economic structures.

Consequently participating states should endeavour to limit their exports of armaments. The growing share of arms imports in the total imports of numerous Third World countries represents a dangerous development. While safeguarding the security situation, we should come to agreements which limit to a reasonable size the transfer of military goods and arms technology under international control.

(8) The danger of an increasing proliferation of nuclear arms is growing continuously. One of the causes is that there is a growing number of states which for reasons of prestige or for the supposed defence of their existence consider possession of atomic weapons desirable. On the other hand new dangers are conjured up by the general increase in energy demand. Hardly any country is prepared to dispense with the peaceful use of nuclear energy. This results in a special responsibility for those countries that export equipment for atomic energy: the limitation, as intended by the non-proliferation treaty, of the number of powers in possession of nuclear arms must not be by-passed by an irresponsible export policy, causing the proliferation of sensitive technologies. Equally the countries that want to build up a nuclear capability of their own must be prepared to co-operate in the limitation of the ensuing risks.

STATEMENT

The following statement was issued by the Swiss Social Democratic Party on September 13:

"The latest development in weapons technology threatens to unbalance the prevailing situation of relative military and political stability by giving a fundamentally new impetus to the arms technology race, despite the fact that even now the nuclear superpowers have weapons in their arsenals with 4,000 times the destructive potential of the total used against Germany and Japan in World War II, as a consequence of which the Pentagon estimates that, in the event of a nuclear war, in the first 48 hours alone there would be 1,500,000 dead and 3,500,000 injured among the civilian population, while a full nuclear confrontation in Western Europe would produce 8,000,000 dead and 20,000,000 injured. Furthermore, new impetus to the arms technology race, despite the fact that even now the nuclear superpowers have weapons in their arsenals with 4,000 times the destructive potential of the total used against Germany and Japan in World War II, as a consequence of which the Pentagon estimates that, in the event of a nuclear war, in the first 48 hours alone there would be 1,500,000 dead and 3,500,000 injured among the civilian population, while a full nuclear confrontation in Western Europe would produce 8,000,000 dead and 20,000,000 injured. Furthermore, in a military conflict escalating into a nuclear war, "Under no circumstances can we demand that the arms control negotiations be extended to this field."

Continued development of atomic weapons by the nuclear powers represents a particular danger. Prior to the decision on the introduction of qualitatively new arms systems very careful consideration should be given as to the consequences this may have for the policy of detente and the arms control negotiations. This applies above all to the arms systems stationed outside the territory covered by MBFR but which affects it, especially the Soviet medium-range potential on the one hand, and the corresponding "cruise missiles" on the other. Also the so-called neutron bomb is to be classed into this context.

It is imperative to prevent technological developments in the field of nuclear arms from lowering the atomic threshold. Nuclear arms cannot yet replace the insufficiency of conventional defence capability. The decision on their use must remain in the hands of the responsible politicians. The distinction between conventional and nuclear warfare must continue to be clearly discernible, and decisions on arms systems must always be based on the considerations of military strategy, also take account of the justified anxieties of the citizens.

To make peace secure it will moreover be decisive whether at long last the ban on chemical arms will be instituted which has been demanded so long by the Federal Republic of Germany and others. Here also, the two World Powers have failed to honour their word since 1974. Here also, time presses. For the conclusion of an effective treaty is made increasingly difficult by the invention of new products, for example binary combat materials.

(7) The armaments in East and West, growing ever faster, represent a considerable threat to peace. The search for safe jobs and the effort for modern know-how contributed to the sophisticated technological production of war material being considered a promising sector of industry.

Hence solutions must urgently be devised as to how the armaments industries can gradually be converted to civil production without the loss of jobs. All states should take care lest the production of military goods should become a decisive component of their economic structures.

Consequently participating states should endeavour to limit their exports of armaments. The growing share of arms imports in the total imports of numerous Third World countries represents a dangerous development. While safeguarding the security situation, we should come to agreements which limit to a reasonable size the transfer of military goods and arms technology under international control.

(8) The danger of an increasing proliferation of nuclear arms is growing continuously. One of the causes is that there is a growing number of states which for reasons of prestige or for the supposed defence of their existence consider possession of atomic weapons desirable. On the other hand new dangers are conjured up by the general increase in energy demand. Hardly any country is prepared to dispense with the peaceful use of nuclear energy. This results in a special responsibility for those countries that export equipment for atomic energy: the limitation, as intended by the non-proliferation treaty, of the number of powers in possession of nuclear arms must not be by-passed by an irresponsible export policy, causing the proliferation of sensitive technologies. Equally the countries that want to build up a nuclear capability of their own must be prepared to co-operate in the limitation of the ensuing risks."
Economic Situation

At the 1976 conference the Government was very strongly criticised for its economic policies in spite of the fact that the central issue of incomes policy had been settled by an agreement with the TUC to limit wage increases on a voluntary basis. The implementation of that agreement has led over the past two years to a reduction in the real income of most people in Britain. Britain having the case that it has not proved possible to reach an agreement to continue wage restraint for the third year. Although the Government for its part will try to limit wage increases to 10 per cent, the TUC has not concluded a further agreement on the lines of those made in 1975 and 1976.

The present situation is characterised by a declining rate of inflation but a very high level of unemployment. Some commentators consider it a remarkable political fact that unemployment is proving to be less of an emotive issue than it was in the 1960s when levels of unemployment was much lower. The Government’s job creation programme was praised but it was felt that more radical measures by the National Enterprise Board and Scottish Development Agency were required.

In contrast to 1975, the Chancellor, Denis Healey, received a warm, if not enthusiastic, welcome. He said that at international level governments had undertaken an excessive degree of deflation, but he was not prepared to engineer an artificial pre-election boom as had been done by Conservative governments in the 1950s and early 1960s. He made it clear that an improved circumstance, undertake more fundamental socialist reforms. It should not be forgotten that Labour has only ever been in government (1924, 1929-31, 1945-51, 1964-70) in periods of economic decline. The Conservatives came into power in 1951 and 1970 just when things had begun to get better, as a result of unpopular but necessary Labour policies. The party is determined not to allow history to repeat itself.

European Community

The conference was presented with a 12-page statement of policy by the NEC and a major background document which was the result of a year’s work by a special EEC sub-committee of the NEC. The background document and the statement are entitled “The EEC and Britain — a Socialist Perspective.”

The statement does not put all the blame on the EEC for Britain’s continuing economic problems but considers that the effect of Community membership on food prices and on the UK’s balance of payments, justify the party’s warnings against membership given before the referendum of June 1975.

The NEC remains convinced that the liberal-capitalist ideology of the Rome Treaty represents a major stumbling block not only to a British Labour Government but also to the strengthening of socialist forces in Europe.

The statement, which was accepted by conference, stated quite clearly: “Our objective is to work towards the creation of a wider but much looser grouping of European states with one in which each country is able to realise its own economic and social objectives under the sovereignty of its own Parliament. In such a Europe, a Labour Britain would seek to work at all times in close cooperation with its European partners. Our priority, however, would be to work with the European Left — to create, within Europe, the climate and conditions needed for the development of socialism in each of the member states. In this statement, therefore, we not only reaffirm our opposition to any kind of supranational control; we put forward a...
number of constructive policies around which socialist forces in Europe can rally in a spirit of international cooperation and solidarity."

The statement goes on to reiterate the party's opposition to economic and monetary union, its desire for reform of the CAP, its opposition to the current Common Fisheries Policy, and its opposition to the majority of the objectives of the Common Transport Policy.

The NEC also passed a specific motion calling for reform of the CAP. It defeated an amendment calling upon the Labour Government to withdraw from the CAP until reform has been achieved. An amendment was also debated which called for support and cooperate fully with other European socialist parties in formulating a socialist manifesto for direct elections, including again reform of the CAP. The NEC asked for this amendment to be remitted to it. The mover, however, insisted on a vote and it was defeated by delegates.

A debate also took place on a resolution calling on the Government to amend the European Communities Act 1972 in order to give the British Parliament an effective veto on Council decisions. On request from the NEC this amendment was not put to a vote but remitted to the NEC where it will be considered as a possible basis for action. A motion calling for a further referendum on EEC membership to take place in Britain in 1978 was defeated. Replying to the debate, Michael Foot welcomed the enlargement of the Community from nine to twelve States.

Jim Callaghan made it clear in his speech that whilst there is no question of Britain withdrawing from the Community, the Labour Party should not ignore the issue in the forthcoming election campaign. The Prime Minister summed up his tactical approach in his speech to conference: "After we have all listened to the debates on the Communion Market this week, Ministers from the Cabinet and representatives from the NEC should meet in the autumn to see how we can progress radical reform as full members of an evolving EEC. By so doing, the Labour Party will once again be the only major political party to which the British people can look for the prospect of changing those features of Community membership which cause dissatisfaction whilst at the same time working for the development of the Community and the growing unity of the people of Europe."

Direct Elections

It will be noted that Mr Callaghan's letter and the NEC statement mark only passing references to direct elections. It should also be noted that the Rules of Procedure of the party did not allow further debate on this matter following the out-right opposition expressed by conference in 1976.

Less than half a page was devoted to the subject in the NEC statement. This said: "The Labour Party has voiced its opposition to direct elections and the inherent move to federalism on many occasion. We reiterate, yet again, our opposition to direct elections. We acknowledge, as we must, that there is now the prospect of elections actually taking place and we do not wish to let the mounting feeling of dissatisfaction with the EEC go unrepresented at the Strasbourg Assembly. But if we are to represent a position, certain basic conditions must be fulfilled:

- the legislation providing for direct elections must include clauses expressly preventing any increase or changes in the powers of the Assembly;
- in spite of the likelihood of the elections being heavily weighted against the party-especially given the mistrust of the EEC by our supporters — we must fight the campaign on a platform of radical change of the EEC and its institutions as outlined above and in our background paper;
- apart from our general objection to direct elections we object to their having to be held on the same day throughout the Community and that they have to be conducted using a common electoral system; they must be held on the same day as our own parliamentary elections, on the basis of the present first-past-the-post system, using single member constituencies;
- party candidates must be selected before each election using normal constituency machinery, and must be bound by party policy and accountable to the party. Within the Assembly itself, we must seek as far as possible to cooperate at work with other EEC socialist groupings."

It is clear from this and from informal meetings held on the fring of conference that there is still opposition to the holding of direct elections. No one, however, would press this issue to an extent which would fundamentally divide the party or lead to the defeat of the Labour Government in the House of Commons. The Government does not appear to be bringing immense pressure to bear on Labour MPs opposed to the elections as it is apparently doing with regard to the devolution legislation. It would also appear that whilst there is a majority in Parliament for legislation for these elections, there is almost certainly not a majority for a system of proportional representation in these elections. This will make it virtually impossible for Britain to hold the elections in May 1978.

Netherlands

New PvdA Executive

The Dutch Labour Party (PvdA) held its Congress in Amsterdam from October 13 to 15. The two main issues under discussion were the election of a new executive and the adoption of a new programme of principles.

The party executive consists of 21 members, one of whom is the president of the PvdA Parliamentary Group, one is president of the women's association, six are representatives for the organization and 13 other members are elected by the Congress. The party chairman, Ina van den Heuvel, was re-elected unopposed, as were the secretary, treasurer, and the first and second vice-chairmen. For the post of international secretary, however, there were two candidates: Harry van den Bergh, the current holder of the office, and Wim Bogaard. In the election, Harry van den Bergh obtained 3,727 votes, while Wim Bogaard got 7,809 votes, so the latter was elected by a large majority. One of the major tasks for the new international secretary will be the activation of the party itself with regard to foreign policy, without of course neglecting the bilateral and multilateral international relations of the Dutch party.

Wim Bogaard, who teaches international law at the University of Utrecht, is 31 years old. Before his election he was active within the party in several fields of international relations; he was inter alia a member of the Council of the European Commission, a member of the EEC commission and secretary of the commission on foreign affairs. In 1974 he worked at the UN Division of Narcotic Drugs in Geneva under a special service agreement. He completed his law studies in 1970 and published several articles in the field of international law i.e. on international control of narcotic drugs and human rights.

Of the other 13 members of the new PvdA executive, five were elected for the first time, the other eight being re-elected. Seven of the 21 members are women.

The full Executive of the Dutch Labour Party is now as follows: Ina van den Heuvel (Chairman), Gerard Heyne den Bak (Secretary), Hans Ouwerkkerk (Treasurer), Jaap van der Doef (First Deputy-Chairman), Bram Peper (Second Deputy-Chairman), Sonja van der Gast-Bakker Schut, Relus ter Beek, Anneke Reuvenkamp, Stan Poppe, Marie-Jose Grotenhuis, Feen Buurman, Evert van Dijk, Maurice Koopman, Edo Jongejan, René Toussaint, Arie van der Hek, Jeanne Hoogendoorn-Herfkens, Nora Salomons, Wim Boogaard (International Secretary), Pijkel Schröder (Chairman, Roos Vrouwens).

Social Democratic Congress

The following report was written by Dick Toornstra of the secretariat of the Confederation of the Socialist Parties of the European Community.

The 32nd congress of the Danish Social Democratic Party was held in Copenhagen from September 17-20, 1977. The congress considered drafts of the new policy and working programmes which had been widely debated at branch meetings of the party. More than 700 amendments had been tabled as the result of these discussions.

Events preceding the congress gave further grounds for optimism — the party had increased its share of the vote from 30 to 37 per cent at the last elections in February 1977, and membership had risen by approximately 125,000.

The congress was also of interest from the European point of view, as important declarations on the party's European policy were included in the new programmes. Given that there is now a majority in Denmark
against membership of the Community, and that a mere 11 per cent of Social Democratic voters are in favour of direct elections, it is scarcely surprising that the congress debate on the European policy was extremely comprehensive.

It was therefore remarkable that the cautiously positive attitude on European elections reflected in both draft programmes came out even more strongly in the amendments that were adopted. The European section of the draft policy programme simply said that its aim was a democratic and socialist Europe which would conduct an open and progressive policy in its relations with other countries. To this statement the following amendment, which was adopted by 147 votes to 104, was added: "Denmark's membership of the Community must be assessed continuously in terms of whether it furthers national and international democratic socialism."

Although the working programme could not be fully discussed due to pressure of time, there is a fairly comprehensive section on the European policy. The outline of a social democratic European policy is contained in the following statements: "The Social Democrats do not take the view that the European policy should be developed by changing the institutions or shifting the balance of power between the institutions, but by a common will to take decisions on economic policy. This means that the present situation, in which an individual country has a right of veto on questions which it considers vital to its own interests, will be maintained."

On direct elections: "The Social Democrats will work to ensure that direct elections to the European Parliament provide increased democratic control over decisions taken in the Community. The Social Democrats will also take the view that such control should be exercised first and foremost by the Folketing (Parliament) and the Community Committee, and in the case of major decisions, will ensure that the Folketing and the public are involved in the decision-making process far enough in advance of the final decision."

The working programme also includes a declaration of the party's readiness to cooperate in many specific sectors: monetary and regional policy, agricultural policy, fisheries policy, the control of multinationals, minimum standards in employment and social policy matters, foreign trade and development aid.

A resolution on the present political situation was altered to include an amendment calling upon the Government and the Folketing to set up an independent commission to make a critical assessment of the economic, social and cultural consequences of Community membership.

Finally, the congress approved a proposal by the party council for candidates for direct elections to be nominated at a special conference. A proposal that constituency associations should nominate their candidates themselves was rejected by a large majority. Under the draft law, one member is to be elected for Greenland, and the rest in "southern Denmark", which counts as a single constituency. The party will therefore draw up a list of 20 names.

The Social Democratic European MPs will become non-voting members of the party council and must consult it and the Social Democratic Group in the Folketing before any important decision in the European Parliament. In addition, their work in the European Parliament is to be discussed at least once a year with the party council. European MPs may also take part in meetings of the Folketing group.

The intention here is to meet the concern that the Danish and European policies of the party might begin to diverge if European MPs' relations with the main party bodies were not close enough.

PNP Conference

The Prime Minister and leader of the People's National Party (PNP), Michael Manley, in his presidential address on September 11 to the PNP's annual conference which had opened three days previously, warned party members of the dangers of disunity and announced that over the next 12 months he would assume personal responsibility for party discipline and organization. This followed a period of increasing tension within the party which subsequently resulted in the resignation as PNP general secretary and Minister of National Mobilization of Donald K. Duncan, announced several days after the end of the conference.

At the same time the PNP's deputy general secretary, three heads of department in the Ministry of National Mobilization and a parliamentary secretary in the Prime Minister's office also announced their resignations.

On September 21, Michael Manley announced that he would himself be taking charge of the National Mobilization portfolio upon Donald Duncan's resignation, which the Prime Minister described as regrettable in view of his "inestimable contribution" to the work of the party and the Government. The post of PNP general secretary was taken over by Ralph Brown (Minister of Local Government).

Canada

NDP Defeat in Manitoba

The New Democratic Party (NDP) Government of Edward Schreyer, which had been first elected in June 1969 and had been re-elected in 1973, was defeated by the opposition Progressive Conservative Party in the Manitoba provincial election held on Oct. 11. The final distribution of seats in the Legislature, compared with that after the previous election in 1973, was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>1977</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Labour Party</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>24.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservatives</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>12.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian People's Party</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>9.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centre Party</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socialist Left Party</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberals</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Progressive Party</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New People's Party</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>101</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The NDP lost 10 seats, leaving them with 19 seats in the 91-seat Legislature. The Progressive Conservatives gained 9 seats, increasing their total to 41, while the New Democratic Party fell to 23 seats. The Liberals remained at 5.

Party strengths at the dissolution of the previous Legislature in September 1977 were: NDP 31; Progressive Conservatives 23; Liberals 3.
On November 8, 1977, the Bureau of the Confederation of the Socialist Parties of the European Community met in Copenhagen under the presidency of the late Wilhelm Droescher. Anker Joergensen welcomed the representatives of socialist, social democratic and labour parties of the Nine. The Danish Prime Minister gave a detailed report about the preparation of direct elections to the European Parliament and explained the Danish position on European affairs. He confirmed that Denmark will stick to all its obligations under the Treaties. On the other hand Denmark is not prepared to take steps towards European union. Anker Joergensen gave the firm promise that Danish legislation for direct elections will be passed before Christmas this year.

In a declaration, the Confederation reminded the European Council of its decision to have direct elections in 1978 and asked the European Council to fix a date on its next meeting on December 5-6.

The Congress of the Confederation of Socialist Parties which will discuss and adopt a common platform for direct elections will take place on April 6-8, 1978, in Brussels.

Karel van Miert, President of the Belgian Socialist Party, was elected Vice-President of the Confederation. The other Vice-Presidents are now Sicco Mansholt (Netherlands), Robert Pontillon (France) and Ivar Noergaard (Denmark).

Another point on the agenda was unemployment in the EEC. After a detailed discussion with the Vice-President of the European Commission, Henk Vredeling, the Bureau of the Confederation decided to set up a common working party with the Socialist Group of the European Parliament to examine ways to fight unemployment.

The Confederation strongly condemned international terrorism. The Bureau asked the member-states and the EEC institutions to find a coordinated European approach to this problem. On the demand of the Socialist Group the European Parliament held a debate on terrorism during its November session in Strasbourg.

In Copenhagen the eleven member-parties of the Confederation set up a research foundation. This "Jean Jaurès Foundation" will have its seat in Brussels. The Foundation is planning to organize a seminar on European elections and the media, also in Brussels, in December 1977.

**Note:**

An Institute for Democratic Socialism has been formed in the United States under the presidency of the leader of the Democratic Socialist Organizing Committee (DSOC), Michael Harrington. Its aims are to encourage public understanding of the achievements and potential of democratic socialism and to further democratic socialist analysis of American society.

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Venezuela: Presidential Candidates

In a primary election held on July 17, Dr. Luis Piñera Ordaz defeated Jaime Lusinchi for the nomination as the candidate of Venezuela’s main political party, Democratic Action (Acción Democrática, AD), for the December 1978 presidential elections, obtaining 63 per cent of the votes cast. Dr. Piñera Ordaz was replaced in his post of secretary-general of Democratic Action by Alejandro Izaguirre, and his nomination was ratified by the AD convention on August 27.

In September the People’s Electoral Movement (MEP) selected Senator Luis Beltrán Prieto Figueroa (75), the party president, to stand for the presidency. (Both AD and MEP are members of the Socialist International).
This time-plan is subject to modifications and additions.